The investigation reveals how China acquires oil from countries sanctioned by the United States. It uses a shadow fleet of thousands of largely aging tankers operating under foreign flags owned through opaque corporate to continue acquiring oil from sanctioned exporters. Using ship-to-ship transfers off the coast of Malaysia, sanctioned crude is disguised by reissued certificates of origin, bills of lading, and cargo manifests that erase its sanctioned provenance.

The investigation finds that China uses monetary contributions, critical UN posts, and strategically deployed troops within UN peacekeeping forces to expand its authoritarian reach.

The Select Committee on China released a new investigation uncovering how China is using infrastructure in Latin America to advance its space capabilities and intelligence collection.

The investigation details how China uses the fleet to extend state power beyond its borders: leveraging fishing access for diplomatic purposes, subordinating civilian vessels to military command, and deploying the fleet for intelligence collection. The military integration is explicit in the seas closest to China, where it maintains a state-directed maritime militia drawn from fishing vessels.

The report builds on the Select Committee’s original bipartisan Ten for Taiwan report, which concluded that central to the Committee’s mandate is deterring CCP military aggression against Taiwan. Since that report’s publication, developments instigated by the CCP have increased the risk of conflict over Taiwan, underscoring the need to deepen U.S.–Taiwan economic, defense, and political cooperation to maintain peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait.

The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has pursued a decades-long strategy to dominate global critical mineral supply chains and manipulate commodity markets to advance the People’s Republic of China’s (PRC’s) geopolitical and economic objectives. This interim report examines how Beijing uses state subsidies, regulatory controls, and coordinated industrial policy to influence global markets for critical minerals such as rare earth elements and lithium.

The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) is straining with all its might to build a domestic, self-sufficient, semiconductor manufacturing industry in the People’s Republic of China (PRC). To do this, the PRC has been acquiring semiconductor manufacturing equipment (SME) produced by U.S. and allied companies to build in semiconductor fabrication facilities (“fabs”) in the PRC that produce a wide range of semiconductor chips, including advanced, foundational, and legacy chips.

At the beginning of the 119th Congress, the Select Committee on the Strategic Competition between the United States and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) launched an investigation into six U.S. universities—University of Maryland, University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign, Carnegie Mellon University, University of Southern California, Purdue University, and Stanford University.