Stranger Pings: Chinese Telecom Companies Infiltrate U.S. Infrastructure

A new bipartisan investigation by the Select Committee on China exposes the Chinese Communist Party's (CCP) infiltration and weaponization of Americans' communications and networks. The investigation found that “Chinese state-owned carriers remained deeply embedded in the U.S. internet ecosystem long after federal regulators had already found them vulnerable to CCP exploitation, influence, and control.” Although China Mobile, China Unicom, and China Telecom had their Section 214 telecommunications licenses denied or revoked previously, they retain extensive unregulated footprints in the United States.

“U.S.-based subsidiaries of Chinese telecommunications companies are beholden to the CCP, and they are a threat to all of us,” said Select Committee Chairman John Moolenaar (R-MI). "They make American customers promise to censor information according to the CCP’s laws, and they poison the domestic cyber infrastructure we rely on. All of this leaves us vulnerable to a new wave of state-sponsored cyberattacks from our nation’s biggest adversary. The CCP does not allow U.S. telecom companies into China. We must cut these subsidiaries out of our domestic infrastructure to protect the American people.”

“This report shows the importance of continued oversight of PRC-linked telecommunications companies operating in the U.S.. Particularly in light of the CCP’s Typhoon campaigns, Congress should continue to address risks to Americans’ data and ensure that the agencies responsible for securing our communications networks have the resources they need to respond to potential threats,” said Ranking Member Ro Khanna (D-CA). 

In March 2025, the Select Committee held a bipartisan hearing entitled “End the Typhoons: How to Deter Beijing's Cyber Actions and Enhance America's Lackluster Cyber Defenses.” In connection with that hearing, and in response to the CCP’s Salt Typhoon hack of U.S. telecommunications infrastructure, the Select Committee launched a bipartisan investigation of China Telecom, China Mobile, and China Unicom. After all three Chinese state-affiliated companies failed to cooperate voluntarily with the Select Committee, the committee subpoenaed them and conducted bipartisan transcribed interviews of personnel from the companies. 

In three key findings, the investigation concluded:

• China Telecom, China Mobile, and China Unicom’s U.S. subsidiaries are not truly independent from their PRC and Hong Kong parent companies.
• The FCC’s actions limit what the companies can sell, but it cannot remove the companies’ equipment, presence, or network relationships.
• These companies remain embedded in U.S. infrastructure, creating security risks for American Internet users through their integration with Chinese parent networks and supporting systems.

The investigation also revealed anomalous internet routing activity that corresponds with the timing of notable CCP-sponsored hacks against the U.S.. In light of these findings, the investigation expresses profound concern that these companies’ residual U.S. operations may help facilitate future malign cyber activities by the CCP in the United States.

The investigation ends by making policy recommendations for Congress to act on, with the goal of identifying and constraining -- and if warranted, completely removing -- foreign state-controlled network infrastructure posing a national security risk.

Policy Recommendations

• Codify the FCC’s authority to deny blanket authorizations and restrict domestic interconnection.
• Establish statutory authority over retained foreign-adversary infrastructure.
• Broaden Team Telecom and Information and Communications Technology Services (ICTS) jurisdiction over private commercial arrangements involving foreign controlled infrastructure.
• Mandate entity specific FCC Covered List determinations and fund targeted “rip-and-replace.”
• Fund internet routing-security enforcement and ensure federal agencies have the technical talent necessary to address foreign adversary threats.
• Require interim logging, monitoring, and recording until covered infrastructure is removed or mitigated.

Read the full report here.