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Investigation Details How Western Government Policy Enabled China's Rise in the Skies

November 19, 2026
Reports

Today, Chairman John Moolenaar of the Select Committee on China released a new report on the threats posed to American national security by U.S. and allied aerospace companies collaborating with the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and Chinese companies. The investigation details how American and European aerospace contractors inadvertently participated in the CCP's national strategy of military-civil fusion to develop lethal and advanced technology for the Chinese military.

"American and European companies transferred technology to China that could be used against our brave men and women in uniform. With the CCP’s military-civil fusion there are no private companies in China. The PLA will exploit civilian technology and use it to advance its military ambitions and that is what happened here,” said Moolenaar. "The U.S. and its allies should strengthen export controls and tighten investment restrictions on the aerospace sector to stop the transfer of vital technology that will empower our foremost adversary.”

Investigation Findings

  1. Western aerospace companies entered lawful commercial arrangements that transferred advanced technology, technical know-how, and Western expertise to Chinese aerospace firms.
  2. Honeywell, GE Aerospace, and Collins repeatedly sought and obtained licenses for controlled technology transfers involving PRC military end users and other military-linked entities as part of Chinese commercial aerospace platforms.
  3. Export controls relied on company due diligence even where commercial incentives favored continuity and past enforcement actions revealed compliance weaknesses.
  4. PRC-based joint ventures created a structural gap in U.S. national security review by allowing sensitive capabilities to move offshore outside the principal Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS) framework.
  5. Unilateral U.S. restrictions would disadvantage American aerospace companies without denying China access to many Western technologies when allied firms backfill the resulting business.

Policy Recommendations

  1. The United States should not allocate taxpayer dollars to companies that build adversary military capabilities that can be turned against the United States and its allies. 
  2. The Treasury Department should restrict outbound investment into China’s aerospace sector under its Outbound Investment Security Program, and Congress should codify this prohibition by amending it into the Comprehensive Outbound Investment National Security Act of 2025 (COINS Act). 
  3. The Federal Aviation Administration should not certify aircraft manufactured in China.
  4. Congress should pass H.R. 11047 Aerospace Transparency Act, requiring aerospace contractors doing business with DOW to disclose their relationships with U.S.-designated Chinese military companies, giving the Department the visibility it needs to assess and act on these entanglements.  
  5. The State and Commerce Departments should fundamentally reapproach how licensing for aerospace technologies is handled, reducing exports to adversaries generally, requiring full beneficial ownership transparency for all interested parties, denying dual-use exports or exports accessible by Chinese military companies, and enforcing violations with genuinely deterrent penalties. 
  6. Congress should pass H.R. 11048 Geospatial Intelligence Transparency and Security Act, directing the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency to assess the full landscape of commercial geospatial AI capabilities, identify those presenting the greatest national security concern, and transmit the findings to the Departments of Commerce and State to inform export control rulemaking and international negotiations.
  7. Subject acquisition of American aerospace companies by French companies to heightened scrutiny and a presumption of denial until they unwind ties to China’s civil-military ecosystem.

Read the report here.