

TEN MORE FOR TAIWAN

Policy Recommendations
to Deter Chinese Communist
Party Aggression



EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

In its original bipartisan report on Taiwan policy, *Ten for Taiwan*, the House Select Committee on the Strategic Competition between the United States and the Chinese Communist Party noted that “central to [the Select Committee’s] mandate is deterring CCP military aggression against Taiwan.”

Since *Ten for Taiwan* was published, developments instigated by the CCP have increased the risk of conflict over Taiwan. CCP actions over the last two years highlight the importance of deepening U.S.-Taiwan economic, defense, and other cooperation to maintain peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait. The United States’ goal is to deter war, which will require urgently employing all elements of national power.

The Select Committee has identified ten additional key bipartisan findings and recommendations to strengthen deterrence against CCP aggression towards Taiwan. Like the Select Committee’s *Ten for Taiwan* findings, this list is non-exhaustive. Instead, it provides a near-term roadmap for how the United States can comprehensively strengthen ties with Taiwan, deepen economic engagement, and expand the U.S.-Taiwan defense partnership:

1. **Clear political signaling from the United States is essential** for communicating American resolve to deter CCP aggression.
2. **Deepening U.S. economic ties with Taiwan strengthens deterrence**, bolsters Taiwan’s resilience, diversifies critical supply chains, and benefits the U.S. economy.
3. **The United States must expand all efforts and pathways to ensure Taiwan has the capabilities it needs to defend itself** in a conflict and against daily gray-zone threats.
4. **The United States must rebuild the American defense industrial base** to deliver the capabilities needed by the United States and our partners to deter and defeat aggression.
5. **The Pentagon must fill critical capabilities gaps for Indo-Pacific deterrence** while enhancing its logistics enterprise to sustain a protracted conflict in a contested environment.
6. **The U.S. must strengthen joint military and economic planning with allies and partners**, while accelerating U.S. military access and posture initiatives in the Indo-Pacific.
7. **It is essential to enhance Taiwan’s domestic resilience across a variety of scenarios**, including a protracted conflict, a blockade, and cyber-enabled coercion.
8. **The United States must support Taiwan in advancing its whole-of-society defense readiness** from active and reserve forces to civilian preparedness.
9. **Defending Taiwan’s international space and economic ties worldwide enhances Taiwan’s strategic resilience.**
10. **Leaders in the Indo-Pacific believe the PRC is closely monitoring the outcome of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, of which Beijing is the chief enabler through its “no-limits” partnership with Moscow**, and factoring lessons from its outcome into its cost calculation relative to a Taiwan invasion.

WHY TAIWAN MATTERS — NOW MORE THAN EVER

In its original bipartisan report on Taiwan policy, *Ten for Taiwan*, the House Select Committee on the Strategic Competition between the United States and the Chinese Communist Party (Select Committee) noted that “central to [the Select Committee’s] mandate is deterring CCP military aggression against Taiwan.” The Select Committee further noted the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) intensifying diplomatic and economic coercion of Taiwan, as well as the urgent need to deepen whole-of-government engagement with Taiwan to strengthen deterrence and promote American interests. “The flip side of economic deterrence” against the CCP, the Select Committee wrote, “is economic engagement with Taiwan.” The Select Committee also contrasted the CCP’s authoritarian threats with Taiwan’s existence as a vibrant democracy.

Now, in 2025, these pillars of the U.S.-Taiwan relationship—economic, defense, and our common values—are more important than ever.

Since *Ten for Taiwan*’s publication in May 2023, Taiwan has only grown more essential for America’s prosperity. According to 2024 data, Taiwan is America’s seventh-largest trading partner and tenth-largest export market.¹ Taiwan is also a key link in U.S. technology and manufacturing supply chains and is an important investor in the United States, spurred by billions of dollars’ worth of incentives from the bipartisan *CHIPS and Science Act*. In 2025, Taiwan semiconductor giant Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company (TSMC) finished construction of its second fabrication plant (“fab”) in Phoenix, Arizona, which will produce some of the company’s—and, by extension, the world’s—most advanced chips. In March 2025, TSMC announced it would increase its total investment in the United States to \$165 billion.² As Rep. Greg Stanton noted at the Select Committee’s May 2025 hearing *Deterrence Amid Rising Tensions: Preventing CCP Aggression on Taiwan*, “TSMC’s investment... \$165 billion under construction and announced in total, is the single-largest direct foreign investment in American history.”

The growing threat of a CCP attack on Taiwan therefore presents a particularly acute threat to America’s prosperity. According to one recent study, losing access to Taiwan’s semiconductors alone would push the United States into an “immediate Great Depression.”³ Such an attack would also devastate the world economy, with a second study estimating that a conflict would cause global gross domestic product to plummet by \$10 trillion, or ten percent in one single year—far worse than the economic devastation wrought by the Great Recession or COVID-19 pandemic.⁴ In short, a military conflict over Taiwan would have disastrous consequences for Taiwan, the United States, and the entire world.

A military attack by the People’s Republic of China (PRC) would also directly threaten U.S. national security and undermine international laws and norms. Congress recognized this threat when it passed the Taiwan Relations Act (P.L. 96-8; 22 U.S.C. §§3301 et seq.) in 1979, which provides that it is U.S. policy to consider “any effort to determine the future of Taiwan by other than peaceful means, including by boycotts or embargoes, a threat to the peace and security of the Western Pacific area and of grave concern to the United States.” The Taiwan Relations Act further declared that “peace and stability in the [Western Pacific] area... are matters of international concern.” As Ranking Member Krishnamoorthi stated at the Select Committee’s May 2025 hearing, the CCP must “know that America—on a bipartisan basis—stands for peace across the Taiwan Strait. But—we will not tolerate actions that put that peace at risk.”

A CCP conquest of Taiwan would position an aggressive and expansionist PRC at a key position within the First Island Chain, posing an immediate threat to America's mutual defense treaty allies such as Japan, the Philippines, and Australia. Furthermore, it would degrade the U.S. military's ability to defend and operate throughout the Western Pacific and American territory— including Guam and Hawaii—would become increasingly vulnerable to attack. As one U.S. Naval War College expert writes, a PRC military takeover of Taiwan would give Beijing “newfound strategic leverage” by “turn[ing] the southern flanks of Japan and South Korea” and increase its threat to the Philippines by “command[ing] the northern rim of the South China Sea.”⁵ Unsurprisingly, the CCP is aware of the immense geopolitical springboard it would gain from occupying Taiwan. As the Select Committee noted in *Ten for Taiwan*, one People's Liberation Army (PLA) handbook boasts that controlling Taiwan would make “Japan's maritime lines of communication... fall completely within the striking ranges of China's fighters and bombers.”⁶ Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi echoed this sentiment in November 2025, when she stated her assessment that, for Japan, “any action involving the use of force [against Taiwan], such as China deploying naval ships, can only be described as a survival-threatening situation.”⁷

Finally, failing to deter a PRC military attack on Taiwan would run contrary to some of America's most deeply held values. Taiwan is one of the world's most successful and vibrant democracies with a robust media, strong protection of civil liberties, and regular peaceful transfers of power. In contrast, the CCP commands an increasingly repressive one-party dictatorship that allows zero political dissent, denies fundamental individual freedoms, and is carrying out a genocide against the Uyghurs and other ethnic minorities in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region. The CCP is also attempting to erase the culture of the Tibetan and Mongolian populations under its rule while destroying civil liberties and the rule of law in Hong Kong, in violation of its pledge to respect Hong Kong's autonomy. The Taiwan Relations Act states that the “preservation and enhancement of the human rights of all the people on Taiwan are hereby reaffirmed as objectives of the United States.” As the Select Committee wrote in *Ten for Taiwan*, in the event of an armed CCP attack on Taiwan, “the Taiwanese people would pay a terrible price and their democracy would hang in the balance.”

Many have described the late 2020s and 2030s as a “danger zone” when it comes to the rising CCP threat against Taiwan, frequently citing 2021 congressional testimony from then-commander of U.S. Indo-Pacific Command, Adm. Philip Davidson, who warned that the PRC may be prepared to take military action against Taiwan by 2027.⁸ Yet 2027's significance to the debate over Beijing's threat to Taiwan stems not from retired Admiral Philip Davidson, but from General Secretary Xi Jinping himself and several key CCP milestones. First, in 2027, Xi is expected to secure an unprecedented fourth five-year term as leader of the CCP, its military, and the PRC government at the CCP's 21st National Congress. Second, in August 2027, the PLA will celebrate the centennial of its founding. Third, the year will conclude as Taiwan enters the final weeks of its 2028 presidential election, slated for January 2028.⁹ Finally, and perhaps most consequentially, 2027 marks the deadline set by Xi for the PLA to attain the capabilities needed to invade Taiwan while countering the U.S. military in the Indo-Pacific.¹⁰

According to the Pentagon, the PLA's 2027 milestone is specifically aimed at attaining the capabilities needed to counter the U.S. military in the Indo-Pacific and force Taiwan's leadership to capitulate to the CCP's terms.¹¹ While there is no guarantee that Xi will attempt an invasion in 2027 or beyond, it is incumbent upon policymakers in the United States and Taiwan alike to deter such a conflict by acting as if this threat will become manifest. As Chairman Moolenaar noted at the Select Committee's May 2025 hearing, the PRC represents a “very real, near-term threat [...] and the 119th Congress may be the last full legislative session with a chance to alter [CCP General Secretary Xi Jinping's] calculus. We cannot delay.”

In 2026, the United States will celebrate the 250th anniversary of the birth of its democracy, while Taiwan will likewise mark the 30th anniversary of its first democratic presidential election. Unfortunately, today democratic governance is under greater external threat in Taiwan and across the Indo-Pacific than at any time since the most perilous days of the Cold War. It remains imperative that, alongside our likeminded allies and partners, the United States continues to stand by the people of Taiwan, who are defending their democracy and freedoms in the face of the CCP's growing military and economic threats.

BACKGROUND

Since the Select Committee's *Ten for Taiwan* report was published, significant developments instigated by the CCP have increased the risk of conflict over Taiwan.

First, since May 2023, PLA air and naval activity around Taiwan has surged to unprecedented levels. The number of PLA aircraft violating Taiwan's air defense identification zone (ADIZ) grew nearly threefold from 125 in May 2023 to 339 in May 2025, spiking to new highs last summer following Taiwan President Lai Ching-te's inauguration on May 20, 2024.¹² The PLA also launched numerous large-scale military exercises surrounding Taiwan, including Joint Sword-2024A, Joint Sword-2024B, and Strait Thunder-2025A, during which it conducted live-fire missile tests over Taiwan and integrated ships from the PRC Coast Guard in a simulated blockade of Taiwan and its outlying islands. U.S. Indo-Pacific Command's Adm. Samuel Paparo has stated that such exercises are "dress rehearsals for forced unification."¹³

This attempted coercion not only endangers Taiwan's security but also threatens the security of U.S. allies such as Japan and the Philippines. Japan's Ministry of Defense 2025 annual defense white paper names the PRC's "external posture, military activities, and other activities," particularly surrounding Taiwan, as "the greatest strategic challenge" facing Japan and the international community.¹⁴ Likewise, the Philippines' National Security Policy (2023-2028) states that "any military conflict in the Taiwan Strait would inevitably affect the Philippines."¹⁵ Gen. Romeo Brawner, Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, reiterated this assessment during an April 2025 speech, stating that "if something happens to Taiwan, inevitably we will be involved."¹⁶

Meanwhile, the PLA also improved its ability to operate beyond the First Island Chain, such as by simultaneously deploying two of its aircraft carriers into the Philippine Sea, which creates new threats to Taiwan's east and to U.S. defense positions along the Second Island Chain.¹⁷ The PLA's growing military intimidation of Taiwan is a clear threat to peace and stability in the Indo-Pacific region and must prompt the United States and our friends, allies, and partners to prepare to deter not only an invasion of Taiwan but also a potential blockade or quarantine of Taiwan.

Second, the CCP has increased its full-force cyber, legal, and diplomatic coercion of Taiwan. Leading up to Taiwan's presidential election in January 2024, reports of malicious cyber incidents dramatically increased from 1,758 detections on January 11 to over 4,300 on January 12 with many of these attacks traced to IP addresses in the PRC.¹⁸ These attacks not only sought to compromise Taiwan's government institutions, law enforcement agencies, and financial entities but also influence and undermine Taiwan's democratic election process. From 2023 to 2024, Taiwan's National Security Bureau estimated the CCP's use of disinformation against Taiwan increased 60 percent, with the CCP disseminating more than two million pieces of disinformation in 2024.¹⁹ This type of propaganda has tangible consequences—the share of Taiwan's population that believes the United States is very unlikely or unlikely to help in a conflict has risen from 35.4 to 46.7 percent.²⁰

Economic coercion is another pillar of the PRC's strategy. Upon President Lai's inauguration, Beijing suspended tariff concessions across 134 items subject to the cross-Straits Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement, claiming that Taiwan had not reciprocated under the agreement and had continued "discriminatory prohibition" on goods from the PRC.²¹ The CCP has also escalated its malicious legal activities against Taiwan and its residents, releasing guidelines that further criminalize free speech, including through threatening the death penalty for anyone asserting Taiwan's independence.²² It has also passed laws, including the PRC Coast Guard Law and regulations promulgated thereunder, which are inconsistent with the PRC's international legal obligations.

Additionally, the CCP has waged a global campaign to harass Taiwan's allies and partners and distort discussion of Taiwan at the UN. In January 2024, the CCP coerced the Pacific Island nation of Nauru to switch diplomatic recognition from Taipei to Beijing, leaving Taiwan with only 12 diplomatic allies.²³ The CCP has also pressured Taiwan's unofficial partners, including South Africa, to downgrade Taiwan's de-facto embassies in their countries. Moreover, the CCP has continued efforts to misconstrue international law to limit Taiwan's rightful participation in international dialogues and fora. Some examples include Beijing demanding the removal of any reference to relations with Taiwan in the Pacific Islands Forum's 2024 communiqué and threatening lawmakers who planned to attend an Inter-Parliamentary Alliance on China conference in Taiwan.²⁴ The CCP has even launched a global disinformation campaign inaccurately misrepresenting 1971's UN General Assembly Resolution 2758 as an endorsement of the PRC's "One-China Principle," rather than a decision that applied only to the right to represent "China" in the UN. These acts of coercion threaten Taiwan's ability to determine its own future and constitute "forms of coercion that would jeopardize the security, or the social or economic system, of the people of Taiwan" of the sort that the Taiwan Relations Act requires the United States to maintain the capacity to resist.

These and other concerning CCP actions over the last two years highlight the importance of deepening U.S.-Taiwan economic, defense, and other cooperation to maintain peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait. The United States' goal is to deter war, which will require urgently employing all elements of national power. As retired Gen. Charles Flynn, former Commander of U.S. Army Pacific, succinctly warned in his testimony at the Select Committee's May 2025 hearing: "The urgency to restore credible deterrence in the Indo-Pacific has never been greater."

THE SELECT COMMITTEE'S WORK

Over the past two and a half years, the Select Committee has continued to examine the United States' relationship with Taiwan and options for strengthening deterrence across the Taiwan Strait.

Since the Select Committee overwhelmingly adopted its policy proposals in its *Ten for Taiwan* report in May 2023, Congress has passed many of the report's recommendations—primarily in National Defense Authorization Acts (NDAs) for FY2024 and FY2025—including using multiyear procurements to increase the number of long-range strike assets in the Indo-Pacific, deepening U.S.-Taiwan defense cooperation, expanding cooperation on defensive military cybersecurity activities, and calling for the Departments of Treasury and State to consult with European counterparts to prepare sanctions against the PRC in the event it takes hostile actions against Taiwan. The Select Committee aims to build on this legislative success by supporting the inclusion of this new report's policy recommendations in future NDAs and other legislative action.

In addition, Members of the Select Committee, including Chairman John Moolenaar, Ranking Member Raja Krishnamoorthi, Reps. Dusty Johnson and Seth Moulton, along with then-Chairman Mike Gallagher, traveled to Taiwan in February 2024 to meet with then-President Tsai Ing-wen, then-President-elect Lai, and other Taiwan officials following Taiwan's presidential election. This historic bipartisan delegation demonstrated strong bipartisan congressional support for the U.S.-Taiwan partnership ahead of Taiwan's presidential inauguration. During the visit, President-elect Lai highlighted that Taiwan is "facing a rapidly changing global geopolitical landscape and also tremendous pressure and diplomatic, military, and economic coercion" from the PRC, but that he hopes "the United States and like-minded countries will also continue to back Taiwan."

On November 20, 2024, the Select Committee held a bipartisan, interactive simulation run by the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) on the ability of the U.S. defense industrial base to support a major Taiwan contingency and the implications for deterrence in the Taiwan Strait. Chairman Moolenaar emphasized that "no matter where or when, the United States and our allies must have the military means to defeat our adversaries." Despite this requirement, the simulation demonstrated that a conflict over Taiwan would deplete critical munitions in a matter of days and take nearly two years to replenish, highlighting the need to revitalize the U.S. defense industrial base to ensure credible deterrence for Taiwan's defense.

In May 2025, Chairman Moolenaar and Select Committee member Rep. Stanton led a congressional delegation, which included Rep. Moulton and House Foreign Affairs Committee Chairman Brian Mast, to the Philippines, Vietnam, and Singapore to bolster cooperation among partners and allies for peace and security in the Indo-Pacific and the Taiwan Strait. During the trip, interlocutors in each country as well as from European and other regional countries participating in the annual Shangri-La Dialogue in Singapore emphasized the need to collectively strengthen deterrence against a CCP military attack on Taiwan given the serious consequences of such an attack on regional and global peace and prosperity. As one regional defense minister put it, a coerced PRC takeover of Taiwan would "change everything" for the region, and therefore a "fundamental collective effort" is required among regional allies and partners to prevent such an outcome.

On May 15, 2025, the Select Committee held a hearing entitled *Deterrence Amid Rising Tensions: Preventing CCP Aggression on Taiwan* with retired Gen. Charles Flynn, retired Rear Adm. Mark Montgomery, and former Deputy Secretary of State Kurt Campbell as witnesses. In the hearing, the witnesses highlighted "the urgency to restore credible deterrence in the Indo-Pacific" and maintain peace and stability in the region by supporting Taiwan, engaging with our partners and allies, and deterring any aggression against Taiwan, including the most likely scenario according to some experts: "a cyber-enabled economic warfare campaign." Notably, the witnesses highlighted that peace and stability enabled by the strength of the U.S.-Taiwan relationship "is largely a result of legislative action" and that "Congress' job is to... aggressively [push] legislation that makes the proper investments, both in weapon systems, munitions, but also diplomatically and economically." This type of "legislative leadership... needs to continue," the witnesses emphasized.²⁵

To that end, Select Committee members have introduced several pieces of legislation in an effort to continue to strengthen deterrence against CCP aggression toward Taiwan. For example, in May 2024, Chairman Moolenaar and Ranking Member Krishnamoorthi, alongside House Foreign Affairs Committee Ranking Member Gregory Meeks and Taiwan Caucus Co-Chairs Reps. Andy Barr, Ami Bera, Brian Fitzpatrick, and the late Gerald Connolly, introduced the bipartisan *Taiwan Allies Fund Act* to strengthen Taiwan's global network of friends and counter CCP coercion. The Members reintroduced the *Taiwan Allies*

Fund Act ([H.R.2559](#)) in April 2025. Sens. Chris Van Hollen, John Curtis, and Andy Kim introduced the Senate version ([S.1216](#)). In August 2025, Reps. Zach Nunn and Jill Tokuda, with Chairman Moolenaar and Rep. Ashley Hinson, introduced bipartisan legislation to establish a formal partnership with Taiwan to enhance joint defense industrial capabilities ([H.R.4860](#)).

In addition, Ranking Member Krishnamoorthi and Select Committee members Young Kim and Greg Stanton, alongside Ranking Member Meeks and Reps. Zach Nunn and Nicole Malliotakis, introduced the *Six Assurances to Taiwan Act* ([H.R.3452](#)) to codify the Six Assurances as official U.S. policy and require congressional oversight of any future attempts to alter or undermine them. On September 18, the bill was unanimously advanced through the House Foreign Affairs Committee. Chairman Moolenaar and Ranking Member Krishnamoorthi also joined Reps. Young Kim and Brian Fitzpatrick in introducing the *Taiwan Travel and Tourism Coordination Act* ([H.R. 2370](#)) to improve the cooperation between the United States and Taiwan with respect to travel and tourism. Sens. Marsha Blackburn and Brian Schatz introduced the Senate version ([S.733](#)). Chairman Moolenaar, Ranking Member Krishnamoorthi, and Rep. Kim also joined together to introduce the House version of a resolution to refute the PRC's false narrative about UN General Assembly Resolution 2758 ([H.Res.148](#)). Sens. Jim Risch, Jeanne Shaheen, Pete Ricketts, and Christopher Coons introduced a Senate version ([S.Res.86](#)).

The Select Committee has commended House passage of the *United States-Taiwan Expedited Double-Tax Relief Act* in the 118th and 119th congresses, and the Select Committee continues to advocate for its passage to strengthen U.S.-Taiwan economic ties, spur economic development, and encourage Taiwan investment in critical sectors like semiconductors.

Finally, the Select Committee is encouraged to see numerous provisions in the FY2026 House NDAA,²⁶ many of which were led or championed by Select Committee members, that would increase security assistance for Taiwan, enhance multilateral security cooperation in the Indo-Pacific, counter the proliferation of PRC arms exports, and support the revival of the U.S. defense industrial base. Among these are a critical increase in the authorized annual funding for the Taiwan Security Cooperation Initiative to \$1 billion. These funds are essential to rapidly bolster Taiwan's ability to defend itself and deter CCP aggression. As Adm. Montgomery testified before our committee, "siege proofing Taiwan and enhancing its ability to defend itself" ought to be a "first line of effort." The establishment of the Defense Industrial Resilience Consortium, moreover, would be a welcome and necessary step to identify and address barriers to expanding production capacity, accelerating innovation, and securing critical defense supply chains—all of which are necessary to meet our own military's requirements and sustain those of our allies and partners—like Taiwan.

TEN MORE FOR TAIWAN: KEY FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Building on this foundation, the Select Committee has identified ten additional key bipartisan findings and recommendations to strengthen deterrence against CCP aggression toward Taiwan. Like the Select Committee's *Ten for Taiwan* findings, this list is non-exhaustive. Instead, it provides a near-term roadmap for how the United States can comprehensively strengthen ties with Taiwan, deepen economic engagement, and expand the U.S.-Taiwan defense partnership while revitalizing U.S. defense industrial capacity to ensure a lasting peace in the Indo-Pacific.

1. **Key Finding: Clear political signaling from the United States is essential for communicating American resolve to deter CCP aggression.**

Through its actions, the PRC has made clear its willingness to unilaterally use force and coercion to change the cross-Strait status quo in direct opposition to U.S. policy laid out in the Taiwan Relations Act—a unique, statutory demonstration of America’s commitment to Taiwan. Beijing has increasingly demonstrated that it views the status quo as no longer acceptable, expanding its military incursions, acts of coercion, and threats of violence. These actions, left unchecked, increase the risk of catastrophic regional conflict. Meanwhile, as PRC aggression has grown, so too has the share of public opinion in Taiwan that openly doubts whether America would aid its defense during a conflict. This “U.S. skepticism” in Taiwan risks further encouraging PRC escalation. The CCP continuously assesses U.S. resolve toward Taiwan based on its actions, rhetoric, and legal commitments. To enhance deterrence and safeguard the status quo, America must not only strengthen its military capabilities—it must sharpen its political messaging to send a clear signal to both friend and foe alike about its resolve and commitment to Taiwan’s security.

Recommendation 1: Actively and consistently affirm America’s commitment to Taiwan’s security.

America’s commitment to peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait and opposition to PRC coercion, threats, or attempted conquest must be made unambiguous, clear, and consistently communicated. It must be clear across all levels of government that, as emphasized in U.S. law, any attempt by the CCP to alter the cross-Strait status quo by military or coercive means would unacceptably and directly impact the national security of the United States. Such an emphasis would be consistent with long-standing U.S. policy laid out in the Taiwan Relations Act but would also reduce the risk of miscalculation by Beijing, strengthen deterrence, and reassure our partners and allies in the Indo-Pacific region.

To further clarify the U.S. commitment to Taiwan, Congress should pass the *Six Assurances to Taiwan Act* ([H.R.3452](#)). Issued by President Reagan in 1982, the Six Assurances lay a critical foundation to ensure that U.S.-Taiwan relations proceed on their own accord and will not be a bartering chip when it comes to bilateral discussions with the PRC. The Six Assurances reaffirm that the United States will not agree to mediate between the PRC and Taiwan, will not pressure Taiwan to negotiate with the PRC, and has not agreed to set a date to end or consult with the PRC about arms sales to Taiwan. Unlike the Taiwan Relations Act, the Six Assurances are not yet statutory law. By codifying the Six Assurances, Congress can further reinforce America’s commitment to Taiwan, including to both Taiwan and PRC audiences.

2. Key Finding: Deepening U.S. economic ties with Taiwan strengthens deterrence, bolsters Taiwan’s resilience, diversifies critical supply chains, and benefits the U.S. economy.

U.S.-Taiwan trade both enhances our economic prosperity and our national security. Taiwan is a lynchpin of the global economy: Taiwan produces around 90 percent of the world’s most advanced semiconductors and is the world’s sixth-largest buyer of American food and agricultural products, creating thousands of good-paying American jobs. The more Taiwan interacts with the United States—and the rest of the world—the more resilient its economy will become, and the more other nations will have a direct interest in its continued prosperity and democracy.

Recommendation 2: Advance pending trade, tax, travel, and technology agreements with Taiwan to deepen investment, expand cooperation, and enhance economic integration. Congress should also pass legislation to deter and rapidly respond to PRC economic aggression, protect critical supply chains, and coordinate economic pressure with allies.

Congress is currently considering several proposals to resist CCP economic aggression against Taiwan by leveraging our two economies' strengths and complementarities. These include a bilateral trade deal, technology cooperation agreements, and the facilitation of travel and tourism. Technological cooperation has historically strengthened the U.S. and Taiwan economies: since 2014, for instance, TSMC has partnered with Apple, facilitating its commercial deployment of EUV lithography.²⁷ Congress is also considering legislation that would resolve the issue of double taxation between our economies. Although the United States has tax treaties with its other largest trading partners, it does not have a formal tax agreement with Taiwan. This creates significant legal and financial complications for taxpayers and puts bilateral investment at a disadvantage compared to bilateral investment with partners with which the U.S. has a tax treaty. Without a tax agreement, individuals and companies operating in both Taiwan and the United States may face taxation twice over. This dampens incentives for bilateral investment and collaboration, especially in high-tech industries like semiconductors. On January 15, 2025, the House of Representatives passed the *United States-Taiwan Expedited Double-Tax Relief Act* ([H.R.33](#)) by a vote of 423 to 1. The Senate should pass and the President should sign the *United States-Taiwan Expedited Double-Tax Relief Act* to deepen cross-border investment between the United States and Taiwan.

Similarly, Congress should pass the *Taiwan Travel and Tourism Act* ([H.R.2370](#)) to help boost Taiwan's economy, deepen cooperation between businesses, and facilitate improved cultural ties. Congress should also work with the U.S. Trade Representative to craft and implement a bilateral trade agreement with Taiwan to deepen the relationship between the two economies. In addition, Congress should encourage the Administration to sign additional technology agreements to facilitate the generation and transfer of cutting-edge science between the two sides. In concert with these efforts, the United States should continue to enhance export control enforcement and help Taiwan protect critical technologies and intellectual property.

A resilient U.S. economic strategy must also blend proactive economic engagement with Taiwan with credible consequences and reduced vulnerability to PRC coercion. Congress should likewise pass legislation like the *Countering Economic Coercion Act* ([H.R.1135](#)) and the *STAND with Taiwan Act* ([S.4789](#)) to empower the United States and its allies to respond in kind to PRC pressure including pre-authorized sanctions against PRC banks, firms, and key leaders that would supplement hard power deterrence. Congress should furthermore consider legislation to strengthen supply chain resiliency through carefully targeted tariffs against PRC-origin products in strategic sectors. Together, these steps would bolster Taiwan and America's economic security, strengthen allied coordination, and ensure preparedness for a crisis.

3. Key Finding: The United States must expand all efforts and pathways to ensure Taiwan has the capabilities it needs to defend itself in a conflict and against daily gray-zone threats.

Since the Select Committee's 2023 report, Congress has created a number of critical pathways to help strengthen Taiwan's self-defense capabilities, including establishing the Taiwan Security Cooperation Initiative (TSCI), extending Presidential Drawdown Authority to Taiwan, and providing Taiwan with Foreign Military Financing for the first time. Congress and the Executive Branch must now work together to ensure that these mechanisms, along with Foreign Military Sales (FMS), are leveraged expeditiously and to their maximum extent to guarantee Taiwan has the capabilities it needs.

At the same time, the CCP has only increased its gray-zone activities targeting Taiwan—including incursions into Taiwan's ADIZ, provocative naval patrols near Taiwan's main and offshore islands, daily cyberattacks, and coordinated disinformation campaigns—all of which seek to erode the material readiness of Taiwan's military, normalize aggression, and wear Taiwan down.

Recommendation 3: Expand, expedite, and streamline security assistance to Taiwan and establish mutually beneficial defense industrial cooperation programs.

Congress should continue the upward trajectory of defense cooperation with Taiwan in recent years by supporting the House of Representatives' FY2026 National Defense Authorization Act's increased authorization of funding for the TSCI to \$1 billion.²⁸ Expanding TSCI would improve consistent and predictable funding for security cooperation, training, and procurement, which are essential for Taiwan to build readiness for a potential conflict and resiliency against the PRC's daily threats. In parallel, Congress must expedite and streamline the bureaucratic process for delivering defense articles to Taiwan by passing legislation such as the *Porcupine Act* ([S.1744](#)), which would shorten the certification timeline for the United States to process FMS requests and expedite third-party transfers from U.S. allies to Taiwan.²⁹

The United States must also consider measures to expedite the Direct Commercial Sales (DCS) process between U.S. companies and Taiwan, such as by requiring the State Department to shorten its timeline for approving the transfer of technical data, training, or manufacturing rights needed to operate or maintain defense systems Taiwan purchases directly from U.S. companies. Congress should also consider directing the State Department to pre-approve these transfers for U.S. systems Taiwan already operates or is expected to request.

Furthermore, the Pentagon and Taiwan's Ministry of National Defense (MND) should establish a strategic partnership to jointly develop, produce, and sustain key capabilities needed both by Taiwan and the United States, including microelectronics, unmanned autonomous systems, and other priority systems and components supported by unique U.S. and Taiwan innovation and manufacturing capabilities.³⁰ This partnership was championed by the Select Committee in the FY26 NDAA, which passed the House in September 2025. To support this partnership, the Pentagon should coordinate with the Department of State, the Department of Commerce, and other relevant agencies to resolve bureaucratic hurdles, such as export controls, that could impede deeper defense industrial collaboration with Taiwan. U.S.-Taiwan industrial cooperation should be complemented by joint investment in critical mineral sourcing, extraction, processing, and refining to help end the U.S. defense industrial base's deeply concerning dependency on the PRC in these sectors, which is a key impediment to deterring CCP aggression.

Finally, Congress should insist the Pentagon fully implement the planning, training, and exercise direction provided to the Department in the Taiwan Enhanced Resilience Act provisions of the FY2023 NDAA, which included a requirement for the Secretary of State and the Pentagon to "establish or expand a comprehensive training program with Taiwan."³¹ To strengthen deterrence against PRC aggression, U.S. and Taiwan forces must significantly enhance their interoperability to increase familiarity and improve coordination in key operational areas. They must also improve defense consultative mechanisms to maximize the effectiveness of Taiwan's acquisition of defense articles and services and begin conducting a campaign to increase complex and persistent exercises and training events. Similarly, advanced operational and strategic planning efforts need to be accelerated between Taiwan's General Staff and U.S. Indo-Pacific Command and between the Pentagon and Taiwan's MND.³² Congress should require a report from the Pentagon outlining its plans to work with Taiwan to acquire capabilities and develop new concepts of operation for managing the PLA's daily gray-zone coercion, while continuing to focus bilateral defense cooperation on enhancing combat-credible deterrence.

- 4. Key Finding: The United States must rebuild the American defense industrial base to deliver the capabilities needed by the United States and our partners to deter and defeat aggression.**

Producing sufficient quantities of arms for ourselves and for our allies and partners depends on the United States' ability to rapidly revitalize our defense industrial base. Without robust domestic manufacturing capabilities, the United States will continue to face challenges in expeditiously providing capabilities to our warfighters and allies and partners across the globe, particularly with the world experiencing simultaneous crises across multiple regions. Inadequate domestic manufacturing capacity leaves the United States vulnerable to supply chain disruptions, lengthy production timelines, and insufficient production capacity, especially in key sectors like shipbuilding and drones, all of which undermine deterrence.

Therefore, the United States must undertake a generational effort to restore and modernize its defense industrial and manufacturing base to meet the demands of deterrence, surge production, and coalition interoperability. During a decade which has tragically seen the return of major conflicts to the global stage and the CCP's weaponization of global supply chains, America must be capable of rapidly fielding, scaling, and sustaining advanced defense systems—not only for our own forces but also to equip allies and partners such as Taiwan.³³

Recommendation 4: Urgently prioritize and expand efforts to build defense industrial production and sustainment capacity, accelerate innovation, and mitigate PRC supply chain dependencies.

Key armaments for which the United States must expand its production capacity include artillery shells and precision-strike systems such as mobile rocket launchers, mobile coastal defense cruise missiles, medium-range air defense systems, and man-portable anti-armor missiles, all of which are critical for helping Taiwan strengthen its deterrent posture. While Congress has taken steps to authorize multi-year procurement and expand production for some of these munitions, critical gaps remain. Moreover, past fluctuations in order volumes have weakened industrial readiness, underscoring the need to build on recent investments with a disciplined, multi-year procurement strategy, anchored in predictable funding, to give industry the confidence to expand production lines for these high-demand systems and avoid costly production breaks, long lead-time bottlenecks, and restart delays that could undermine surge capacity in a crisis. In addition, supporting the organic industrial base and investing in efficient sustainment and maintenance capacity is essential for improving U.S. military readiness both in peacetime and in the event of a conflict.

To reduce America's reliance on the PRC in key industries and demonstrate the ability to sustain a protracted conflict, Congress should pass the *SHIPS for America Act* ([H.R.3151](#)) to incentivize large-scale investment in the U.S. shipbuilding industrial base, which will also improve economies of scale for naval shipbuilding.³⁴ Congress should pass similar legislation to strengthen the U.S. drone industry and defense industrial base broadly by creating dedicated funds to spur investment in autonomous systems and in U.S. defense-related manufacturing capacity and workforce development that have been hollowed out by predatory CCP industrial policy and decades of offshoring manufacturing jobs to the PRC. Expanded tax incentives for American manufacturing offer a promising start but must be paired with bipartisan permitting reform legislation that streamlines the permitting and Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) process for projects deemed essential to national defense.

The United States must also accelerate defense innovation to stay ahead of the PRC's Military-Civil Fusion program. To this end, Congress must pass acquisition reforms like those in the *SPEED Act* ([H.R.3838](#)), which recommends streamlining or replacing the Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System (JCIDS) process to ensure that innovative capabilities can transition from concept to

fielding in months, not years.³⁵ Congress should also direct the Pentagon to design more munitions using Modular Open Systems Architectures (MOSA), which can increase defense innovation by allowing components and subsystems to be upgraded without redesigning entire platforms.

Finally, Congress should direct the Pentagon to improve the transparency and security of its supply chains, while working to address munitions bottlenecks, stabilize sub-tier supplies, and invest in workforce and infrastructure development. As supported by the Select Committee in the FY26 NDAA, the Pentagon should start by investigating the supply chains of its major weapons systems and critical infrastructure to identify and mitigate any reliance on PRC-dominated components. The Department should then address the findings of these audits by providing Defense Production Act (DPA) Title III funding to create secondary sources of critical components and materials currently sourced from the PRC.

5. Key Finding: The Pentagon must fill critical capabilities gaps for Indo-Pacific deterrence while enhancing its logistics enterprise to sustain a protracted conflict in a contested environment.

The Pentagon reports that the PRC possesses the world's leading hypersonic missile arsenal and has dramatically expanded its inventory of missile launchers and ballistic and cruise missiles in recent years. The PLA can now use these missiles to strike U.S. assets across the Pacific, Guam—and likely soon even the continental United States.³⁶

Meanwhile, military officials warn that the U.S. military's logistics enterprise is "woefully unprepared for what large-scale operations against a peer adversary will demand,"³⁷ which highlights the need to field next-generation logistics capabilities. Furthermore, the PRC's growing cyber, electronic warfare, and anti-satellite capabilities are increasingly threatening the U.S. military's ability to target, navigate, and communicate in a potential conflict.³⁸ Maintaining space dominance and the military's ability to sustain large-scale operations will, among other steps, require expanded capacity to rapidly launch and replenish space capabilities.³⁹

Given the rapid growth in PLA capabilities, the Pentagon must act with urgency to close critical gaps in its ability to shoot, move, and communicate across a highly contested, all-domain battlespace. This requires a comprehensive approach to modernizing air and missile defenses, expanding the U.S. military's logistics enterprise, and ensuring a resilient, domestic space launch ecosystem.

Recommendation 5: Enhance the U.S. ability to sustain forward-deployed forces by improving air and missile defense (AMD) capabilities, rapidly fielding next-generation sustainment and contested logistics platforms, and expanding space launch capacity.

Today, worrisome gaps remain in space-based missile defense, hypersonic defense, and persistent sensor coverage that must be addressed to protect the homeland and forward-deployed forces in a potential future high-intensity conflict. To help close these gaps, Congress should continue funding for the development of persistent mid- and high-altitude sensor platforms to provide wide-area missile detection, tracking, targeting, and resilient communications in contested environments.⁴⁰ Congress should also consider options for developing an interim hypersonic defense capability to bridge the gap until long-term solutions like the Glide Phase Interceptor are fielded.⁴¹ Meanwhile, Congress should continue rapidly developing and delivering directed energy systems to increase the magazine depth and decrease the cost of countering rockets, artillery, mortars, unmanned aerial systems, and cruise missiles.

Congress should also support Pentagon efforts to improve sustainment and logistics capabilities by increasing investments in intra- and inter-theater sea and air lift, prepositioned stocks, and bulk fuel storage and availability. In addition, it should continue support for air-refueling modernization and advancing blended-wing technology to extend the range, fuel efficiency, and operational flexibility needed for high-end conflict, which will be particularly important as the increasing range of the PLA Rocket Force's missiles force the United States to project and sustain power at greater distances.⁴² The U.S. military's ability to operate in a contested environment will be further enhanced by continued congressional support for developing and fielding the Transferable Rearming Mechanism, which will enable U.S. Navy vessels to reload their vertical launch systems at sea rather than returning to port where they will be out of the fight for weeks or months.⁴³

Enhancing U.S. cyber security is also essential to maintaining America's ability to respond in the event of a crisis. As Admiral Montgomery stated in his testimony before the Select Committee, "China may employ malicious cyber activity to weaken U.S. critical infrastructures in order to both paralyze military mobility and logistics enterprises and bring the American economy to a standstill."⁴⁴ To prevent PRC cyberattacks from undermining military mobility and the flow of forces to the Indo-Pacific—as well as from threatening the American homeland—America must redouble its cyber defenses and enhance coordination across all levels of government. Priority must be given to ensuring that bases, ports, airfields, and related critical infrastructure essential for military mobilization cannot be taken offline, while minimizing disruptions to the American economy and society as a whole.

Lastly, in a Taiwan contingency, rapidly replenishing U.S. space assets will be imperative to maintaining our qualitative military advantage.⁴⁵ To maintain timely and persistent access to space, Congress should continue to invest in building a resilient and redundant national space-launch enterprise. In particular, the Pentagon should consider establishing a Strategic Spaceport Program to integrate non-traditional spaceports into contingency and surge launch planning. Such an initiative would help create a distributed, defense-integrated network essential to quickly reconstitute satellites and preserve space-enabled targeting, navigation, and communications in the event of a conflict with the PRC. Simultaneously, state and local authorities should consider using available financing tools, such as tax-exempt bonds, to meet the growing demand for commercial and defense-related space launch facilities.

6. Key Finding: The U.S. must strengthen joint military and economic planning with allies and partners, while accelerating U.S. military access and posture initiatives in the Indo-Pacific.

Despite the United States being an "alliance superpower,"⁴⁶ as the historian Stephen Kotkin described to the Select Committee, the state of collective security planning between the United States and its allies for a potential conflict over Taiwan remains nascent. To strengthen deterrence against PRC aggression and ensure the ability to rapidly respond in a contingency, the United States must accelerate and expand Indo-Pacific basing, posture, and infrastructure initiatives, deepen allied and partner security cooperation, and create new multilateral maritime and defense networks. Success will require integrated Pentagon-State Department planning, sustained congressional oversight, and a keen focus on operational outcomes.

U.S. allies and partners in the Indo-Pacific have a direct stake in deterring a conflict over Taiwan, providing fertile ground for strengthening multilateral deterrence against PRC aggression. As Japan's late Prime Minister Shinzo Abe said in 2021, "a Taiwan emergency is a Japanese emergency, and therefore an emergency for the Japan-U.S. alliance."⁴⁷ And as General Flynn testified before the Select Committee, U.S.

allies and partners are essential for deterring the CCP, making it even more important for “the Department of Defense and the Department of State... to be hand-in-glove.”⁴⁸

Recommendation 6: Accelerate regional infrastructure, basing and access, and intelligence-sharing initiatives; further integrate U.S., Japanese, Philippine and other allied and partner forces along the First Island Chain; and establish new multilateral exercises and command and control structures.

The Pentagon should implement and report to Congress on a comprehensive strategy to strengthen deterrence in the Indo-Pacific through enhancing multilateral access and basing agreements, command and control structures, intelligence-sharing, and exercises and operations. This strategy should emphasize options to enhance integration between U.S., Japanese, Philippine, and Australian forces, including as part of a “One Front” concept spanning the First Island Chain from northern Luzon to southwestern Japan.⁴⁹ The Pentagon should also conduct and present to Congress a comprehensive audit of all planned or ongoing projects and locations where it is seeking to establish or enhance U.S. military access in the region, including joint headquarters, installations, prepositioned stocks, and forward operating locations. The audit should detail the expected timeline for the operational availability or completion of each project, as well as any financial, diplomatic, and logistical barriers to completion, as well as a prioritized list of projects and any resource or policy changes that would be required to accelerate them by 2027, 2030, and 2035. This assessment should inform congressional oversight and funding decisions to ensure the most critical lines of effort are completed on an accelerated timeline for maximum operational and deterrence impact.

Simultaneously, the Department of State should assess the most effective pathways for enhancing security assistance to Indo-Pacific partners, devoting additional resources to the programs that prove most effective in bolstering deterrence. It should also work with the Departments of Treasury and Commerce to continue efforts to coordinate economic and diplomatic plans with allies and partners inside and outside the region, including in NATO and the G7, as well as through AUKUS, the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue, and U.S.-Japan-South Korea and U.S.-Japan-Philippines trilateral pacts, to collectively deter and respond to CCP aggression.

Finally, the Pentagon should report to Congress on the potential benefit of establishing a Combined Maritime Forces–Pacific (CMF-PAC) or other similar structure, modeled in part on the Combined Maritime Forces (CMF) in the Middle East.⁵⁰ The goal of this new initiative would be to assemble a multilateral coalition incorporating both naval forces and coast guards across the region and beyond to operate together across a variety of missions, including through joint training, intelligence-sharing, and regular multilateral exercises. It would also allow allies and partners of varying capability, capacity, and regional concerns to address a broad variety of threats on an individualized, “opt-in” basis. In assessing the value of such a force, the Pentagon should also evaluate the benefit of establishing specialized Combined Task Forces headquartered in participating countries, including task forces focused on partner-navy training and disaster relief, safeguarding freedom of navigation, escorting and reflagging critical assets such as liquefied natural gas (LNG) tankers, combating illicit trafficking and IUU fishing in both the South China Sea and the Pacific, and protecting critical undersea cable infrastructure.

7. Key Finding: It is essential to enhance Taiwan’s domestic resilience across a variety of scenarios, including a protracted conflict, a blockade, and cyber-enabled coercion.

During the Select Committee’s May 2025 hearing, retired Adm. Mark Montgomery emphasized that Taiwan needs to prepare for a variety of scenarios, to include a military invasion, maritime blockade, and a comprehensive cyber-enabled economic warfare (CEEW) campaign.

As an archipelago, during both a protracted conflict and a blockade scenario, Taiwan would be highly vulnerable. It would face widespread disruptions, including to its import-dependent economy, energy shortages, and communications blackouts. Taiwan currently imports nearly all of its energy and can last only approximately ten days on current natural gas reserves.⁵¹ Current natural gas storage capacity sites would also likely be a high-priority target for PLA Rocket Force strikes on Taiwan. In addition, Taiwan's limited arable land and a small agricultural sector make it uniquely dependent on agricultural imports—including animal feed from the PRC. Taiwan would need ample food to outlast a blockade or protracted conflict. Taiwan would also need a robust stockpile of munitions and critical defense materials—coordinated with U.S. assistance—that would ensure Taiwan's forces have the necessary resources for self-defense even if cut off from external support.

A CEEW campaign is also an emerging threat. Under this scenario, the CCP would aim to weaken Taiwan's societal resilience and compel annexation without a direct kinetic conflict or act of war. Such a campaign would target critical infrastructure—including energy, communications, and financial services—while combining malicious cyber activity, disinformation campaigns, economic pressure, and military provocations to maintain relentless pressure over an extended period. This campaign would build on efforts from PRC-linked cyber actors like Volt Typhoon, which have increasingly targeted a wide range of government, critical infrastructure, and business networks around the world, including in the United States and especially in Taiwan. Public reports indicate that Taiwan experienced an average of 2.4 million cyberattacks per day in 2024.⁵²

Like with the conflict and blockade scenarios, the CCP is less likely to launch cyber-enabled economic aggression campaigns if it assesses that Taiwan can withstand the pressure. Building this resilience requires urgent coordination across central and local governments, the private sector, and civil society.

Recommendation 7: Work with Taiwan to expand and diversify its energy supply, increase imports and storage capacity of LNG, stockpile U.S. and allied agricultural and medical products, and strengthen its cybersecurity capabilities.

Addressing Taiwan's acute energy vulnerabilities is the most urgent step to strengthening its domestic resiliency. To start, this means diversifying Taiwan's energy supply and considering all energy sources including nuclear, LNG, and renewables. Additionally, the United States should work with Taiwan to invest in a network of small modular reactors (SMRs) that can help support critical energy needs. The United States must also urgently work with Taiwan to expand its energy imports—leveraging abundant and reliable U.S. supply—and build larger reserves. As a major energy supplier to Taiwan, especially of LNG, the United States should authorize the Development Finance Corporation (DFC) to support deals in Taiwan that meaningfully diversify energy supplies, increase storage capacity, and solidify existing production and distribution infrastructure.

Priority efforts include supporting Taiwan in modernizing and fortifying eastern terminal facilities, developing offshore receiving terminals, and partnering with nations such as Japan and the Philippines to also facilitate additional storage. To enhance readiness in the event of a PRC blockade, the Pentagon should also report to Congress on the feasibility and benefit of establishing a new multilateral exercise focused on building capacity to escort and reflag ships in a contested environment, as well to deliver humanitarian supplies and facilitate civilian travel.

While Taiwan has made progress when it comes to reserves of critical commodities, the U.S. must do more to work with Taiwan to expand its national stockpile systems and improve its storage infrastructure. One promising place to start is enhancing U.S. agriculture exports to Taiwan. While Taiwan ranks near the top-five largest markets for U.S. food and agricultural exports, the PRC remains in the top three.⁵³ Currently, American farmers export approximately 17 percent of their goods to the PRC, with soybeans and pork accounting for nearly ten.⁵⁴ Strengthening U.S. agricultural exports to Taiwan would not only provide Taiwan with a more stable food supply, but would reduce the American agricultural sector's reliance on the PRC market. Consequently, Congress should incentivize U.S. agricultural exporters to shift key commodities—including soybeans, meat, and feed grains—toward Taiwan.

To address Taiwan's growing cyber vulnerabilities, the United States must support Taiwan in prioritizing the protection of critical infrastructure that would be prime targets in a PRC CEEW campaign.⁵⁵ These sectors should receive priority access to advanced network defenses, real-time threat intelligence, and incident response capabilities, paired with mandatory cybersecurity investments, recurring exercises, and recovery planning. To strengthen coordination and develop new joint initiatives, the United States and Taiwan should establish a U.S.–Taiwan Cybersecurity Center of Excellence. In addition, the United States should detail additional U.S. cybersecurity experts to Taiwan's critical infrastructure facilities, with clear mechanisms to ensure corresponding recommendations are promptly adopted by such facilities, and expand intelligence sharing on CCP cyber threats. Strengthening resilience also requires institutionalizing public-private collaboration through secure, rapid threat-sharing channels, sector-specific incident response plans, and joint training exercises. A central civilian agency should coordinate critical infrastructure defense and public-private partnerships, as Taiwan grows its cyber workforce, expands partnerships with leading international technology and cybersecurity firms, and considers developing offensive cyber capabilities to impose costs on the PRC for malicious activity.

8. Key Finding: The United States must support Taiwan in advancing its whole-of-society defense readiness from active and reserve forces to civilian preparedness.

While Taiwan has made important strides in recent years to enhance the readiness of its reserve component and civilian population, urgent work must still be undertaken to enhance reserve component training and lethality while strengthening civil defense.

Recommendation 8: Assist Taiwan's civil defense preparedness while providing more opportunities for Taiwan's military personnel to participate in U.S. training programs and expanding pathways for long-term advisors to support Taiwan.

Congress should expand civilian defense and preparedness training with Taiwan to further improve Taiwan's military training, reform its reserves, and strengthen humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HA/DR) cooperation, while bolstering civil defense, preparedness and resilience. Deepening defense consultations will also allow both sides to better coordinate on defense procurement strategy, priorities, and process.

To start, the United States should expand billets for Taiwan in the International Military Education and Training (IMET) program, a State Department–authorized and Pentagon-implemented initiative that provides military education and leadership training on a grant basis to foreign military and defense-affiliated civilian personnel. IMET provides Taiwan's military personnel with professional military training. Furthermore, the United States should expand National Guard training programs with Taiwan similar to the State Partnership Program, which links U.S. state National Guards with foreign partners for

training, exchanges, and capacity-building.⁵⁶ This cooperation should particularly focus on reserve training, HA/DR, and civil-military engagement with emergency services and disaster-preparedness agencies. Such a program would provide regular, low-cost engagement, deepen institutional relationships, and facilitate greater interoperability.

The United States should also create long-term billets for U.S. military personnel to foster stronger relationships with Taiwan, provide continuity, and sustain momentum behind U.S.-led initiatives. In addition, the United States should expand rotations of additional U.S. military personnel—including trauma surgeons and combat medics—to train Taiwan’s medical corps and first responders in treating combat-related injuries. At the same time, the U.S. should establish pathways to bring Taiwan’s military medical corps personnel to the United States to acquire firsthand experience in key hospitals, advancing medical readiness.

Additionally, the United States should explore additional pathways for advising Taiwan’s armed forces and national security institutions on strengthening personnel vetting, classification protocols, and counterintelligence practices to prevent PRC espionage activities. Simultaneously, the U.S. military should help Taiwan professionalize its military justice system, including by drawing on the U.S. Uniform Code of Military Justice and the law of armed conflict to ensure Taiwan’s military personnel have the authorities they need across a variety of scenarios.

To further bolster Taiwan’s civilian preparedness, the United States should work with Taiwan to incorporate lessons learned from Ukraine’s defense against Russia’s war of aggression, including Ukraine’s widespread civilian first-aid training and effective territorial defense units of local volunteers and ex-servicemen. Resisting PRC aggression is a whole-of-society challenge. The readier Taiwan’s society is to resist aggression, the less likely that aggression is to occur in the first place.

9. Key Finding: Defending Taiwan’s international space and economic ties worldwide enhances Taiwan’s strategic resilience.

The PRC’s concerted campaign to exclude and isolate Taiwan from the international stage threatens Taiwan diplomatically and economically by calling into question its global standing and legitimacy, thereby lowering the bar for PRC aggression. The CCP has routinely exerted diplomatic pressure and coercion to exclude Taiwan from international organizations and multilateral fora. This campaign allows the CCP to propagate false narratives that directly undermine Taiwan’s ability to defend itself both at home and in multilateral environments. The United States must actively combat these efforts by promoting and defending Taiwan’s international space and global voice.

Recommendation 9: Prioritize efforts to expand Taiwan’s presence and role in international organizations, strengthen global partnerships, and support economic resilience through multilateral initiatives and targeted funding.

To begin, Congress should fully fund and expand efforts to counter and combat the CCP’s diplomatic coercion of third-party countries. This includes providing full funding to the Department of State’s Countering PRC Influence Fund (CPIF) and passing the *Taiwan Allies Fund Act* ([H.R. 2559](#); [S. 1216](#)) into law. These initiatives are critical to support countries that face growing CCP pressure over their official and unofficial relations with Taiwan. The CCP’s attempts to poach Taiwan’s diplomatic allies and discourage robust unofficial relations under threat of economic retaliation cannot go unanswered.

Congress should also advance Taiwan's international space through the passage *H.Res.148, "Clarifying the United States' position on UN General Assembly Resolution 2758 that the resolution did not resolve the issue of Taiwan's potential representation at the UN nor its sovereignty as relates to the PRC."* This resolution would reaffirm the United States' stance that UN General Assembly Resolution 2758 did not and does not align with Beijing's distorted view on Taiwan or distortion of the One-China Policy with the CCP's "One-China Principle." Instead, the resolution reaffirms that the UN has not taken a position on Taiwan's ultimate political status—thereby allowing Taiwan's crucial participation at the international level. Likewise, Congress should direct the Secretary of State and the U.S. Ambassador to the UN to advocate for and support mechanisms that would facilitate technical experts from Taiwan to engage in UN specialized agencies. This could include technical advisors from Taiwan acting as U.S. advisors under delegations attending events associated with the World Health Organization (WHO) or the International Telecommunication Union (ITU). Similarly, the U.S. representative to the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) should actively support Taiwan's observer status and cooperation in annual meetings and advocate on behalf of Taiwan in the event of its absence.

Congress should also increase funding for the Global Cooperation and Training Framework (GCTF), a joint U.S.-Taiwan initiative that showcases Taiwan's capacity in fields like global health, from \$4 million to \$8 million while directing the Secretary of State to develop a comprehensive strategy to expand international participation by inviting third-party countries to take part. By expanding GCTF's reach, Taiwan can better leverage its technical strength in areas such as public health, disaster relief, and digital governance. Such steps would increase regional integration and security while amplifying Taiwan's voice internationally.

To further institutionalize support, Congress should amend and update the *Taiwan Allies International Protection and Enhancement Initiative (TAIPEI) Act of 2020* to extend Section 5(b) reporting requirements—currently set to sunset in 2025—for an additional five-year period, to help support continuous oversight over Taiwan's diplomatic space. Furthermore, Congress should take steps to authorize the Director of the American Institute in Taiwan (AIT) to be considered, for all practical purposes, equivalent to the position of a U.S. Ambassador. This step would promote the AIT Director's inclusion in regional strategic dialogues and internal policy meetings with other senior-level officials, while also highlighting the importance of the United States' diplomatic presence on Taiwan.

10. Key Finding: Leaders in the Indo-Pacific believe the PRC is closely monitoring the outcome of Russia's invasion of Ukraine, of which Beijing is the chief enabler through its "no-limits" partnership with Moscow, and factoring lessons from its outcome into its cost calculation relative to a Taiwan invasion.

In its hearings and overseas travel in the Indo-Pacific, a repeated theme the Select Committee heard was that what happens in Ukraine will influence the Taiwan Strait, particularly as it relates to the cost that Xi assesses he might have to pay for aggression against Taiwan. As Taiwan's then-President Tsai told the Select Committee during its trip to Taiwan in February 2024, "if Russia wins... the CCP wins and will be encouraged." Likewise, during the Select Committee's trip to the Philippines in May 2025, National Security Advisor Eduardo Año opined that the outcome of the Russia-Ukraine war "absolutely affects China's thinking."

Central to Xi's calculus regarding Taiwan is his "no-limits" partnership with Vladimir Putin, through which the PRC has become the head of an emerging authoritarian bloc that is enabling and encouraging aggression across multiple theaters from Europe to the Indo-Pacific. As part of their partnership, Beijing

has become the chief enabler of the Kremlin's defense industrial base, allowing Russia to rapidly rebuild its military stockpiles and surge the production of armor, artillery, missiles, and drones in support of its invasion of Ukraine. The PRC has exported significant amounts of ball bearings, navigation equipment for aircraft, manufacturing tooling for munitions and vehicles, as well as a host of dual-use technologies, like semiconductors and drone components.⁵⁷ The United States estimated in 2024 that at least 70 percent of the machine tools and 90 percent of the microelectronics Russia has used to surge defense production have been imported from the PRC.⁵⁸ In return, Moscow has lent support to Beijing's development of military capabilities needed to seize Taiwan by force, reportedly agreeing in 2024 to transfer to the PLA and train its paratroopers to use special-purpose equipment critical for carrying out an airborne assault on Taiwan based on lessons from Russia's battlefield experience in Ukraine.⁵⁹

The PRC's support for the Russian war has prolonged the conflict and further put the sclerotic state of America's—and Europe's—defense industrial base into stark relief. The very fact that policymakers have been forced to consider tradeoffs between key theaters such as Europe, the Middle East, and the Indo-Pacific highlights how defense industrial base shortfalls have limited the decision-making space of NATO allies. Reviving transatlantic production capacity will help sustain Europe's defensive efforts while also increasing America's defense industrial capacity needed for deterring and, if necessary, defeating the CCP's military adventurism in the Indo-Pacific.

Recommendation 10: Impose costs on the PRC for its “no-limits” partnership and make Xi's Taiwan calculations more difficult, while strengthening NATO's military readiness and industrial capacity to deter and respond to authoritarian threats across multiple theaters.

To impact Xi's analysis, Congress should pass legislation like the *NO LIMITS Act* of 2025 ([H.R.2914](#)), led by Chairman Moolenaar, to sanction PRC defense-industrial and financial entities that enable Russia's military production, including firms supplying machine tools, semiconductors, and other “high-priority” dual-use items to the Kremlin's defense industrial base. These measures would directly target Beijing's role as the chief enabler of Russia's war machine and impose meaningful costs on the CCP unless it changes course. The U.S. can likewise impact Xi's calculations by working with allies and partners across the Indo-Pacific to diversify critical supply chains and reduce their economic dependence on the PRC—thereby expanding their decision-making space in the event of a crisis.

To strengthen allied deterrence and industrial resilience, the United States and its allies should leverage the Pentagon's Partnership for Indo-Pacific Industrial Resilience (PIPIR) initiative to align production priorities, streamline export controls, and scale co-production of critical systems supporting both the European and Indo-Pacific theaters. Expanding collaboration through PIPIR would accelerate shared defense production, sustainment, and supply-chain resilience across allied industrial bases. At the same time, the United States should support allied efforts to significantly increase defense spending in line with recent commitments—helping urgently expand the readiness and capacity of the transatlantic and Indo-Pacific defense ecosystems to meet two-theater demands. The United States should also encourage both European and Asian allies to provide direct or indirect security assistance to Taiwan through PIPIR or similar initiatives.

Finally, NATO militaries can and should directly contribute to deterring CCP aggression in the Indo-Pacific. Transits through the Taiwan Strait and South China Sea and regional port visits by NATO allies emphasize to the PRC that aggression would bring a global response—not merely a regional one. To this end, Congress can promote this positive role for NATO and E.U. militaries in the region by advising the Pentagon to work with NATO allies to better coordinate deployments to the Indo-Pacific while

simultaneously meeting their commitments to European security, including by documenting the capabilities, frequency, and deterrent impact of NATO and E.U. military deployments to the region.

CONCLUSION: DETERRENCE MUST NOT FAIL. WE NEED TO ACT.

From Europe to the Middle East, the world has been reminded of the catastrophic consequences of war. Our authoritarian adversaries have proven once again that peace is not a given and that if would-be aggressors perceive a strategic advantage, they will strike. The task now falls to the United States, Taiwan, and our allies in the Indo-Pacific and around the world to learn from these failures of deterrence and move with urgency and resolve to prevent a similar catastrophe from befalling Taiwan. The CCP's aggressive designs are on full display. Through our rhetoric and actions, the United States must make clear to Beijing they will fail.

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