

The Chinese Communist Party (CCP)’s Policies in Xinjiang: Overall Strategy, Central Government Involvement, and Evidence for a Systematic Attack on a Civilian Population as well as Genocide

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Dr. Adrian Zenz
*Senior Fellow and Director of China Studies
Victims of Communism Memorial Foundation
Washington, D.C., USA*

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NOTE: Please note that this written testimony is a summary of the author’s own work. It does not represent a summary of all scholarly work on the subject. Recommended further readings and sources are listed below the references.

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1.0 Introduction and Methodology

From 2017, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) embarked on a campaign of mass internment in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR) in the northwest of the People’s Republic of China that has swept up perhaps 1-2 million members of ethnic groups into re-education camps (Zenz 2018a, 2019b, 2022a, 2022b). This has been referred to as the largest incarceration of an ethnoreligious minority since the Holocaust. Beijing’s policies in the region have included the separation of children from parents through boarding schools, targeting of Uyghur intellectual and religious elites, forced labor and birth prevention.

New evidence from classified government documents shows that this campaign was implemented following a secret 5-year plan with the direct support of the central government (Zenz, 2022b). Section 6.4 below contains a list of central government officials implicated in the planning, execution and support of the atrocities that are recommended to be sanctioned by the U.S. government. Sections 7.1 to 7.5 discuss the complicity of U.S. companies in the atrocities.

The author's research uses a wide range of documents. Most of these consist of publicly-accessible material obtained through government websites or the Chinese internet in general, such as: government reports, state media reports, government budgets, procurement and construction bids, recruitment notices, propaganda accounts that reflect the implementation and/or effect of relevant policies; as well as a cache of thousands of internal (non-public) government documents obtained through local government social media networks (the "Xinjiang QQ Files"), that contain information such as spreadsheets of locals in ethnic minority regions by villages with their internment, education or labor status. On several occasions, the author was given leaked or hacked internal and classified government documents from Xinjiang that underscored public documents and witness statements and shed light on leadership attitudes and the implementation of state policies related to this mass atrocity: the "China Cables" (Zenz 2019b), the "Karakax List" (Zenz 2020a), the "Xinjiang Papers" (Zenz, 2021d) and the "Xinjiang Police Files" (Zenz 2022a, 2022b).

In 2017 and 2018, the author developed an investigative approach to discourse analysis to elucidate surreptitious state policies (Zenz, 2018; 2019a). This approach was used to first document the campaign of mass internment by (a) identifying the genesis and usage of key terms, and (b) ascertaining the development of related policy frameworks based on triangulated documentary evidence at different administrative levels (from autonomous region to counties and townships). Having established basic conceptual cornerstones, the research then proceeded to assess policy implementation through a triangulating analysis of diverse related sources (state reports, budgets, procurement bids, propaganda stories) in connection with witness accounts. Relevant sources are identified through extensive searches based on relevant terms (keywords) and whether they fit into the related policy framework. Chinese state speeches, policy texts, and related directives or implementation reports form series of intertextual chains, whereby official texts draw on other texts (Zhou and Qin 2020, 3). This process is facilitated by recurrences of "[p]olitically binding standard phrases" that steer political discourse and streamline policy implementation (Heilmann 2017, 313). The analysis also includes state propaganda material, reading between the lines of propaganda statements to glean crucial additional evidence.

2.0 A Concise Overview of the Chinese Government's Evolving and Long-Term Strategy of Targeting Xinjiang's Ethnic Minority Populations Through Multiple Coercive Policies

Beijing carefully prepared its campaign of subjugating the Uyghurs and other ethnic minorities in Xinjiang through an unprecedented build-up of different types of police forces, complemented by an advanced surveillance system based on the latest technologies (Roberts, 2020; Zenz, 2018c). Chen Quanguo, Xinjiang's Party Secretary between 2016 and 2021, was selected for his expertise and innovation in repressing minority dissent in Tibet (from 2011 to 2016; Leibold, 2020; Zenz and Leibold, 2017). Chen used the first 9 months of his reign in Xinjiang (mid-2016 to spring 2017) to prepare the ground through large-scale security recruitments, then embarked on the internment campaign in tandem with sending another wave of cadres to the countryside to act as informants (Zenz and Leibold, 2017; Zenz, 2020a).




Figure 1: Total police recruitment by type of police force XUAR wide, 2006-2017. Source: Zenz and Leibold (2019).

Beijing’s long-term strategy in Xinjiang consists first in an internment and imprisonment campaign that intimidates the population and removes key influencers by eventually sentencing them to long prison terms (Conrad et al., 2020; Zenz, 2018, 2019b, 2020a, 2022a, 2022b). The detentions frequently targeted middle-aged males, especially heads of households and other social influencers. Their release is dependent on the “good behavior” of their family members. Once released, they are being carefully monitored and liable to return to the camps if they behavior does not conform to government expectations. Most are released into different forms of coercive labor. The internment campaign serves as an intermediate, medium-term effort to break the soul of the minorities, render them docile, and pave the way for the long-term strategy. Many important intellectuals and cultural influencers have been sentenced to long prison terms to eliminate their socio-cultural influence – these are potential death sentences.

The Xinjiang Police Files contain internal spreadsheets from the county of Konasheher showing the personal information of approx. 286,000 individuals – basically the entire county population in 2018 (Zenz, 2022a).¹ They indicate that approx. 12.1 to 12.5 percent of the county’s ethnic adults were in some form of internment in re-education, detention or prison facilities, providing new evidence for the vast scale of the mass internments. This means that Konasheher’s combined per capita internment/imprisonment rate was over 64 times higher than China’s national imprisonment.²

The Xinjiang Police Files further contain detailed re-education camp security instructions describe special police units carrying military assault weapons and show guards handcuffing detainees (Zenz, 2022a). Candid internal speeches show leading official’s impassioned demands to treat persons from ethnic groups like dangerous criminals, and to readily open fire to stop escapees and to safeguard the camps. Besides QBZ-95 assault rifles that are also used by the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), internment camp police forces use handguns, anti-riot guns, and military-grade machine guns (the QBB-95). The

¹ According to government statistics, the Konasheher county adult population in 2018 was approx. 284,000 (Xinjiang Statistical Yearbook 2019, table 3-9).

² China’s national figure excludes an unknown number of persons that may potentially still be detained in the formally abolished Re-education Through Labor (RETL), or those held in detention centres.

document mandates that when responding to incidents, the forces are to “decisively carry out armed strikes, language that reflects Chen Quanguo’s demand that not even one single person must escape alive from a detention facility. Watchtower guards are to be armed with QBU-88 sniper rifles and tripod-mounted machine guns to provide “suppressing fire” against potential intruders. When transferred between camps, female and male detainees are to be shackled behind their backs and hooded. The image material shows handcuffed detainees receiving forced injections. Images of police exercises from the Tekes Detention Center show detainees shackled, cuffed, hooded, and placed into a tiger chair for interrogation (camp survivors have stated that they were placed into tiger chairs for interrogation and torture).




Image material from the Xinjiang Police Files, source: Tekes County Detention Centre. Image taken on September 28, 2017, and February 14, 2018, with a Canon EOS60 DSLR and an EF-S18-55mm zoom lens (camera serial number: 0421500837). The author added the magnified crop of the injection procedure to the bottom left image, and cropped the bottom-right image with the detainee in the tiger chair.

The second aspect of this strategy is parent-child separation. Children are reared by the state in highly securitized boarding school environments where they must speak Chinese, cannot practice religion, and are raised as loyal followers of the Party (Zenz, 2019a). This is designed to win over and domesticate the young generation. Between 2017 and 2019, the numbers of boarding students in primary and middle schools (grades 1 to 9) increased by 76.9 percent, from 497,800 to 880,500. This increase of 382,000

boarding school students occurred during the time frame of the internment campaign, and would have predominantly taken place in minority regions.³ New local government data from Yarkand county (Kashgar) shows over 10,000 mostly Uyghur children in “hardship” due to one or both parents detained. About 1,000 of these children have both parents in detention.⁴ A number of them have been put into state orphanages, some of which are directly next to schools.

The third aspect is forced labor, by which men and women are made to work in full-time, labor-intensive factory work (Zenz, 2019c, 2020c, 2021a). This makes the expensive security apparatus financially more sustainable, separates the nuclear family, gives the Party greater control over and more time with each family member, maximizes state control over the young generation, and breaks the intergenerational chain of transmitting the cultural and religious heritage. Since 2020 and especially under Xinjiang’s new party secretary Ma Xingrui, a technocrat from Guangdong experienced in economic development, Xinjiang has been shifting from Chen Quanguo’s highly mobilizational, campaign-style labor transfers to a more normalized and institutionalized strategy that emphasizes maintaining labor placement achievements through intensified monitoring (Zenz, 2022c, also below). Xinjiang’s 13th Five-Year Poverty Alleviation Plan first specified the creation of an “Unemployment Monitoring and Early Warning System” (失业监测预警机制) to ensure achievement of employment targets. Xinjiang’s 14th Five-Year Plan for Employment Promotion (2021-2025) mandated, in the critical “guiding thought” section that outlines the plan’s core principles, that not just one person per household but “every single person who is able to work is to realize employment”. As a result of this intensification, labor transfers reached a record 3.17 million person-times in 2021. In 2021, Xinjiang sent 400,000 cadres to investigate and monitor the income situations of 12 million rural households through an “early prevention, early intervention, early assistance” campaign that identified 774,000 households for “real-time monitoring”. Consequently, the new measures further prevent transferred Uyghurs from leaving their workplaces without state approval, reinforcing potential family separations.

Fourth, this strategy is coupled with a drastic reduction of birth rates to slow ethnic minority population growth, contain or even decrease total population size, rendering the population easier to control (Zenz, 2020b, 2021b, 2021e). Significantly lower numbers of children make it easier for the state to focus resources on indoctrinating the young generation, to promote more social control and assimilation by subjecting minority populations to greater ethnic mixing with the Han, and to reduce the need for policing and security. Fifth, this strategy is secured at the international level through various pressure strategies and a global elite capture of multilateral institutions, including the United Nations, the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC), and the European Union.

In sum, Beijing’s population control strategy consists of a combination of internment and imprisonment, coercive labor, parent-child separation, and birth prevention. All four of these operate in tandem. Key intellectuals and community influencers have been sentenced to prison terms of often around 20 years, removing their influence and curbing intergenerational cultural transmission. Forced labor separates families and enables greater state control over the next generation. Birth prevention is the cornerstone of raising Han population shares and neutralizing minority groups through embedding and dilution. Over the next 20 years, all of these aspects will be operating in tandem. Within this time frame, we can expect a substantial destruction in part resulting from birth prevention together with a severe impact on the distinct identity and unique characteristics of these groups as groups.

The most concerning aspect of official and academic discourses about these minorities is that they are demonized and framed as a “problem” that threatens an otherwise “healthy” society. Some Chinese scholars even called it a “human problem” (Zenz, 2021b). This language is akin to purported statements

³ Source: <https://adrianzenz.medium.com/story-45d07b25bcad>.

⁴ Source: <https://adrianzenz.medium.com/story-45d07b25bcad>.

by Xinjiang officials that problem populations are like “weeds hidden among the crops” where the state will “need to spray chemicals to kill them all”. While this statement itself refers to re-education in camps and not directly to mass slaughter, the framing of Uyghurs and others as a human problem, and their concentrated population and growth as a threat to China’s national security, is a cause for grave concern.

The secret central government documents contained in the Xinjiang Papers provide important new evidence regarding the intent behind the policies implemented in Xinjiang after 2014 (Zenz, 2021c, 2021d, 2021e). In a top-secret speech, Xi argues that the Belt and Road Initiative, his signature project, requires a stable domestic security environment. He asserts that the entire country’s national security and the achievement of the CCP’s major goals in the 21st century are in jeopardy if the situation in southern Xinjiang cannot be brought under control. Xi argues that the “stability across Xinjiang and even the whole country depends on southern Xinjiang” (Central Office Bulletin, 2014a, p.29). In both of his speeches, Xi argues that the achievement of that goal is a matter of China’s “national security” (Central Office Bulletin, 2014a, p.3, 6, 35; Central Office Bulletin, 2014b, p.2,4).

Statements and demands made by Xi and other central government figures can be linked to the following subsequent policies: mass internment for re-education, poverty alleviation through coercive labor transfers, “optimizing” the ethnic population distribution by increasing Han population shares and adjusting birth control policies in ethnic regions, criminalizing customary religious practices, and the implementation of Chinese language-focused education in centralized boarding schools. The significance of such connections for atrocity determinations is as follows: if a systematic attack against a civilian population is carried out as part of a long-term strategy pursued by the central government in Beijing, and if that strategy is said to be of great importance to ensuring China’s national security, then it is far more likely that related policies (and the resulting human rights violations) are systematically and rigorously pursued into the long-term – until the stated or implied goals are reached.

Another central government figure who made important remarks on the state’s wider political intentions in Xinjiang is Yu Zhengsheng (俞正声). In 2014, he was head of the Central Committee Xinjiang Work Coordination Small Group (中央新疆工作协调小组) and chairman of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC; 中国人民政治协商会议全国委员会) – the latter post made him Beijing’s fourth-highest ranked official at the time. Yu emphasizes that in the current “painful period of interventionary treatment” (干预治疗阵痛期), the achievements of Xinjiang Work goals are paramount, not only for the region, but for the entire nation. Like Xi, he notes that the achievement of stability maintenance is a matter of “national security” (国家安全). To quote:

We must thoroughly comprehend that doing a proper job in Xinjiang is not only a matter concerning the region, but also a major issue for the whole party and the entire country. If the Xinjiang situation is not handled properly, it will affect the overall situation regarding reform, development and stability of the country, and the realization of the “Two Centennial Goals.” (Central Office Bulletin, 2014b, p.64).

China’s Two Centennial Goals are 1) to “build a moderately prosperous society” by 2021, the centenary of the CCP, and 2) to “build a modern socialist country that is prosperous, strong, democratic, culturally advanced and harmonious” by 2049, centenary of the People’s Republic of China (Xinhua, 2017b). Together, they arguably constitute Beijing’s most important political goals in the coming decades.

In tandem, the evidence demonstrates the intent behind a systematic attack on the ethnic population in Xinjiang and/or the intent to destroy this population in part: Beijing’s intent (both inferred and explicitly stated) behind these actions and policies is to effectively contain the perceived threat posed by a

concentrated, growing and increasingly resistant ethnic population especially in southern Xinjiang, in order to:

- a) Safeguard China's domestic social stability
- b) Safeguard China's national security, as perceived Chinese Communist Party (CCP)
- c) Achieve the politically important Two Centennial Goals (explained above)
- d) And therefore, safeguard the long-term rule of the CCP and the personal role and leadership of Xi Jinping

The stated intent behind the policies implemented in Xinjiang is the long-term survival of the political leadership in Beijing that is mandating and implementing these policies. A discussion of the involvement of central government officials in policies related to the atrocities carried out in Xinjiang can be found in section 6.0 below.

3.0 Birth Prevention and Birth Rate Declines in Xinjiang's Ethnic Regions

The text below is adapted from Zenz, A. (2021b) 'End the Dominance of the Uyghur Ethnic Group': An Analysis of Beijing's Population Optimization Strategy in Southern Xinjiang. Central Asian Survey. 40 (3): 291-312. <https://doi.org/10.1080/02634937.2021.1946483>

Chinese family planning policies were introduced in the 1980s to reduce population growth, but they have also been associated with eugenic purposes of “upgrading population quality [素质]” (Hong-Fincher, 2018, p.180). Kipnis (2007, p.393) has pointed out the intimate link between discourses of improving population “quality” (素质) and limiting population quantity through family planning. Discourses of “population quality” have been especially pertinent regarding ethnic minority women, who are assumed to possess a “lower quality” (低素质): Xinjiang's officials have argued that “worryingly high birth rates” among Uyghur women have a negative effect on “population quality in the region, posing risks to social stability” (Hong-Fincher, 2018, p.180).

In the context of Xinjiang's “people's war on terror” since 2014, official discourses shifted. Rather than just being a population with a “low quality” (Byler, 2020), Uyghurs began to be framed as something akin to a biological threat (Roberts, 2020). Xinjiang's officials have argued that the Uyghur population suffers from an “illness” of the mind that must be “cured” through re-education, and that rooting out religious “extremism” is akin to “eradicating... tumors” (Zenz, 2018b, p.20-21). Ethnic minorities are divided into “safe, average, and unsafe” populations (Tobin, 2020, p.237; Zenz, 2020a, Section 3.4).

In early 2016, the Chinese government abolished its decade-long one child policy, permitting all families to have two children (PRC Government, 2016). Since then, the state has actively encouraged couples to have more children – what researchers call “political steering” to optimize population trends (Alpermann and Zhan, 2019). In China's northwestern Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR), high natural population growth rates have long been a subject of concern for the authorities (Zenz, 2020b). Mandatory family planning was implemented for Xinjiang's Han starting in 1975 (Sautman, 1997, p.6). In 1983, the region sought to limit urban ethnic minority families to two children, rural minority families to three children, and those in remote areas to four. The enforcement of these measures sparked a demonstration in 1985, and predominantly Muslim ethnic groups were subsequently permitted to have up to four children (Sautman, 1997, p.7).

Amid criticisms of preferential policies towards ethnic minorities by proponents of the PRC's Second Generation Ethnic Policy, efforts to roll back preferential birth quotas gradually gathered pace (Leibold,

2014). In 2014, after Xi Jinping’s visit to Xinjiang, the region’s party secretary Zhang Chunxian argued that all ethnic groups should have equal birth quotas (Cliff, 2016, p.204). In 2015, a senior Xinjiang official argued that the region needed to combat “worryingly high birthrates” (Hong-Fincher, 2018, p. 180). In 2017, when large numbers of ethnic minorities were interned in re-education camps, the region issued an updated family planning policy that permitted Han to have the same number of children as minorities: two children for urban and three for rural families (Zenz, 2020b, p.10).

Since then, Beijing’s family planning policies in Xinjiang rapidly became draconian. Starting in 2018, birth control violations were liable to be punished with extrajudicial internment (Zenz, 2020b, pp. 10-11). In 2018, the region performed 243 sterilization procedures per 100,000 population, compared to 33 per 100,000 in the rest of the country (Zenz, 2020b, Figure 9). By 2019, at least 80 percent of women of childbearing age in parts of southern Xinjiang were subject to forced placement of intrauterine devices (IUDs) or sterilization (Zenz, 2020b, p.12).

A detailed examination of Xinjiang’s natural population growth shows that rates across all minority counties began to decline in 2015—the very year that the government began to single out the link between population growth and “religious extremism” (see Figure).




Figure 5. Calculated by the author based on annual Xinjiang Statistical Yearbooks (tables 3-6 and 3-7), and local Social and Economic Development Reports. “Minority counties” have an ethnic minority population share of 50 percent or higher. Combined Han and minority counties growth rates are weighted by population.

Xinjiang has been performing drastically increasing numbers of per capita sterilizations in Uyghur regions (Zenz, 2020b, also below). Nationwide, per capita sterilization procedures plummeted after the national family planning reform, which from January 2016 permitted Chinese citizens to have two children (China Brief, February 28). In sharp contrast, sterilizations in Xinjiang surged in 2017 and 2018 (see Figure 9). However, on a per capita basis, overall figures remain far below those of the two Uyghur regions. Between 1998 and 2018, China sterilized a combined total of 2,557 persons per 100,000 of the total population; but in a single year, Guma County and Hotan City scheduled to sterilize 2,998 and 7,322 respectively. In 2018, Xinjiang sterilized 1.1 percent of all married women of childbearing age. For 2019, Hotan City was

scheduled to do the same to 34.3 percent of such women, and Guma County to 14.1 percent of them. For 2020, the Xinjiang Health Commission budget featured another \$19.5 million (140 million RMB) for the same project.




Figure 9. Source: 2011-2019 Health and Hygiene Statistical Yearbooks, table 8-8-2.

Between 2015 and 2018, combined natural population growth rates in the four prefectures of southern Xinjiang (Hotan, Kashgar, Aksu, Kizilsu), where 91.6 percent of the population in 2018 were ethnic minorities, declined by 72.9 percent (population-weighted average; China Statistics Press 2016, 2018, 2019, tables 3-5 and 3-6). In 2019, rates continued to decline (Table 1). Prefectures with data for both 2018 and 2019 (Aksu and Kizilsu), and individual counties for prefectures without such data, were weighted by their respective populations. For the prefecture of Bayingol, frequently considered part of southern Xinjiang, the table lists the three counties with an ethnic minority population share of over 50 percent. In the resulting population-weighted sample, the average natural population growth rate fell from 5.19 per mille in 2018 to 1.66 per mille in 2019.

Table 1. Natural population growth rates in per mille (per thousand).

Year	2018	2019	2020 (plan)	2021 (plan)
National (for comparison)	3.81	3.34		
Xinjiang	6.13	3.69		
Southern Xinjiang counties (the weighted sample of counties shown below)	5.19	1.66		
Aksu prefecture	5.67	1.48		
Awat county	4.71	0.59		
Xinhe county	1.29	0.73		–0.50 to –1.00 (est.)
Kizilsu prefecture	6.39	3.57	–3.14	
Kashgar prefecture	2.38	n.a.		
Yingjisha county	5.26	1.37		
Shufu county	1.39	0.20		
Yopurga county	7.12	0.55		
Bachu county	n.a.	–1.00 to –2.50 (est.)		
Hotan prefecture	2.96	n.a.		
Qira (Cele) county	2.32	–0.05		
Yutian county	–0.49	n.a.		
Bayingol prefecture	4.29	3.85		
Qiemo county	7.57	4.11		
Luntai county	1.83	1.10		
Hejing county	2.26	2.58		

Note: est., Estimate.

Sources: Prefecture and county socio-economic development reports (*Guo min jing ji he she hui fa zhan tong ji gong bao* 国民经济和社会发展统计公报).

A second sample consisted of 35 counties with ethnic minority population shares over 50 percent, and 28 counties with Han majority populations, all of them with published birth rate figures for 2019. In this sample, the population-weighted average birth rate in ethnic minority counties fell by 50.1 percent in 2019, while the birth rate in the Han counties declined by only 19.7 percent. This is consistent with plans for mass sterilization for 2019 published by counties in southern Xinjiang (Zenz, 2020b, pp.16-19).

The 2020 Xinjiang Statistical Yearbook ceased to publish all breakdowns of total populations and population growth by region or ethnicity (China Statistics Press, 2020). Similarly, Hotan and Kashgar Prefectures published neither birth nor natural population growth rates for 2019, breaking with a decades-long practice. However, data from the counties under their jurisdiction indicate further declines. In Kashgar, Bachu County's 2019 birth rate stood at 4.15 per mille; given an expected death rate of between 5 and 7 per mille, its 2019 growth would likely have ranged between -1.00 and -2.50 per mille. For 2021, Aksu's Xinhe County planned for a birth rate of 6 per mille or less, which at the county's current death rate of 6.62 would result in an estimated negative population growth between -0.50 and -1.00 per mille.

In Kizilsu, the prefecture planned a 6.14 per mille reduction in its natural population growth rate for 2020, which would result in a negative 3.14 per mille figure (Kizilsu Prefecture Government, 2020). In an August 2020 report, Kizilsu noted that in 2019, nobody was born outside of the government's plan, and that 88 percent of all women of childbearing age had adopted "long-term effective birth prevention" measures (Kizilsu Prefecture Government, 2020).

Overall, the available evidence suggests that Southern Xinjiang's growth rates are trending near or below zero. This is in line with Beijing's goals of "optimizing" the ethnic population by reducing Uyghur population shares.

4.0 An Overview of Beijing’s “Population Optimization Strategy in Southern Xinjiang

The text below is adapted from Zenz, A. (2021b) “‘End the Dominance of the Uyghur Ethnic Group’: An Analysis of Beijing’s Population Optimization Strategy in Southern Xinjiang.” *Central Asian Survey*. 40 (3): 291-312. <https://doi.org/10.1080/02634937.2021.1946483> or https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3862512.

And from Zenz, A. (2021e) “*The Xinjiang Papers: An Analysis of Key Findings and Implications for the Uyghur Tribunal in London*.” *The Uyghur Tribunal*. December 9, 2021. <https://uyghurtribunal.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/12/The-Xinjiang-Papers-An-Analysis-for-the-Uyghur-Tribunal.pdf>

Researchers have been able to gather substantial evidence of a campaign of birth suppression and mass sterilization from Chinese documents and witness statements, together with official data showing dramatic declines in birth rates, especially in Xinjiang’s ethnic minority regions. This evidence raised but did not quite answer the question of the ultimate intent with which the Chinese state is pursuing these policies, besides inferring that this would make the Uyghur populations easier to control by reducing their size. If these policies continued, they would depress the ethnic minority population. But will they, and what population loss would this suppression potentially cause?

Subsequent research has provided evidence of the Chinese state’s likely intent to substantially reduce ethnic minority natural population growth in Xinjiang in the longer-term by “optimizing” (优化) the ethnic population (Zenz, 2021b). This refers to a targeted dilution of populations deemed problematic by the state with Han Chinese, through in-migration, which can result in so-called processes of “embedding” (嵌入).

According to a 2017 research paper by a Chinese academic titled “Research on Optimizing Southern Xinjiang’s Population Resources,” the central government in Beijing “attaches great importance to the problem of Xinjiang’s population structure and population security.” Expressions such as “optimizing the ethnic population structure” or just “optimizing the population structure” (in reference to ethnic minority regions) are common to the academic literature on Xinjiang’s counterterrorism. They are consistently linked to birth control.

The sentiment behind these terms was bluntly expressed by a dean of Tarim University at a 2015 academic event. When discussing “methods to solve Xinjiang’s problems”, Liao said that in southern Xinjiang the state must “change the population structure and layout [and] end the dominance of the Uyghur ethnic group” [this refers to their numeric dominance in southern Xinjiang]. In a 2016 academic publication, Liao argued that the “underlying reason” for Xinjiang’s unrest was the high concentration of Uyghur populations in southern Xinjiang. Due to a recent exodus of Han Chinese, “the imbalance of the ethnic minority and Han population composition in southern Xinjiang has reached an unbelievably serious degree” (Liao, 2016).

Xinjiang’s most authoritative voice on this subject is arguably Liu Yilei, deputy secretary-general of the party committee of Xinjiang’s Production and Construction Corps (XPCC), and a dean of Xinjiang University. At a July 2020 symposium with 300 experts and scholars from across China, Liu noted that despite all progress, “the root of Xinjiang’s social stability problems has not yet been resolved.” Which is quite remarkable after all they have done so far. To quote from his speech:

...the problem in southern Xinjiang is mainly the unbalanced population structure. Population proportion and population security are important foundations for long-term peace and stability. The proportion of the Han population in southern Xinjiang is too low, less than 15%. The problem of demographic imbalance is southern Xinjiang's core issue (Liu, 2020).

Note: In the four Uyghur heartland prefecture of southern Xinjiang, the Han population share in 2018 was actually only 8.4%. In 2018, Liu had argued that “Xinjiang’s population structure [and] ethnic structure ... are unreasonable”, and that Xinjiang must “afresh analyze [its] population structure [and] ethnic structure...from a viewpoint of national security”.

One of the most sophisticated accounts of this perceived population “problem” is found in a 2017 research paper by Li Xiaoxia, director of the Institute of Sociology at the Xinjiang Academy of Social Sciences – who has published major reports and is well-known. In her paper, Li argues that

the population gap between ethnic minorities and the Han continues to widen, which has made the concentration of a single ethnic group in certain regions more obvious. The lack of interaction and exchanges between different ethnic groups has caused the three factors of ethnicity, religion and land area to become superimposed, thereby strengthening the viewpoint that one ethnic group owns a [particular] land area, [thereby] weakening national identity and identification with the Chinese Nation, [adversely] impacting peace and long-term stability.

Consequently, controlling the growth rate of the ethnic minority population and adjusting the regional ethnic population structure are considered to be important ways to achieve long-term peace and stability in Xinjiang. (Li, 2017a, p. 68).

Similar to Liu Yilei, Li argues that “the problem of the ethnic population structure in southern Xinjiang” is “one of the roots of the Xinjiang problem” (Li, 2017a, p. 77).

Soon after Li’s publication, Xinjiang set up new initiatives to implement systematic birth prevention campaigns in ethnic minority regions. An increasingly common outcome indicator of these initiatives was the mandated target to “optimize the population structure”, or more commonly to “balance the population structure”.

A detailed review of the literature shows that the perceived threat arising from concentrated Uyghur populations centers around the following four themes.

1. Excessive ethnic minority population growth creates a growing rural surplus workforce that that suffers underemployment, creating risks to social stability. Large numbers of unemployed young Uyghurs constitute a "severely excessive" rural surplus labor population, created by lax family planning policies, that pose a “latent threat to the current regime.” (e.g., Zhao & Song, 2017, p.30)
2. High ethnic minority population density combined with low mobility breeds a “hardened” society with a “dense religious atmosphere,” creating a breeding ground for religious extremism and terrorism (e.g., Lu & Guo, 2017, p.194).
3. High ethnic minority population concentrations create a dangerous sense of identification with their homeland, weakening identification with the central government (e.g., Li, 2017a, p.68).

4. High ethnic minority population ratios and resulting low Han population shares are a national security risk in sensitive border regions (which includes southern Xinjiang) (e.g., Liang, 2019; Wang, 2018).

Other Chinese researchers have argued that the “foundation for solving Xinjiang's counterterrorism problem” is “to solve the human problem” (人的问题) (Gao & Li, 2017). Specifically, this requires “diluting...the proportion of ethnic populations” by increasing the Han population share and reducing the shares of populations with “negative energy,” referring to religious and traditionally-minded Uyghurs. This process of targeted ethnic dilution, first proposed by Xi Jinping in 2014, is referred to as “population embedding”(人口嵌入) (Li, 2017b).

A 2017 paper published by two researchers from the Xinjiang Police Academy argues that “population embedding” is the key strategy to eradicate terrorism by “rapidly optimizing the population structure” (Gao & Li, 2017). To quote:

“[T]o completely eradicate terrorist crimes in Xinjiang it is necessary to completely eradicate the soil, the growth conditions and the environment in which terrorist mobs produce crimes. [To do so] ..., it is necessary to rationalize the population structure.”

Specifically, the academics suggest that the establishment of embedded communities requires a careful balancing of “desirable” versus less desirable populations. To quote:

Therefore, optimizing the proportions of the population and improving and enhancing the quality of the population - which is to solve the human problem - is the foundation of solving Xinjiang's counterterrorism (and other) problems. Embedding the population is one of the simplest and most direct ways to solve the human problem. ...

This will achieve the goal of diluting the proportion of the poor population, the proportion of the unemployed population, the proportion of the low-educated population, the proportion of [certain] ethnic populations,... the proportion of the population with a criminal history, etc.

Embedding therefore involves a targeted dilution of undesirable population segments, such as low-income, lesser-educated and more traditionally-minded ethnic minorities, who are seen as more susceptible to religious extremism and other so-called “crimes”.

To boost Han population shares, Beijing has to get millions of Han to move to southern Xinjiang. By 2022, it already plans to settle 300,000 there (Zenz, 2021a). However, the south is also Xinjiang's ecologically most fragile region. Arable land and water are scarce. Urbanization and industrial development vastly increased the per capita resource utilization. Chinese studies say Xinjiang as a whole was already overpopulated by 2.3 million persons in 2015, significantly exceeding its ecological population carrying capacity. Most of the so-called “overpopulation” is in rural southern Xinjiang – meaning Uyghurs (Liu, Zhi, & Liu, 2017).

Part of the population optimization is achieved through Poverty Alleviation through Labor Transfers of Uyghurs. Labor transfers do not have to imply physical relocation, they primarily refer to a transfer of rural agricultural surplus laborers (富余劳动力) out of the primary and into secondary and tertiary sectors. This program was extended to all of Xinjiang in 2005, and it is conceptually distinct from the forced labor of released internment camp detainees (教转人员), this latter program began in 2018 and

came into full force in 2019. The forced labor linked to the camps targets predominantly men, given that over 85 percent of such detainees are male, whereas the coercive labor transfer scheme targets persons who were typically never detained, with a particular focus on getting women out of household roles and into full-time work, especially in textile industries. According to official figures, Xinjiang had 2.59 million rural surplus laborers in 2019—1.65 million of them in the four southern Uyghur-majority prefectures. In the first 10 months of 2018, 364,000 or 13 percent of all labor transfers were outside people's home prefectures, and 25,000 or 1 percent were to other provinces. Labor transfers have intentionally and disproportionately displaced persons from Uyghur-majority regions and especially targeted the southern Uyghur heartlands and poor households. In 2018, the overall percentage of labor transfers from Xinjiang to outside provinces was only around 1 percent, while labor transfer efforts targeting poor households and therefore mostly ethnic minorities transferred 11 percent.

Xinjiang's most recent intensification of Poverty Alleviation through Labor Transfers has led to an annual transfer of over 3 million persons (including Han). Together with former VSETC (Vocational Skills Education and Training Center) detainees sent to work in factories, between two to two and a half million persons in Xinjiang can be estimated to be at risk of coercive labor.

Even so, labor transfers that displace ethnic minorities by coercing them to work in regions outside of southern Xinjiang represent comparatively small numbers and are by themselves entirely insufficient to achieve the abovementioned population optimization goals. A Chinese academic report called the Nankai Report admitted that labor transfers are a method to "reduce Uyghur population density in southern Xinjiang." However, the numbers of transferred laborers are too small, especially given that annual transfer numbers often involve the same persons who are transferred again each year.

As a result, nearly all of the cited academics and officials strongly urge birth prevention as a primary means to optimize ethnic population ratios. Quantitative analysis confirms that indeed, the only way that the state can significantly increase Han population shares without having to transfer unrealistically high numbers of Han to southern Xinjiang, which would be very expensive, difficult and cause severe overpopulation, is to limit ethnic minority population growth.

The analysis shows that the most ideal range for this growth is in fact negative, around -2.5 per mille. By 2040, the state could boost Han population shares in southern Xinjiang to nearly 25 percent by settling 1.9 million Han there. This would dilute Uyghur population concentrations in line with counterterrorism targets (25% Han means the state can embed half the Uyghur population at a 50:50 ratio, diluting so-called problem populations and neutralizing the "human problem").

As a result, ethnic minority population in southern Xinjiang would shrink from currently 9.5 million to 9 million by 2040, a decline that could pass unnoticed by outside observers. A smaller population is also easier to control and to assimilate (Zenz, n.d.)

The "destruction in part" resulting from these aims is assessed as the difference between
a) projected natural population growth without substantial government interference, and
b) reduced growth scenarios due to birth prevention, in line with the state's intent to achieve counterterrorism goals by "optimizing" the ethnic population structure.

Based on adapted projections that were recently published by Chinese researchers in a peer-reviewed international journal, southern Xinjiang's ethnic minority population could increase to an estimated 13.1 million by the year 2040 without severe measures to prevent births, broadly based on existing family planning – all the more now given a universal right to have up to three children (Huo et al., 2020; Zenz, n.d.).

The 4.1 million discrepancy between 9 and 13.1 million can be understood to constitute the “destruction in part” caused by the state’s intent to “optimize” ethnic population ratios and dilute problem populations. This would reduce the projected ethnic minority population during the coming 20 years by nearly one third (31 percent).

How realistic is this plan? Natural population growth in southern Xinjiang is already trending towards zero or just below zero. Recently, Xinjiang has told family planning offices to “optimize the population structure” and to carry out “population monitoring and early warning.” The region has created all the necessary preconditions for “optimizing” its ethnic population structure. It also no longer reports birth rates or population counts by region or ethnic group, leaving researchers in the dark and covering its tracks.

Importantly, understanding the role that birth prevention and long-term population reduction plays in this overall policy distinguishes Beijing’s actions against the Uyghurs from its general, national population control measures and from its treatment of other minorities.

The new findings presented today should be seen in tandem with other pertinent aspects:

- The targeted internment and imprisonment of leading community figures and elites. Many intellectuals have been sentenced to long prison terms. Internal spreadsheets listing families by internment status show that the re-education campaign mainly targets the heads of households, the main influencers within families. In some regions, between 30 and 50 percent of heads of households were shown as detained in camps in 2018. This strategy further enables the state to utilize the absence of men, husbands and fathers to separate children from parents and to subject the women to birth control surgeries.
- According to official data, the number of students in Xinjiang who live in boarding facilities increased by 77 percent, from half a million to 880,000. Evidence from non-public Xinjiang government spreadsheets shows over 10,000 children from Yarkand County (Kashgar Prefecture) as having at least one parent in detention, and 10 percent of them have both parents in detention.

Beijing’s population control strategy consists of a combination of internment and imprisonment, coercive labor, parent-child separation, and birth prevention. All four of these operate in tandem. Key intellectuals and community influencers have been sentenced to prison terms of often around 20 years, removing their influence and curbing intergenerational cultural transmission. Forced labor separates families and enables greater state control over the next generation. Birth prevention is the cornerstone of raising Han population shares and neutralizing minority groups through embedding and dilution. Over the next 20 years, all of these aspects can be expected to be working in tandem. Within this time frame, we can expect a substantial destruction in part resulting from birth prevention together with a severe impact on the distinct identity and unique characteristics of these groups as groups.

The most concerning aspect of official and academic discourses about these minorities is that they are demonized and framed as a “problem” that threatens an otherwise “healthy” society (cf. Roberts, 2020, pp.16-17). Some Chinese scholars even called it a “human problem”. This language is akin to purported statements by Xinjiang officials that problem populations are like “weeds hidden among the crops” where the state will “need to spray chemicals to kill them all” (Zenz, 2018b, p. 21). While this statement itself refers to re-education in camps and not directly to mass slaughter, the framing of Uyghurs and others as a human problem, and their concentrated population and growth as a threat to China’s national security, is a cause for grave concern.

The secret speeches contained in the Xinjiang Papers show that plans to optimize the ethnic population composition can be linked to statements and demands made by the central government.

In his May 2014 speech, Xi demanded that birth control policies in southern Xinjiang were to be made “equal for all ethnic groups” (Central Office Bulletin, 2014b, p.22).⁵ This statement about birth control “equality” reflects a euphemism that since 2017 undergirded policies that drastically reduced birth rates of ethnic groups. To give just one pertinent example, Xinjiang’s Health Commission established a set of performance targets in 2019 for a special initiative funded with 120 million Chinese Yuan (CNY) that employed the exact same phrase – “implement a birth control policy that is equal for all ethnic groups” – as the stated overall goal behind a new mandate to reduce birth rates in southern Xinjiang by “at least 4 per mille,” to provide free birth control surgeries that included female sterilization procedures, and to achieve an adoption rate of “long-term effective birth prevention” measures of at least 90 percent in rural regions (these measures include IUD insertions and sterilization surgeries).⁶

Document no.7 from December 2017 makes a similar demand, to “enact birth control policies that are equal for each ethnic group” (落实各民族平等的计划生育政策), yet bluntly adds that this measure is specifically designed to “promote equal population growth for each ethnic group” (促进各民族人口均衡发展; Central Office Bulletin, 2017, p.20).⁷ This mandate is exactly in line with recommendations made by numerous Xinjiang academics and experts on population growth and “population optimization,” who have unilaterally called for precisely such measures (Zenz, 2021b).

Xi’s top-secret April 29, 2014 speech to the XPCC symposium (document no.1) contains a section dedicated to the sensitive topic of population structure and optimization. Xi states that “population proportion and population security are important foundations for long-term peace and stability” (人口比例和人口安全是长治久安的重要基础). This same exact wording is then later contained in document no.7, a classified central government directive regarding the development of the XPCC in southern Xinjiang. In that document, Beijing mandates that by 2022, at least 300,000 settlers (mostly Han from eastern China) are to be moved to regions in southern Xinjiang. The same phrase that “population proportion and population security are important foundations for long-term peace and stability” was then used by Liu Yilei (cited above).

Document no.2 (Yu Zhengsheng’s speech) likewise states that in southern Xinjiang, “the population structure is monolithic” (人口结构单一), adding that there is a concentration of poor people and a “distorted religious atmosphere” (宗教氛围扭曲; p.67). Only months later, Yu’s statement was repeated nearly verbatim by Xinjiang’s then-Party Secretary Zhang Chunxian (CPC, 2014). This link between a concentrated ethnic population in one particular region and a related overly “dense” (or here: “distorted” or “contorted”) religious atmosphere is significant, because this exact link explains the threat perception behind concentrated Uyghur populations in southern Xinjiang – and hence the need to mitigate this threat through population embedding and other “population optimization” strategies.

Yu’s statement, which was soon after adopted by Zhang Chunxian, constitutes an important extension and elaboration of Xi Jinping’s statements about the nexus of “population proportion and population security.” Taken together, they provide strong confirmation that “population optimization” strategies are a

⁵ 在南疆实行各民族平等的计划生育政策

⁶ 在南疆实行各民族平等的计划生育政策 (Central Office Bulletin, 2014b, p.22). 2019 Xinjiang Health Commission planning document:

wjw.xinjiang.gov.cn/hfpc/yjsgk/201901/e99e758857c0417dbf8e76377efc4f11/files/35885e0814254402bd1b71c7062d31f0.xls (since deleted), archived download: “2019 年自治区卫生健康委员会机关及直属（管）单位绩效目标.” Accessed November 27, 2021. <https://bit.ly/3kYC94i>.

⁷ 均衡 can be translated as “equal” or “balanced.”

significant consideration and concern of the central government. The explicit links between such “optimization” strategies and national security considerations are therefore not merely part of an intra-Xinjiang discourse among academics and a few scholar-cadres, as previously outlined by the author. Rather, they are consistently stated in classified central government discourses. Even by itself, this particular finding is of highest importance for our understanding of currently unfolding policies pertaining to population control and birth prevention, and for our assessment of likely future trends: the policy of “population optimization” began and was frequently reiterated by top PRC leaders.

5.0 Implications of Birth Prevention Evidence for a Mass Atrocity / Crimes Against Humanity / Genocide Assessment

The text below is based on an article by Adrian Zenz and Erin Rosenberg in *Foreign Policy* (<https://foreignpolicy.com/2021/06/08/genocide-population-xinjiang-uyghurs/>) and on an article by Adrian Zenz and a legal assessment by E. Rosenberg with the Jamestown Foundation (Zenz & Rosenberg, 2021; Zenz, 2021a).

Evaluating the Intent behind the Destruction of a Protected Group (Genocide)

Research findings on birth prevention and population optimization shed important new light on Beijing’s intent to physically destroy in part the Uyghur ethnic group by preventing births within the group. The new publication convincingly argues other measures aimed at achieving ethnic population changes since Han in-migration and Uyghur out-migration will not accomplish the overall goal due in part to ecological, economic, and other practical constraints (Zenz, 2021a). As such, the prevention of Uyghur births is a critical and necessary part of the CCP’s overall “optimization” policy in Xinjiang—a policy considered to be a matter of national security. Importantly, understanding the role that birth prevention and long-term population reduction plays in this overall policy distinguishes China’s actions against the Uyghurs from its general national population control measures and from its treatment of other ethnic and religious minorities, such as Tibetans.

In its 2007 judgment in the *Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro* (2007) case, the International Court of Justice (ICJ), the judicial body that has jurisdiction over disputes between states in relation to the Genocide Convention, held that “the intent must be to destroy at least a substantial part of the particular group” (*Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro*, 2007; ICJ, n.d.). The ICJ expanded on the criteria for assessing the “substantial part” threshold in its 2015 *Croatia v. Serbia* judgment, holding it is not merely a numerical assessment but also takes into account the intent to destroy “within a geographically limited area” and the “prominence of the allegedly targeted part within the group as a whole” (*Croatia v. Serbia*, 2015). We argue that a long-term policy of preventing millions of Uyghur births meets this threshold.

Two additional factors are important to understanding the gravity of the current situation facing the Uyghurs. First is the CCP’s systematic imprisonment of Uyghur religious, intellectual, and cultural elites, with the increased imposition of lengthy sentences as opposed to arbitrary detention (Gunter, 2021; Bunin, 2020). The systematic removal of persons central to maintaining and transmitting Uyghur culture and identity is accompanied by a policy of family separations, where Uyghur children are taught to adopt the majority Han culture (Zenz, 2019a). Second is the concern that Beijing’s assumption of the needed “optimization” levels may change over time if the Uyghur population, even when reduced in number, does not assimilate as envisioned. Genocidal intent can develop and strengthen over time as it has done in past genocides. The perception of Uyghurs as a human threat to China’s national security

suggests birth prevention targets could increase over time, increasing the threat to the continued existence of the group as a whole.

In sum, the newly published research provides states and the international community with compelling evidence that a genocide is slowly being carried out. Of particular concern is Beijing's perception of concentrated Uyghur populations as a national security threat. Other signs of genocidal intent under the U.N. framework are also clearly present. However, even those states that may not share this conclusion cannot deny that, at a minimum, there is a serious risk of genocide occurring.

Evaluating the Crimes Against Humanity of Forcible Transfer and of Persecution

An independent legal analysis of the evidence on Xinjiang's coercive labor transfer program—which was peer reviewed by four leading experts on international criminal law—states that there are “credible grounds to conclude” that Xinjiang's labor transfer program meets the criteria of two Crimes Against Humanity under Article 7 of the Rome Statute (see Appendix B).[1] The program violates first the Crime Against Humanity of Forcible Transfer (Article 7 (1)(d)), which relates to safeguarding the “protected interests and rights of persons to ‘live in their communities and homes’” (Appendix B, Section B.1); and second the Crime Against Humanity of Persecution (Article 7 (1)(h)).

The crime against humanity of forcible transfer refers to the removal of civilians from a place where they are lawfully present (usually, but not always, their residence⁸), without their consent. This differs from the crime against humanity of deportation in that forcible transfer occurs within the borders of a State.

As a crime against humanity, the case law regarding the prohibition on forcible transfer is somewhat complicated, due to its non-inclusion as a listed crime in international criminal statutes until the creation of the ICC Rome Statute. The International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) directly incorporated the crimes against humanity set out in the 1945 Charter of the International Military Tribunal of Nuremberg (IMT), which only included the crime of deportation.⁹ Despite this, the ICTY did address forcible transfers as the crimes against humanity of persecution and as ‘other inhumane acts’.¹⁰

⁸ The prohibition on forcible transfer does not require that the affected person have a “residence” in the legal sense. In other words, internally displaced persons or other similarly situated persons are also protected. See *Ntaganda Trial Judgment*, para. 1069 (“The prohibition against forcible transfer is intended to protect the right of individuals to remain in their homes or communities unhindered. The requirement of ‘lawful presence’ does not mean that the victim must have had legal residence in the area. Indeed, this protection extends to individuals who, for whatever reason, have come to live in a community, including internally displaced persons who have established temporary homes after being uprooted from their original communities.”).

⁹ 1945 Charter of the International Military Tribunal of Nuremberg (IMT), art. 6 (c); Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY), art. 5.

¹⁰ See *The Prosecutor v. Krajišnik*, Judgment, 17 March 2009 (“*Krajišnik Appeals Judgment*”), IT-00-39-A; *The Prosecutor v. Stakić*, Judgment, 26 March 2006, IT-97-24-A (“*Stakić Appeal Judgment*”); *The Prosecutor v. Krnojelac*, Judgment, 17 September 2003, IT-97-25-A (“*Krnojelac Appeal Judgment*”). The crime against humanity of ‘other inhumane acts’ is a “catch-all” provision meant to address acts that are not specifically listed as a crime against humanity in a particular statute, but are considered to be of a “similar character,” meaning that the nature and gravity of the act are similar to a listed crime against humanity. Examples of this crime come from the ICTY, the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR), and the Special Court for Sierra Leone (SCSL). Because the ICTY's statute only listed deportation as a crime against humanity, the *Kupreškić* Trial Chamber held that forcible transfer was a crime against humanity as other inhumane acts, finding that the act was of a similar nature and gravity to the listed crime of deportation. At the ICTR, rape was listed as a crime against humanity, but not other acts of sexual violence. Similar to the approach in the *Kupreškić* case, the ICTR Trial Chamber reasoned that sexual violence could be charged as ‘other inhumane acts’ due to its similar character to the listed crime of rape. In the *Brima et al.* and *Sesay et al.* cases, the SCSL Appeals Chamber upheld convictions for ‘forced marriage’ as a crime against humanity of ‘other inhumane acts’. What these examples show is that, because of its role as a residual crime, what is meant by “other inhumane acts” is constantly evolving based on what crimes are contained in the specific statute that it is a part of. The ICC Rome Statute's codification of additional crimes against humanity from the IMT Nuremberg and ICTY/ICTR/SCSL statutes means that some acts that were previously prosecuted as “other inhumane acts” are now charged under their specific provision in the Rome Statute. Thus, forcible transfer and sexual violence are now listed crimes against humanity and would not be charged as a crime against humanity of other inhumane acts at

According to the ICTY jurisprudence, the prohibition on forcible transfer safeguards the protected interests and rights of persons to “live in their communities and homes”.¹¹ Evidence relevant to establishing the crime of forcible transfer includes evidence regarding the creation and implementation of an infrastructure to facilitate the transfer.¹² Not all acts of transfer qualify as the crime against humanity of forcible transfer; the act must be intended to result in the transfer of the civilian to another place.¹³ However, there is no requirement that the displacement be intended to be permanent.¹⁴

Regarding the “forcible” requirement, in *The Prosecutor v. Jadranko Prlić*, the Trial Chamber held:

“The Tribunal’s case-law does not go so far as to require that forcible removal occur “by force” in the strict sense of the word. Indeed, the mere threat of resorting to force or physical or mental coercion may be enough, if the targeted population facing this coercive climate or these threats, has no other choice but to leave its territory.”¹⁵

Even when consent is given, the overall coercive climate facing the individual must be considered in order to determine the genuineness of that consent.¹⁶ In this respect, “a climate of terror and violence obviates any and all value arising from the consent”.¹⁷

All people lawfully within a State have the right to choose their place of residence.¹⁸ Permissible grounds for forced transfers of civilians under international law are limited to the security of that civilian population or for military reasons, as well the “exceptional measure” of evacuation for purposes of protecting the population.¹⁹ Forcible transfers based on a policy of “‘ethnic cleansing’ or similar practices aimed at/or resulting in altering the ethnic, religious or racial composition of the affected population” constitute arbitrary displacement and are not permissible under international law.²⁰ The International Committee of the Red Cross identifies the forcible transfer of a civilian population as one method used to achieve “ethnic cleansing”,²¹ which “aims to change the demographic composition of a territory”.²²

Following Dr. Zenz’ approach, this analysis focusses on the coercive Poverty Alleviation through Labor Transfer program, which is distinct from the forced labor associated with re-education camps (Zenz, 2021a, Section 2.1).

the ICC. In the *Ongwen* case, the Trial Chamber convicted Mr Ongwen for forced marriages as a crime against humanity of other inhumane acts. See *Ongwen* Trial Judgment, paras 2741-2751, p. 1073 (GUILTY of count 50 forced marriage as an inhumane act).

¹¹ *Stakić* Appeal Judgment, para. 277; *Krnjelac* Appeal Judgment, para. 21.

¹² See, for an overview, Case Matrix Network, Means of Proof Digest, available at: <https://www.casematrixnetwork.org/cmn-knowledge-hub/proof-digest/art-6/6-e/5/#p-6>.

¹³ *The Prosecutor v. Naletilić and Martinović*, Judgement, 31 March 2003, IT-98-34-T, para. 537 (“The Chamber is not satisfied that these acts constitute unlawful transfer under Article 2(g) of the Statute, even though the persons, technically speaking, were moved from one place to another against their free will. They were apprehended and arrested in order to be detained and not in order to be transferred. Therefore, the requisite intent is not established. These arrests and movements to the Heliodrom on 9 May 1993 is further considered under unlawful confinement detention as persecution.”)

¹⁴ *Stakić* Appeal Judgment, para. 278.

¹⁵ Judgement, 29 May 2013, IT-04-74-T, para. 50 (“*Prlić* Trial Judgment”).

¹⁶ *Krnjelac* Appeal Judgment, para. 229; *Prlić* Trial Judgment, paras 50-51.

¹⁷ *Prlić* Trial Judgment, para. 51.

¹⁸ International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), art. 12, Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171. Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), art. 13(1), G.A. Res. 217A (III) A, UN Doc. A/RES/217(III) (Dec. 10, 1948).

¹⁹ *The Prosecutor v. Radovan Karadžić*, Public Redacted Version of Judgement Issued on 24 March 2016, 24 March 2016, IT-95-5/18-T, para. 492.

²⁰ Representative of the Secretary-General on Internally Displaced Persons, *Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement*, Principle 6(2)(a), UN Doc. E/CN.4/1998/53/Add.2 (1998). Available at: <https://undocs.org/E/CN.4/1998/53/Add.2>.

²¹ The term “ethnic cleansing” is a political term, not a legal one. However, ethnic cleansing, can constitute different crimes against humanity, depending on the manner and circumstances in which it is carried out.

²² See ICRC, Customary IHL Database, Rule 129.

In terms of the *actus reus*, the evidence is overwhelming. According to the report, in the first 10 months of 2018, approximately 364,000 people were transferred outside of their home prefecture, representing 13.3% of all transfers, and 25,378 people were transferred outside of Xinjiang to another province, representing 0.93% of all labor transfers (Zenz, 2021a, Section 2.6). Between 2017 and 2019, approximately 76,000 people were transferred from Xinjiang to other parts of China (Zenz, 2021a, Section 2.6).

There are credible grounds to conclude that these transfers are “forcible” insofar as they do not appear to have been voluntary and resulting from the free will of those affected, having regard to all the relevant circumstances.

First, evidence suggests that refusal to participate in the transfer program carries the threat of being labeled “untrustworthy” and may result in detention (Zenz, 2021a, Section 2.0).

Second, the comprehensive infrastructure that China has put in place to facilitate the transfer of Uyghurs demonstrates the coercive nature of the program. In particular, at the recruitment stage, the report highlights the difference between “self-chosen” labor training versus a “government-led” approach. The “government-led approach” represented approximately 70% (Hotan) and 71.5% (Aksu) of all labor transfers in two Uyghur majority prefectures in Xinjiang (Zenz, 2021a, Section 3.2). This “government-led approach” is carried out by government officials and Communist Party cadres, who in the Xinjiang context have the authority to designate a person for detention if he or she does not “consent” (Zenz, 2021a, Section 3.2).

In addition, the government urges Uyghur farmers and pastoralists to place their land and herds into a trusteeship scheme, thereby “liberating” them to participate in labor transfer and leave their home regions. This program functions as an additional form of coercion to facilitate the transfers. While these land and livestock transfers are framed by the government as being the result of “vigorous promotions”, the evidence shows that they are carried out by government officials, which suggests that the threat of detention of being deemed “untrustworthy” attaches to any refusal to transfer land or livestock to these government entities (Zenz, 2021a, Section 3.4). Government sources state that in some instances, 90 percent of a village’s farmers were made to surrender their land usage rights in order to be subjected to labor transfer (Zenz, 2021a, Section 3.4).

Finally, the coercive environment facing Uyghurs in Xinjiang generally has already been established in relation to the mass detention, surveillance, and persecution to which China is subjecting the Uyghur population. These transfers cannot be viewed in isolation but must be considered within this overall coercive and violent context. In terms of China asserting that Uyghurs are voluntarily agreeing to be transferred, this extraordinarily oppressive environment and the threat of detention or persecution to themselves and/or their family members if a person does not “consent” render any such consent not genuine. As the report succinctly notes in relation to the alleged voluntary interest of Yarkand county residents in being transferred to another county, Yarkand county “was at the center of the internment campaign, meaning that participation in labor transfer would be one of the few ways to escape internment” (Zenz, 2021a, Section 2.5).

Similarly, regarding the required *mens rea*, the evidence establishes credible grounds to conclude that the intent of the transfers is to remove Uyghur civilians from their homes and communities in Xinjiang. While Xinjiang’s labor transfer program has existed since the early 2000s, the report demonstrates that, following the 2009 interethnic unrest during the Urumqi riots, the Chinese government began to explicitly identify labor transfers as a method to assimilate its Uyghur ethnic population and to reduce the size of the Uyghur population in Xinjiang, which China views as a threat to security and a cause of “separatism”. In 2014 on a visit to Xinjiang, President Xi stated that there was a need for “ethnic mixes, exchanges, and blending”, which would be accomplished through Xinjiang’s ethnic minorities receiving “employment and residence

in eastern China” (Zenz, 2021a, Section. 2.2, emphasis added). The Nankai Report, published in December 2019, identifies labor transfers as a “long-term strategy” to “reduce Uyghur population density” (Zenz, 2021a, Section 1.0, 2.3). Similarly, recently published Chinese academic writings position labor transfers as a means to “crack open the solidified [Uyghur] society” (Zenz, 2021a, Section 2.3).

The associated land and livestock transfer programs support the conclusion that the labor transfer program is intended to transfer Uyghurs from their homes and communities. While it is not necessary to demonstrate that the transfers are intended to be permanent, the land and livestock transfer program, along with the related “centralized care” programs for children²³ and elderly family members, indicate that Uyghurs may be unable to return to their homes and original livelihoods in Xinjiang. Similarly, labor transfers to other Chinese provinces can involve entire families (Zenz, 2021a, Section 3.4, 3.1).

Further, these transfers are manifestly not permissible under international law and, in contravention of international law, appear to be aimed at separating Uyghurs from their community in order to reduce their resistance to assimilation and to change the demographic make-up of Xinjiang by reducing the relative ethnic population share of the Uyghur community and breaking up the community’s density within specific Xinjiang prefectures. The report’s findings include that:

“labor transfers in Uyghur majority regions (Aksu, Kashgar, Hotan, and Kizilsu) cause must greater displacement, both through transfers to other regions in Xinjiang (typically 15 to 40 percent) and to other provinces (typically 2 to 12 percent). Regions [of Xinjiang] with low shares of Turkic ethnic minorities such as Bortala Prefecture show much lesser degrees of displacement” (Zenz, 2021a, Section 2.6).

The report also finds that, “[i]n 2018, 14,500 of all 25,378 Xinjiang labor transfers to other provinces involved laborers from Hotan alone” (Zenz, 2021a, Section 2.6).

The jurisprudence on forcible transfer, and the international texts setting out the human rights implicated by its prohibition, do not establish any distance requirement or that the transfer cross over internal administrative boundaries. As such, the transfers of persons from one prefecture to another within Xinjiang may qualify as the crime against humanity of forcible transfer so long as the intent is the transfer of the civilian from the place where they are lawfully present. In this regard, the Nankai report’s reference to “population density” can be credibly argued to refer to dispersing the Uyghur community from the areas of Xinjiang where they constitute a majority to other parts of Xinjiang. This is supported by the evidence showing that Uyghur majority prefectures have higher rates of displacement within Xinjiang (meaning transferred outside of one’s home prefecture or county) than those with lower minority ethnic populations.

The evidence presented in Dr. Zenz’ report, particularly in relation to the Nankai Report, provides credible grounds for concluding that China is committing the crimes against humanity of forcible transfer and persecution against its Uyghur civilian population.

²³ The separation of Uyghur children into centralized care homes, boarding schools, and, in some instances, orphanages has been identified as potentially establishing the *actus reus* of article 2(e) of the Genocide Convention. See e.g. Essex Court Chambers Legal Opinion, paras 56-58, 141-142. Dr. Zenz’ previous report addressing this topic explores how the Chinese government is removing children on the grounds that their parents are in some form of detention. That report states that “[c]hildren whose parents are in prison, detention, re-education or “training” are classified into a special needs category that is eligible for state subsidies and for receiving “centralized care”. This “care” can take place in public boarding schools or in special children’s shelters.” See Zenz, 2019a.

The ICTY has held that forcible separation from one’s home and community “is by definition a traumatic experience”²⁴ that can cause “serious mental harm” to the victims of these acts.²⁵ The crime against humanity of forcible transfer, while perhaps not often discussed, is in no way a “lesser” crime—and, indeed, to the contrary, is as equally grave as other crimes against humanity.²⁶ In this regard, the protected interest at stake, namely the right to “live in their communities and homes”, is intrinsically tied to the Uyghur people’s ability to resist Beijing’s attempts to destroy and erase their unique identity and culture.

6.0 Central Government Approval and Support for the Policies Implemented in Xinjiang

6.1 Minister of Public Security Zhao Kezhi’s Speech

This text is based on Zenz (2022b), available from <https://www.chinafile.com/reporting-opinion/features/public-security-ministers-speech-describes-xi-jinpings-direction-of-mass>. The Xinjiang Police Files can be accessed at www.xinjiangpolicefiles.org. The Xinjiang Police Files are further described and authenticated here: <https://journals.univie.ac.at/index.php/jeacs/article/view/7336>. For further evidence of central government involvement, see also Zenz (2021c) at <https://jamestown.org/program/evidence-of-the-chinese-central-governments-knowledge-of-and-involvement-in-xinjiangs-re-education-internment-campaign/>.

Since 2017, China’s government has detained large numbers of Uyghur and other Turkic populations. Outside observers have worked to understand the nature and scale of this internment drive, but they have been hampered by limited physical access to the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region as well as by strict controls on digital communication. Two questions in particular have cropped up again and again: How many people has the Chinese government sent into prisons or “re-education” camps? And how direct is General Secretary Xi Jinping’s involvement in this effort?

Now, an internal Chinese government document provides new support for the extraordinary scale of internment during what was likely its peak in 2018 and 2019. The document, a transcript of an internal June 15, 2018 speech by Minister of Public Security Zhao Kezhi, reinforces the plausibility of previous detention estimates, adding to the evidence that the People’s Republic of China (PRC) had interned between one and two million Uyghurs and other ethnic minority individuals by the late 2010s. The speech also points to Xi Jinping’s informed and active support for continued spending on additional detention facilities and prison staff to manage the influx of detainees.

Zhao’s speech, along with tens of thousands of Chinese government documents and spreadsheets, which I refer to as the “[Xinjiang Police Files](#),” were obtained by an individual who gained access to the internal police computer networks of two predominantly Uyghur and Kazakh counties in Xinjiang: Konasheher (Shufu) and Tekes (Tekesi). The transcript of Zhao’s speech is an unredacted scan of a paper copy, labeled “classified document” on its first page.

Research based on both publicly available and internal Chinese government documents is necessary because China’s government has worked so hard to keep international observers from gathering first-hand

²⁴ *The Prosecutor v. Krstić*, Trial Judgement, 2 August 2001, IT-98-33-T, para. 523.

²⁵ *Krajišnik Appeals Judgment*, para. 331.

²⁶ Not only is forcible transfer a grave crime causing immense harm in its own right, it has also been identified as potentially relevant to the development of genocidal intent, when targeted at a protected group. See *Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v Serbia and Montenegro)*, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2007, 43, 122–3, ¶ 190.

information. The campaign to intern large numbers of Uyghurs and other predominantly Turkic ethnic groups, holding them in prisons as well as “re-education” (literally “transformation through education”) facilities, began five years ago, in 2017. Scholars and reporters have written extensively about the campaign, which employs not only incarceration but also coercive measures to limit childbearing, restrict cultural and religious practice, and facilitate forced labor.

In the absence of independent data—or any reliable official information from the Chinese government itself—observers have been left to estimate how many people the state has incarcerated. These estimates rely on a range of different methodologies, from phoning local police officers, to extrapolating from leaked government spreadsheets, to analyzing food subsidy payments for “re-education” facilities. The estimates themselves also have varied widely. My own projection from 2018 posited between several hundred thousand and one million interned; in 2019, based in part on leaked government spreadsheets listing detention figures for several Uyghur townships, I increased this estimate to between 900,000 and 1.8 million. Many scholars of the region have accepted these estimates.

For several years, observers were similarly unsure of the precise role of General Secretary Xi Jinping or of the central government in the campaign. While it was obvious that Xi would have given his blessing to any set of policies with such far-reaching consequences, a dearth of information about internal Chinese government processes prevented scholars from concluding with confidence that Xi played any direct role in those policies’ formulation.

Zhao’s speech offers additional evidence that between one and two million people have indeed been incarcerated. It also shows that Xi himself has been personally aware of the details of this campaign, and that he issued instructions that enabled its continuation and expansion. Zhao delivered the speech in Urumqi at the end of a five-day “investigative” visit to Xinjiang. Other high-ranking central government leaders were also part of the delegation.

Zhao affirms Beijing’s support for the mass internment drive. In the first section of his speech, he summarizes the region’s praiseworthy achievements and commends regional authorities for having thus far “done transformation through education [work] well.” He also lays out the timeline the regional government had been following in implementing its unprecedented crackdown. After the arrival of Xinjiang Party Secretary Chen Quanguo, the region commenced a five-year work plan: in year one (2017), “stabilize” the region; in year two, “consolidate” those gains; in year three, achieve a “basic normalization” of the new state of affairs; and by the fifth year (2021), reach “comprehensive stability.”

Chen Quanguo reiterates the same five-year scheme in the speech he delivered three days after Zhao’s. Chen says that he was “sent” to Xinjiang by Xi himself, not as a routine assignment but on a special mission for the nation:

“The General Secretary sent me to Xinjiang; first, not in order to [merely] be an official; second, not in order to make a fortune; third, not in order to have nothing but an empty title. [Rather,] the General Secretary sent me to Xinjiang in order to make a stable Xinjiang arise . . .”

Chen adds that he personally told Xi he would be willing to work in Xinjiang for 10 years. But in December 2021, Beijing replaced Chen with Ma Xingrui, the governor of Guangdong province. This change—swapping out Chen, who was likely deployed to Xinjiang because of his ruthless securitization of Tibet and his reputation for iron-clad Party discipline, with Ma, a scientist-turned-technocrat—suggests Beijing considered its five-year scheme for Xinjiang well in hand.

In the second section of Zhao's speech, he highlights ongoing challenges and work priorities for the current "consolidation" phase of the plan. He lists the problems still facing the region and asserts that its counterterrorism struggle "absolutely cannot be relaxed in any way." Here, Zhao begins to hint at the number of people targeted for "re-education" or imprisonment. He refers to two groups, each comprising "two million people," who pose an internal threat to stability: "Xinjiang has two million people who have been influenced by pro-Xinjiang independence, pan-Islamist, and pan-Turkist thinking. Southern Xinjiang has more than two million people who have been severely influenced by the infiltration of extremist religious thought."

The first "two million," those "influenced by pro-Xinjiang independence, pan-Islamist, and pan-Turkist thinking," alludes to people who identify with a broader Turkic religious, cultural, and linguistic heritage—that is, Uyghurs, Kazakhs, Kyrgyz, and people of other ethnically Turkic groups. Beijing links this sense of non-Han Chinese identity, or pan-Turkic identity, with separatism, frequently describing it as a "poison" of the mind that must be eradicated through "re-education." Zhao specifies that the second "two million" people reside in southern Xinjiang, where the percentage of Uyghur and other Turkic peoples is much higher than in the north. Zhao's reference to "extremist religious thought" could describe almost anyone who engages in religious behavior, given Beijing's exceedingly broad definition of what constitutes "extremism."

Notably, Zhao does not accuse these two groups of people of violent resistance against the state. Rather, it is primarily their cultural and religious identity that make them targets for "re-education." This capacious rubric for labeling people as a threat to the state broadly aligns with witness accounts, documentary evidence, and satellite imagery that all point to internment on a very large scale.

Though Zhao enumerates the two groups separately, their membership almost certainly overlaps. Someone "influenced by extremist religious thought" in the south, for example, could also be harboring "pan-Turkist" tendencies. It's hard to know the size of this overlap, whether Zhao is talking about a total closer to two million people or four million people. But given regional demographics, the overlap could be rather small, the total number closer to three or four million: In 2018, some 3.5 million Uyghurs, Kazakhs, and Kyrgyz lived in northern Xinjiang—all Turkic groups the state deems liable to espouse "pan-Turkist" tendencies, meaning that two million people could potentially be designated among this group alone.

Nowhere does Zhao definitively say that either of these "two million" groups of people have been or will be incarcerated. Yet, time and again, high-level Chinese officials have made clear they believe "re-education" is key to containing terrorism and religious extremism. White papers, state media reports, and other official statements describe "re-education" centers as cutting off "terrorism and religious extremism at the source." In his speech, Zhao too lauds the "re-education" centers for successfully "implementing centralized re-education for those who have been influenced by extremist religious thought," suggesting that, if nothing else, both of these "two million" groups were the kind of people authorities sought to detain and transform.

In his speech, Chen, like Zhao, refers to those who have "been influenced by pro-Xinjiang independence, pan-Islamist, and pan-Turkist thinking," calling them a "relatively large group of people." Chen exhorts cadres to "keep the alarm bells ringing" and continue to execute Xi Jinping's "strategy for Xinjiang." This is consistent with statements by Zhao that more directly link Xi to the mass internment.

In the final section of his speech, Zhao discusses a practical implication of the broad rubric for "re-education" he has just outlined: the overcrowded prisons and detention facilities resulting from the mass incarceration campaign.

Zhao depicts a system of prisons and other internment facilities holding detainees in numbers that strain their capacity. The “success” of the “strike hard” and “de-extremification” campaigns had led, by mid-2018, to “a great number of excess detentions [relative to capacity]” (Zhao mentions “excess detentions” four times in the speech). In fact, Zhao makes note of measures taken to relieve the pressure on Xinjiang’s prisons, including bringing police from other parts of China to Xinjiang and transferring Uyghur prisoners from Xinjiang to other provinces, albeit in comparatively small numbers. Zhao assures regional officials that the central government would soon approve funding to construct additional detention centers in southern Xinjiang. He also asserts that Beijing would “increase the strength of its support” for covering the “high costs” of operating and maintaining Xinjiang’s internment facilities.

Though Zhao never says exactly how many people the region has incarcerated, his emphasis on overcrowding attests to very large numbers of detainees, and it aligns with witness testimonies from around that time. It also explains why, as demonstrated by satellite imagery, construction or expansion of internment facilities boomed in the second half of 2018. Evidently the central government had come through with the funding, just as Zhao promised. In 2021, experts estimated that expansion of detention facility space since 2016 would allow the region to hold at least one million new detainees, if they were housed according to state standards for minimum living space. If detention facilities were overcrowded, as Zhao indicates in his speech, then the space built after 2016 could hold well over a million people, and that is without even including the capacity of pre-existing detention facilities.

Further support for the one-to-two million estimate comes from other material in the Xinjiang Police Files. Spreadsheets containing information on more than 280,000 people living in Konasheher county show that in 2018 over 12 percent of all adults were in some form of internment or imprisonment. This accords with my earlier estimates that between 7.7 and 15.4 percent of Xinjiang’s adult Turkic minority population have at some point been interned, and suggests a total internment figure at or above one million people.

Still other documents in the Xinjiang Police Files refer to a category of “500,000 untrustworthy persons.” Though previous caches of leaked data also described detainees as “untrustworthy persons,” they did not mention a specifically defined set of “500,000 untrustworthy persons.” Like the references to the two “two million” groups, this phrase could indicate yet another group of people the government is targeting for “re-education.” (The government’s definition of “untrustworthy” appears extremely broad: A 32-year-old woman labeled as one of the “500,000 untrustworthy persons” was “detained for re-education” in July 2017 because she allegedly engaged in “unusual nightly activities” and her phone was “frequently turned off.”) Of note, the phrase “500,000 untrustworthy persons” appears in the same spreadsheets as the more general term “untrustworthy persons.” In my view, this indicates that “500,000 untrustworthy persons” potentially functions as a sub-category within the wider “untrustworthy” label, meaning that the total combined number of “untrustworthy persons” is in fact substantially larger than 500,000. Local directives within the Xinjiang Police Files make it clear that “untrustworthy” people should be locked up: One township-level notice from April 2018 states that “all those who are untrustworthy must be detained for re-education”; a few months later, a prefectural police chief said that “untrustworthy” people are to be “put into a trustworthy place to slowly transform them.”

Zhao’s speech also offers evidence for General Secretary Xi Jinping’s informed and active role in directing policy in Xinjiang. Zhao says Xi’s “important instructions on governing Xinjiang according to the law, unifying and stabilizing Xinjiang, and building Xinjiang over the long term” provide the basis for numerous policy priorities outlined in the speech, including “bringing the Vocational Skills Education and Training Center management work into the orbit of legalization” (i.e., establishing them as legally operating facilities). Zhao describes Xi as directing Xinjiang authorities to “conduct de-extremification work,” which according to Zhao includes the “transformation through education” work conducted in the “re-education” facilities. According to Zhao, after central Party leader Guo Shengkun reported on the

prison capacity challenges he witnessed during his visit to Xinjiang in April 2017, Xi himself ordered regional authorities to, “implement practical measures such as expanding the number of employed [staff in detention facilities], enlarging the capacity [of these facilities], and increasing investment [in these facilities] within the set time frame.”

Unsurprisingly, Zhao’s speech abounds in references to General Secretary Xi, to his leadership and vision, and to his close interest and guiding role in the governance of Xinjiang in the “new era.” Zhao credits Xi with having devised the plan by which the region is now enjoying “stability” and celebrates that plan as “entirely sagacious and correct.” Even if this kind of fawning language in part reflects the political necessity of ceaselessly praising the nation’s leader, Zhao’s speech suggests that Xi’s personal involvement in Xinjiang policy has determined actual developments on the ground. At the very least, Xi has had a detailed understanding of the mass internment campaign and played a role in directing it.

By early 2022, Xinjiang had reached the end of Beijing’s five-year strategy to pacify and subdue the region—meaning that, according to the timeline, Xinjiang is now in a state of “comprehensive stability.” Indeed, the visible police presence and onerous security checks of 2017 and 2018 have largely given way to today’s more imperceptible but still pervasive surveillance regime. In his June 2018 speech, Chen Quanguo explained that the region would shift toward a much more “invisible” security state, where the police force is “not reduced” but simply less evident, and where it can be “immediately” mobilized if required. Measures such as mass internment in “re-education” camps constituted what a group of Chinese scholars in an academic report referred to as “drastic short-term measures” that were “absolutely necessary and effective.”

And yet, even in 2017, in the transcript of another speech from the Xinjiang Police Files, Chen had already predicted that some of those detained in “re-education” camps “may not necessarily have been transformed well even after three or five years.” Indeed, while some detainees have been released, witness accounts and documentary evidence published through the Xinjiang Victims Database indicate that many others have since been sentenced to long prison terms. Zhao’s speech shows that Beijing prioritized not only the construction and expansion of “re-education” facilities, but also the prisons that would confine many individuals after their initial “re-education” period. The “re-education” work that Zhao says “must persist for a long time” is likely now being carried out in prisons instead of camps, which effectively serve as a legal mechanism for arbitrary incarceration.

Beijing’s campaign of repression in Xinjiang, which had relied on middle-of-the-night house raids and large-scale internment, has now entered a new phase. Under Xinjiang’s current Party secretary, Ma Xingrui, the region is now embarking on a multi-billion-dollar initiative to boost infrastructure construction and “high-quality economic development.”

However, in 2022, the regional government’s work plan described the struggle to enforce social stability as “still grim and complex.” In April, Ma gave the strongest indication yet that some forms of “re-education” will continue when he stated that Xinjiang will, “to the greatest possible extent, educate and save people who have been bewitched by extremist ideas”—a commonly used euphemism for “re-education” in camps. Many continue to languish in prisons and detention facilities. For the elderly, including important cultural and religious figures, their terms are tantamount to life sentences. Meanwhile, the state continues to destroy traditional community ties by means of forced labor transfers, separation of parents from children, eradication of the Uyghur language through boarding schools, and “optimization” of ethnic “population structures” through birth prevention policies and a planned migration of 300,000 Han Chinese settlers into Uyghur areas. Along with the muting of the region’s police presence, these measures and their support from the very highest reaches of the CCP’s leadership amount to a largely invisible, slow form of genocide.

6.2 Evidence from Classified Internal Documents (the “Xinjiang Papers”) of the Chinese Central Government’s Steering and Intent behind the Atrocities in Xinjiang

The text below is adapted from: Zenz, A. (2021d) “The Xinjiang Papers: An Introduction.” The Uyghur Tribunal, November 27, 2021. Revised December 13, 2021. Available from:

<https://uyghurtribunal.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/11/The-Xinjiang-Papers-An-Introduction-1.pdf>.

And from: Zenz, A. (2021e) The Xinjiang Papers: An Analysis of Key Findings and Implications for the Uyghur Tribunal in London. The Uyghur Tribunal, 9 December. Available from:

<https://uyghurtribunal.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/12/The-Xinjiang-Papers-An-Analysis-for-the-Uyghur-Tribunal.pdf>.

The Xinjiang Papers given to the Uyghur Tribunal contain highly sensitive material. Nearly all the material is classified as confidential. One document containing three speeches by Chinese President (more accurately: General Secretary) Xi Jinping is classified as “top secret” (绝密), China’s highest State Secret Classification Level for government documents. This denotes material that if leaked “will cause particularly serious damage to the security and interests of the country.”²⁷ This appears to be the first-ever instance that material with “top secret” statements made by a Chinese head of state have leaked into the public domain.²⁸

The material provides substantial evidence linking numerous aspects of Beijing’s crackdown in Xinjiang to explicit statements and demands made by central government figures in 2014, including:

- Mass internments in re-education camps
- Poverty alleviation through coercive labor transfers
- “Optimizing” the ethnic population distribution by increasing Han population shares
- Criminalizing customary religious practices
- Forcing hundreds of thousands Han officials to “become family” with ethnic populations
- Implementing Chinese language-focused education in centralized boarding schools.

Appendix A provides a detailed comparison of related statements with policies implemented after 2016/2017.

First, the documents state that in 2014, Xi Jinping himself authorized the Xinjiang government to draft a local legal regulation to address the issues of religious extremism and violent resistance. The resulting “De-Extremification Regulation” came into effect in April 2017 and is intimately linked with the re-education campaign.²⁹ Its October 2018 revision constituted the first official acknowledgement that so-called Vocational Skills Education and Training Centers (VSETCs, 职业技能教育培训中心) perform “re-education” (literally “transformation through education”, 教育转化).³⁰ VSETCs are a state euphemism for what are in effect high-security re-education internment camps. In its original report, the

²⁷ http://web.archive.org/web/20191127023402/http://www.npc.gov.cn/wxzl/wxzl/2000-12/10/content_4509.htm

²⁸ The so-called “Tiananmen Papers” purported to contain top secret government documents related to the 1989 massacre. However, there has been no verification of the originals or of the original Chinese classification designation, and the papers’ authenticity has been challenged (see <https://www.scmp.com/article/458154/other-tiananmen-controversy>).

²⁹ Zenz, Adrian. “Evidence of the Chinese Central Government’s Knowledge of and Involvement in Xinjiang’s Re-Education Internment Campaign.” The Jamestown Foundation. September 24, 2021. <https://jamestown.org/program/evidence-of-the-chinese-central-governments-knowledge-of-and-involvement-in-xinjiangs-re-education-internment-campaign/>.

³⁰ “新疆维吾尔自治区第十三届人民代表大会常务委员会公告（第7号）Announcement of the Standing Committee of the 13th People’s Congress of the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (No.7).” 新疆维吾尔自治区人大常委会. October 9, 2018. <https://web.archive.org/web/20181010124647/http://www.xjpcsc.gov.cn/1009/t4028e49c665347630166588b8cf40001001.html>.

New York Times famously cited Chen Quanguo’s mandate to “round up everyone who should be rounded up.” However, its report did not mention that Xi Jinping himself issued an arguably very similar demand when he mandated in 2014 that “those who should be seized should be seized, and those who should be sentenced should be sentenced.”³¹ Xi’s statements that religious extremism is like a “powerful psychedelic drug” and that acts of terror will “multiply like cancer cells” if extremist thought is not eradicated are quoted verbatim (and attributed to Xi) in a widely-cited March 2017 government document that likens re-education to free medical treatment for “sick thinking.”³² At the very time when Xi demanded that people’s “immunity” against extremist ideology must be increased, Uyghur regions were actively carrying out early forms of re-education and reported that these re-education efforts were “increasing the immunity...of ‘susceptible’ groups of people.”³³ In two separate speeches, Xi called religious extremism a “poison.” He argued that Xinjiang was stricken with a “heart sickness” that could only be cured by “heart medicine” in order to “support the correct, remove the evil.” A 2017 work report on re-education in a Uyghur region quoted the latter expression verbatim when stating that re-education must “support the correct, remove the evil.”³⁴

Second, the material shows that the transfer of nearly 3 million rural surplus laborers into full-time employment through a “vigorous” development of labor-intensive industries was designed to prevent Uyghurs from “having nothing to do” and therefore being “easily exploited by evildoers.” Xi Jinping similarly suggested that unemployed persons are liable to “provoke trouble”, and that employment in companies promotes ethnic mixing and helps workers to “resist religious extremism.” He argues that such employment will lead ethnic workers to “imperceptibly study Chinese culture” (i.e. without them realizing it).³⁵ The stated reasons for Xinjiang’s labor transfers are therefore more political than economic: while the promotion of employment through labor transfers into labor-intensive industries was not expected to make a greater contribution to the economy or government revenue than other industries, it was considered a “matter of vital importance” to “Xinjiang’s long-term peace and stability.” In a classified May 2014 speech, a leading central government figure announced a plan to “drive at least one million people into employment”³⁶ through developing the textile and garment industries – a plan that was formalized in February 2018.³⁷ Xi himself called for a systematic expansion of ethnic citizens from Xinjiang going to eastern China for “education, employment and residence.” China’s premier Li Keqiang notes that Chinese companies have struggled to recruit ethnic workers in Xinjiang due to the latter’s maladaptation to modern society. He argues that Xinjiang must therefore “transform [people’s] way of thinking about employment,” language that was soon after mirrored in official directives on the forceful promotion of labor transfers.³⁸ In sum, the mandates contained in the Xinjiang Papers quite directly

³¹ The relevant sections from the original documents with transcript page numbers for this and subsequent quotes can be found in the Introduction, Authentication and Transcription for documents no.1 and 2 (some of them are also found further below in this Introduction to the Xinjiang Papers).

³² “宣讲稿: 到教育转化班学习是对思想上患病群众的一次免费住院治疗 Presentation: Studying in the Educational Transformation Facilities Is Free Hospitalization for the Ideologically Ill Individuals.” 壹读. March 31, 2017. <http://web.archive.org/web/20211119192652/https://read01.com/zh-sg/n3L6Do.html>.

³³ 潘从武 and 刘琰. “新疆司法厅实施‘土壤改良计划’, 主攻‘去宗教极端化.’” *The Paper* (法制日报, May 20, 2016). http://web.archive.org/web/20211014204208/http://m.thepaper.cn/renmin_prom.jsp?contid=1471896&from=renmin.

³⁴ “新源县司法局 2017 年工作计划.” 新疆新源. 新源县人民政府网, May 26, 2017. http://web.archive.org/web/20190630195027/http://www.xinyuan.gov.cn/info/egovinfo/1001/common/inf_content/xy022-02_A/2017-0526003.htm.

³⁵ Chinese: 潜移默化学习中华文化 (Document no.2, p.20).

³⁶ Full sentence: 比如, 对发展纺织服装产业提出了一系列的扶持政策和要求, 是要带动至少一百万人就业, 这件事对新疆社会稳定和长治久安至关重要. (Document no.2, p.76).

³⁷ “《新疆纺织服装产业发展规划(2018-2023 年)》印发实施.” 新疆维吾尔自治区人民政府. March 2, 2018. <http://web.archive.org/web/20180825053820/http://www.xinjiang.gov.cn/2018/03/02/148047.html>.

³⁸ Chinese: 转变就业观念 (document no.2, p.40). Subsequent Xinjiang directives from 2016 are found for example at “关于开展自治区脱贫攻坚转移就业专项行动的通知 (新人社发 (2016) 74 号).” 中国就业. 人社部农民工司, July 4, 2016. <https://archive.is/iQUUt>.

undergird the implementation of significantly more coercive labor transfer mechanisms between 2015 and 2017.

Third, the documents show that plans to optimize the ethnic population composition, which are connected to Xinjiang's campaign of suppressing births, can be linked to statements and demands made by the central government. In a top-secret speech, Xi argued that "population proportion and population security are important foundations for long-term peace and stability."³⁹ This statement was later quoted verbatim by a senior Xinjiang official in July 2020, who then argued that southern Xinjiang's Han population share was "too low."⁴⁰ Other classified documents lament "severe imbalances in the distribution of the ethnic population" and a "severely monoethnic" population structure (an overconcentration of Uyghurs) in southern Xinjiang. They mandate that by 2022, 300,000 settlers (mostly Han from eastern China) are to be moved to regions in southern Xinjiang administered by the Xinjiang Construction and Production Corps (XPCC), also known as '*bingtuan*', a paramilitary colonial settler entity, with the explicitly stated aim of increasing Han population shares in the region. Xi himself ordered the abolishment of preferential birth control policies for ethnic groups in southern Xinjiang that had previously allowed them to have more children than the Han. In the context of increasing preferential treatment for the Han population, he demand that birth control policies in southern Xinjiang were to be made "equal for all ethnic groups." This statement became a euphemism that since 2017 undergirded policies that drastically reduced birth rates of ethnic groups. To name just one pertinent example, Xinjiang's Health Commission established a set of performance targets in 2019 that employed the exact same expression – "implement a birth control policy that is equal for all ethnic groups" – as the stated overall goal behind a new mandate to reduce birth rates in southern Xinjiang by "at least 4 per mile," to provide free birth control surgeries that included female sterilization procedures, and to achieve an adoption rate of "long-term effective birth prevention" measures of at least 90 percent in rural regions.⁴¹ A central government directive from December 2017 (document no.7) that is part of the leak makes a similar demand, to "enact birth control policies that are equal for each ethnic group", yet bluntly adds that this measure is specifically designed to "promote equal population growth for each ethnic group."⁴² Xi further mandates that the XPCC is to "bring into play [it's] role in optimizing population resources and become a staging area for optimizing the population" in the Uyghur heartlands.⁴³ Another leaked classified central government document indicates that this goal is to be achieved by 2030.⁴⁴ All of these mandates is precisely in line with recommendations made by numerous Xinjiang academics and experts on population growth and "population optimization," who have unilaterally called for such measures.⁴⁵

³⁹ Chinese: 人口比例和人口安全是长治久安的重要基础 (document no.1, p.40).

⁴⁰ "刘以雷老师参加'中国区域经济 50 人论坛'专题研讨会并作为代表发言." 新疆大学经济与管理学院. July 14, 2020. <http://web.archive.org/web/20210220221018/http://ems.xju.edu.cn/info/1055/1661.htm> AND Zenz, Adrian. "'End the Dominance of the Uyghur Ethnic Group': An Analysis of Beijing's Population Optimization Strategy in Southern Xinjiang." *Central Asian Survey* 40, no. 3 (August 24, 2021): 291–312. <https://doi.org/10.1080/02634937.2021.1946483>. (Open access version at Zenz, Adrian. "'End the Dominance of the Uyghur Ethnic Group': An Analysis of Beijing's Population Optimization Strategy in Southern Xinjiang." (June 8, 2021). *Central Asian Survey*. Available at SSRN: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3862512.)

⁴¹ 在南疆实行各民族平等的计划生育政策 (Document no.2, p.22). 2019 Xinjiang Health Commission planning document: wjw.xinjiang.gov.cn/hfpc/yjsgk/201901/e99e758857c0417dbf8e76377efc4f11/files/35885e0814254402bd1b71c7062d31f0.xls (since deleted), archived download: "2019 年自治区卫生健康委员会机关及直属（管）单位绩效目标." Accessed November 26, 2021. <https://bit.ly/3kYC94i>.

⁴² Chinese: 落实各民族平等的计划生育政策 和 促进各民族人口均衡发展 (Document no.7, p.20). Note that 均衡 can be translated as either "equal" OR "balanced," and likely here refers to both (with "equal" constituting an important aspect in official perceptions of "balanced").

⁴³ Chinese: 成为优化人口的中转站 (Document no.1, p.40)

⁴⁴ Document no.7.

⁴⁵ See Zenz. "'End the Dominance of the Uyghur Ethnic Group'." <https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/02634937.2021.1946483#metrics-content>. (Open access alternative: Zenz. "End the Dominance of the Uyghur Ethnic Group." SSRN: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3862512.)

Fourth, the classified material shows that numerous other policies designed to assimilate and control the region's ethnic groups including a Chinese (Mandarin) language focused education in centralized boarding schools, more intensive forms of predictive policing through the analysis of big data, or sending Han officials to live with Uyghur families, can be directly linked to statements or explicit demands made by Xi Jinping. For example, Xi demanded that rural children should be put into boarding schools so that they would “study in school, live in school, grow up in school.”⁴⁶ His observation that “some religious people interfere with matters of the secular life” was soon after formalized as the mandate that “religion is strictly forbidden to interfere with secular lifestyles.”⁴⁷ By 2017, this policy then undergirded the internment of persons in re-education camps who had offered customary prayers at funerals or participated in customary religious wedding ceremonies.⁴⁸ In short, Xi's remarks and requirements provided the basis for criminalizing most of the customary religious practices that are part of ethnic populations' daily lives.

The material divulges a wide range of other important information. Xinjiang's Party Secretary Chen Quanguo personally commanded officials to “round up all who should be rounded up” and that the region's vocational re-education facilities (VSETCs) are to be “unswervingly operated for a long time.”⁴⁹ The documents state that the state should show “absolutely no mercy” towards its “enemies,” plans by Beijing to sinicize Islam, and the construction of new high-security prisons, detention centers and military bases in the regions administered by the XPCC. They detail how officials in Xinjiang who did not fully obey their orders and failed to detain large numbers of the local Uyghur population in re-education facilities were severely punished.

Evidence Regarding Intent

The files also show the motivation behind these unprecedented measures. In a top-secret speech, Xi argues that the Belt and Road Initiative, his signature foreign policy project, requires a stable domestic security environment. He asserts that the entire country's national security and the achievement of China's major goals in the 21st century are in jeopardy if the situation in southern Xinjiang cannot be brought under control. Xi demands that the region engages in an all-out battle to “prevent Xinjiang's violent terrorist activities from spreading to the rest of China.” He notes that since violent acts have already spread to other regions of China, “[t]herefore we propose that Xinjiang is currently in ... a painful period of interventionary treatment...”⁵⁰ Xi argues that the “stability across Xinjiang and even the whole country depends on southern Xinjiang.” In both of his speeches, Xi argues that the achievement of that goal is a matter of China's “national security” (document no.1, pp.3, 6, 35; document no.2, pp. 2,4)

Xi declares that Xinjiang's stability maintenance work is “at a historical stage” (document no.2, p.7). He argues that “[w]e must have strong faith in our victory, make a determined effort, and even pay a special price sometimes” (document no.2, p.7).⁵¹

In the face of rampant violent terrorist activities and frenzied violent terrorists,
we must focus our current fight on a severe crackdown on violent terrorist

⁴⁶ Chinese: 让适龄的孩子们学习在学校、生活在学校、成长在学校 Document no.2, p.21.

⁴⁷ Chinese: 有一些信教的人干预世俗化生活的事情, 如干预婚丧嫁娶、生活方式等, 这个也是不能让它蔓延开来的 (Document no.1, p.33), and 张玉和常雪梅. “中共新疆维吾尔自治区委员会关于全面推进依法治疆建设法治新疆的意见.” 人民网. 新疆日报, November 28, 2014.

<http://web.archive.org/web/20210201050726/http://cpc.people.com.cn/n/2014/1128/c64387-26115134-2.html>.

⁴⁸ Zenz, Adrian. “The Karakax List: Dissecting the Anatomy of Beijing's Internment Drive in Xinjiang.” *The Journal of Political Risk* 7, no. 2, (February 17, 2020). <https://www.jpolrisk.com/karakax/>.

⁴⁹ Chinese: 要把职业教育培训中心坚定不移长期办下去 (Document no.8, p.7).

⁵⁰ Chinese: 所以, 我们提出, 新疆正处于... 干预治疗阵痛期... (Document no.2, p.6)

⁵¹ 我们要坚定必胜信心, 作出特别努力, 有时还要付出特殊代价。

activities. We must not hesitate or waver in the use of the weapons of the people’s democratic dictatorship, and focus our energy on executing a crushing blow that buys us time and initiative for solving the deep-seated issues regarding Xinjiang’s long-term peace and stability. (document no.2, p.8)⁵²

Especially the latter statement about “initiating a crushing blow that buys us time” constitutes an apt description of Beijing’s strategy in Xinjiang since Xi’s speech, and especially since early 2017, when the region initiated an unprecedented campaign of mass internment (along with a range of other severe measures).

In both of his speeches, Xi argues that the origins of Xinjiang’s “terrorism” problem are external, yet that such violence can flourish due to Xinjiang’s domestic conditions that render it susceptible to these external influences:

As I said before, there are ‘seeds’ outside the [national] borders, the ‘soil’ within the borders, and a ‘market’ online – these are the main causes behind the highly active occurrence of violent terrorist activities in Xinjiang. (document no.2, p.7; compare document no.1, p.4)⁵³

By firmly locating the reasons for Xinjiang’s ethnic conflict in a religious extremism that is predominantly identified as an external (foreign) force, Xi’s two 2014 speeches effectively set the stage for the region’s evolving counterterrorism-through-re-education strategy. If the key domestic issue was the fertile breeding ground in local minds for foreign fanatic influences, and if one believes that re-education can change minds and hearts, then “inoculating” the susceptible population through a period of re-education internment would be the logical response.

Another central government figure who made important remarks on the state’s intention is Yu Zhengsheng (俞正声). In 2014, he was head of the Central Committee Xinjiang Work Coordination Small Group (中央新疆工作协调小组) and chairman of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC; 中国人民政治协商会议全国委员会) – the latter post made him China’s fourth-highest ranked official at the time.

Yu emphasizes that in the current “painful period of interventionary treatment” (干预治疗阵痛期), the achievements of Xinjiang Work goals are paramount, not only for the region, but for the entire nation. Like Xi, he notes that the achievement of stability maintenance is a matter of “national security” (国家安全). To quote:

We must thoroughly comprehend that doing a proper job in Xinjiang is not only a matter concerning the region, but also a major issue for the whole party and the entire country. If the Xinjiang situation is not handled properly, it will affect the overall situation regarding reform, development and stability of the country, and the realization of the “Two Centennial Goals.” (document no.2, p.64)⁵⁴

⁵² “面对十分猖獗的暴力恐怖活动，面对丧心病狂的暴力恐怖分子，必须把严厉打击暴力恐怖活动作为当前斗争的重点，毫不迟疑、毫不动摇运用人民民主专政的武器，集中力量进行毁灭性打击，为从根本上解决影响新疆长治久安的深层次问题赢得时间和主动。”

⁵³ 我说过，境外有“种子”、境内有“土壤”、网上有“市场”，是导致新疆暴力恐怖活动呈活跃态势的主要原因。

⁵⁴ 要深刻认识做好新疆工作，不仅是新疆的事情，而且是全党全国的大事，如果新疆的问题处理不好，将会影响全国改革发展稳定大局，影响“两个一百年”奋斗目标的实现。

China's Two Centennial Goals are 1) to "build a moderately prosperous society" by 2021, the centenary of the CCP, and 2) to "build a modern socialist country that is prosperous, strong, democratic, culturally advanced and harmonious" by 2049, centenary of the People's Republic of China.⁵⁵ Together, they arguably constitute Beijing's most important political goals in the coming decades.

Summary

The evidence from the new material shows that top Chinese leaders viewed the achievement of "stability maintenance" and related goals such as religious "de-extremification" in Xinjiang to be a matter of China's national security, crucial to achieving primary long-term political goals.

The evidence further shows that in late 2016, right before the implementation of a set of unprecedented measures in Xinjiang, these statements by central government leaders were given to Xinjiang's cadres as crucial study material, preparing their minds and hearts for the unconditional implementation of the upcoming measures.

6.3 Evidence of the Chinese Central Government's Knowledge of and Involvement in Xinjiang's Re-Education Internment Campaign

Note: this section has been adopted from Zenz (2022c), available at <https://jamestown.org/program/evidence-of-the-chinese-central-governments-knowledge-of-and-involvement-in-xinjiangs-re-education-internment-campaign/>.

Previously unanalyzed central government and state media commentary from the People's Republic of China (PRC) surrounding the introduction of the crucial March 2017 "XUAR De-Extremification Regulation" ([新疆维吾尔自治区去极端化条例], hereafter 'Regulation') as well as its October 2018 revision show that several important central government institutions were closely and directly involved in the drafting and even approval of this key legislation. The March 2017 Regulation legalized Xinjiang's re-education internment campaign in the eyes of the state and directly preceded the campaign's inception.⁵⁶ The October 2018 revision contained blunt mandates for re-education in so-called Vocational Skills Education and Training Centers (VSETC, 职业技能教育培训中心, Zhiye jineng jiaoyu peixun zhongxin, a state euphemism for what are in effect high-security internment camps).

Two of the three central government institutions involved can be directly linked to some of the most powerful members of China's top decision-making body, the Politburo Standing Committee (PSC, 中国共产党中央政治局常务委员会). Specifically, they are overseen by the Politburo Standing Committee's third- and fourth-ranked members, who rank directly under General Secretary Xi Jinping (first-ranked) and Premier Li Keqiang (second-ranked).

Xinjiang officials have asserted that both the Regulation and the vocational "centers" implement central government policy for the region and the "important instructions" of Xi Jinping (Humanrights.cn, November 23, 2018; Chinaxinjiang.cn, March 31, 2017). Such statements contextualize Xi's 2020 assertion that "ethnic work [in Xinjiang] has been a success" (Xinhua News, September 26, 2020).

⁵⁵ "CPC Q&A: What Are China's Two Centennial Goals and Why Do They Matter?" Xinhua News, October 17, 2017. http://web.archive.org/web/20180223145958/http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2017-10/17/c_136686770.htm.

⁵⁶ Legal experts have pointed out that Xinjiang's detentions for re-education can only be legalized through a formal statute passed by the NPC or its standing committee, meaning that Xinjiang's local legislation is by itself insufficient ([Lawfare](#), October 11, 2018).

Finally, there is substantial circumstantial evidence that when Xi personally addressed Xinjiang’s leadership in March 2017, he spoke in direct relation to the state’s mass internment campaign that would begin weeks later.

The March 2017 De-Extremification Regulation laid the foundation for the “normalization, standardization, and legalization” (常态化、规范化、法治化, *changtaihua, guifanhua, fazhihua*) of Xinjiang’s re-education (lit. “transformation through education”—教育转化, *jiaoyu zhuanhua*) through “centralized education” involving “behavioral correction” (XUAR Government, March 30, 2017; Legal Daily, April 11, 2017). Re-education camp construction bids and anecdotal accounts from the ground indicated that Xinjiang’s campaign of mass internment began right around when the Regulation came into effect (Zenz, 2018). The PRC has also stated that the Regulation constitutes the legal basis for the VSETC (PRC Consulate-General in Brisbane, November 30, 2018). The Regulation was revised in October 2018 to fully legitimize the VSETC, referring to them as “re-education institutions” (教育转化机构, *jiaoyu zhuanhua jigou*) (Standing Committee of the XUAR People’s Congress, October 9, 2018). Construction bids for such “centers” were already being published by the fall of 2017 (Zenz, 2018).

An April 11, 2017 article published by Legal Daily (法制日报, *Fazhi Ribao*), a newspaper backed by the state’s Central Political and Legal Affairs Commission (CPLC, 中央政法委, *Zhongyang zheng fa wei*) that describes itself as “the party’s main mouthpiece on the political and legal front,” noted that the drafting of the Regulation took “over two years” (Legal Daily, April 11, 2017; Legal Daily, August 1, 2020; China Court, April 6, 2017). The process involved extensive consultations (lit. “extensively solicited opinions”, 广泛征求意见, *guangfan zhengqiu yijian*) with three important central government organs: the Office of the Central Xinjiang Work Coordination Small Group (中央新疆工作协调小组办公室, *Zhongyang Xinjiang gongzuo xietiao xiaozu bangongshi*, often shortened to 中央新疆办, *Zhongyang Xinjiang ban*); the Legislative Affairs Commission of the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress (NPC) (全国人大法工委, *Quanguo renda fa gong wei*), and the State Administration for Religious Affairs (SARA, 国家宗教局, *Guojia zongjiao ju*) (Legal Daily, April 11, 2017).

Legal Daily’s information came from Qin Wei (秦维), director of the Legislative Affairs Commission of the Standing Committee of the XUAR People’s Congress (自治区人大常委会法制工作委员会, *Zizhuqu renda chang wei hui fazhi gongzuo weiyuanhui*), who was closely involved in the drafting process (Turpan City People’s Government, September 1, 2016). Qin added that besides these three central government institutions, more than 20 relevant departments and bureaus in Xinjiang were also involved. In May 2016, when Qin discussed the review of a preliminary draft of the Regulations at the 22nd meeting of the Standing Committee of the XUAR People’s Congress, he stated that both the national Chinese Communist Party (CCP) Central Committee (中国共产党中央委员会, *Zhongguo Gongchandang zhongyang weiyuanhui*, often shortened to 党中央, *dangzhongyang*) and the regional XUAR version of that body “attach great importance to the work of de-extremification,” and that both had proposed “a series of major deployments and decisions” (XUAR People’s Government, May 26, 2016).

The nature of the involvement of the Central Xinjiang Work Coordination Small Group is further clarified in a Work Report of the Standing Committee of the XUAR People’s Congress published in January 2017 by Tianshan Net:

During the deliberation process of implementing the Counter-terrorism Law and the De-radicalization Regulation, in accordance with the instructions of the [XUAR] Party Committee, it [the Standing Committee of the XUAR People’s Congress] also specially reported to the Office of the Central Xinjiang Work Coordination Small

Group for guidance, [to] ensure that the legislative work transformed the party’s propositions into legal norms that all people abide by (Phoenix Information, January 13, 2017) (emphasis added).

The 2018 revision of the Regulation involved an even more direct link with the central government. The revision process is described in a previously unexamined “Explanation” (说明, shuoming) of the Regulations, published only as an appendix to a related communique of the Standing Committee of the XUAR People’s Congress (新疆维吾尔自治区人民代表大会常务委员会, Xinjiang Weiwuer Zizhuqu renmin daibiao dahui changwu weiyuanhui). The Explanation states that:

Relevant leaders of the Party Committee of the Autonomous Region, relevant leaders of the Standing Committee of the XUAR People’s Congress and relevant comrades of the Legislative Affairs Commission made a special trip to the Legislative Work Commission of the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress [in Beijing] to report on the revision. The Legislative Affairs Commission of the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress expressed its full affirmation of the role of the autonomous region’s local laws and regulations in counterterrorism and stability maintenance work, expressed approval for the amendments to the “Regulation”, and proposed specific amendments to form a draft amendment, which was reported [back] to the autonomous region’s Standing Committee of the Party Committee for review and approval (XUAR People’s Congress, September 10, 2018).

The deliberations of the revisions made by the NPC apparently took place during the 21st meeting of the directors of the Standing Committee of the XUAR People’s Congress in August 2018 (Xinjiang Daily, August 11, 2018).

The close involvement of these central government institutions in the drafting of the Regulation and its 2018 revision (in the case of the NPC) is of extreme significance.

The chairman of the NPC Standing Committee (currently Li Zhanshu, 栗战书) to whom the Legislative Affairs Commission reports, is the third-ranked member of the PSC, (Congressional Research Service, March 20, 2013). Wang Yang (汪洋), head of the Central Xinjiang Work Coordination Small Group, is the fourth-ranked member of the PSC, and also chairman of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC; 中国人民政治协商会议全国委员会, Zhongguo renmin ghengzhi xieshang huiyi quanguo weiyuanhui), which represents a central part of the CCP’s United Front system (China Leadership Monitor, May 16, 2018).⁵⁷ The PSC consists of seven members and is China’s supreme decision-making body, more powerful than the Politburo itself.

Practically speaking, the direct and close involvement of the NPC Standing Committee’s Legislative Affairs Commission and the Central Xinjiang Work Coordination Small Group in the drafting of the 2017 Regulation (and the Legislative Affairs Commission’s further involvement in its 2018 revision) provides tangible evidence that the framing of Xinjiang’s de-extremification through re-education campaign was undertaken with the direct knowledge of leading figures in China’s most powerful policy, legislative and advisory bodies (see Figure 1). This effectively implicates Xi’s inner circle of power in the atrocities committed in Xinjiang.

⁵⁷ Wang Yang’s predecessor was Yu Zhengsheng (俞正声) (Gov.cn, April 3, 2014).




Figure 1: The Politburo Standing Committee is the most powerful decision-making body of the national-level Communist Party hierarchy. (Source: Congressional Research Service).

In addition, the new findings shed further light on the involvement of Hu Lianhe (胡联合), who defended Xinjiang's re-education campaign at the United Nations in Geneva in August 2018 following China's first admission of the existence of vocational "centers." Hu has been a deputy director of the Office of the Central Committee Xinjiang Work Coordination Small Group since 2012 (China News, July 17, 2017; China Brief, October 10, 2018). The close involvement of his institution means that Hu would have been involved in the entire two-year drafting of the Regulation. This strengthens the link between this pivotal figure in the central government and the Xinjiang re-education campaign.

Xinjiang's faithful implementation of the central government's strategy for the region was also affirmed by Xi Jinping himself in a September 2020 speech at the Third Central Xinjiang Work Forum. Xi said, "Xinjiang is enjoying a favorable setting of social stability... The facts have abundantly demonstrated that our national minority work has been a success" (Xinhua, September 26, 2020).

6.4 Sanctions Recommendations for Central Government Officials Implicated in the Atrocities in Xinjiang

Based on the available evidence, the following individuals are recommended for human rights-related sanctions. Note: for statements without citation, most of the details of positions and date ranges comes from Chinese Wikipedia or Baidu Baike entries for the respective individuals.

Members of the Central Government:

- Xi Jinping (习近平), General Secretary, implicated by his April and May 2014 confidential speeches in Xinjiang and at the Second Central Xinjiang Work Forum, as well as by Zhao Kezhi's June 2018 speech stating that Xi approved of the mass internment drive and had ordered the construction of expanded and new internment facilities, as well as the recruitment of additional prison / camp security staff. Xi asserted in his speech at the 2020 Third Central Xinjiang Work Forum that Beijing's policies in Xinjiang have been "totally correct" ([SCMP](#), 2020).
- Yu Zhengsheng (俞振声), head of the Central Xinjiang Work Coordination Small Group (2012 to 2019), chairman of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC) that oversees United Front (UWFD) work (from March 2013 until March 2018), member of the Politburo Standing Committee (PSC, from 2012 to 2017). See discussion above.

- Wang Yang (汪洋), head of the Central Xinjiang Work Coordination Small Group (since 2019), CPPCC chairman (since March 2018), fourth-ranked member of the Politburo Standing Committee (PSC). See discussion above.
- Generally, members of the Central Xinjiang Work Coordination Small Group (中央新疆工作协调小组) between mid-2016 and end of 2018 (or until the end of 2019).
- Shi Dagang (史大刚), Director of the Small Group Office (中央新疆工作协调小组办公室主任) since 2018, previously Deputy Head of the UFWD, between 2011 and 2016 Vice Chairman of the XUAR government ([UFWD](#), 2016). In June 2016, Shi visited Kashgar to inspect “de-extremification” initiatives ([Huanqiu](#), 2016).
- Li Zhanshu (栗战书), Chairman of the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress (NPC) since 2018, between 2017 and 2018 Director of the Office of the Central National Security Committee (中央国家安全委员会办公室主任), since 2017 third-ranked member of the Politburo Standing Committee (PSC), regarded as a top advisor of Xi Jinping and members of his inner circle.
- Meng Jianzhu (孟建柱), Secretary of the CCP Central Political and Legal Affairs Commission (CPLAC) from 2012 to late 2017, previously Minister of Public Security from 2007 to 2012.
- Guo Shengkun (郭声琨), Secretary of CPLAC since late 2017, previously Minister of Public Security (until 2017).
- Zhao Kezhi (赵克志), Minister of Public Security from late 2017 to June 2022, and CPLAC Deputy Secretary. Implicated also and especially by his June 2018 speech (see above).
- Xiong Xuanguo (熊选国), Deputy Minister of the Justice Department (司法部副部长) since October 2016, previously head of the XUAR CPLAC from 2011 to October 2016, member of the XUAR De-Extremification Work Leading Small Group (“去极端化”工作领导小组) in 2016, an entity described as directly reviewing and planning de-extremification and “transformation through education” (re-education) campaigns linked to the imminent campaign of mass internment.⁵⁸ Xiong gave the infamous April 2015 interview outlining in detail the need to implement large-scale re-education for de-extremification, and would have played a leading role in the development of the mass re-education internment campaign.⁵⁹
- Liu Zhiqiang (刘志强), Deputy Minister of the Justice Department (司法部副部长), accompanied Zhao Kezhi at his June 2018 visit to Xinjiang (the group inspected southern Xinjiang’s re-education camps) and is mentioned in Zhao’s classified June 2018 speech. In that speech, Liu’s ministry is highlighted as having increased staff positions and provided additional police staff for Xinjiang’s prisons, as well as facilitating the transfer of prisoners from Xinjiang to other provinces.
- Liu Yuejin (刘跃进), member of the Party Committee of the Ministry of Public Security and national Anti-Terrorism Commissioner (公安部反恐专员[副部长级], 党委委员) between December 2015 and June 2020. He accompanied Zhao Kezhi at his June 2018 visit to Xinjiang (the group inspected southern Xinjiang’s re-education camps) and is mentioned in Zhao’s classified June 2018 speech.
- Hu Lianhe (胡联合), a deputy director of the Small Group Office since 2012. Defended Xinjiang’s re-education campaign at the United Nations in Geneva in August 2018 following China’s first admission of the existence of vocational “centers.”
- Lu Xin (鲁昕), Deputy Head of the Small Group (中央新疆工作协调小组办公室副主任) from January 2016 to December 2018, formerly Deputy Head of the Education Department ([ChinaNews](#), 2016).

⁵⁸ <https://archive.ph/vyWC4>

⁵⁹ See <https://news.ifeng.com/mainland/special/xjqjdh/> and also <https://news.ifeng.com/mainland/special/xjqjdh/xxg.shtml>.

- Members of the Legislative Work Commission of the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress (全国人大法工委) between early 2016 and autumn 2018.
- Leading members of the National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC, 国家发改委) at least between January and July 2018. This includes most notably He Lifeng (何立峰), Party Secretary and Director of the NDRC (国家发展和改革委员会主任、党组书记) since 2017, also Vice Chairman of the 13th National Committee of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference (十三届全国政协副主席) since 2017 ([NDRC](#)).
- Leading members of the State Administration for Religious Affairs SARA (国家宗教局) and the State Council's Legislative Affairs Office (国务院法制办) between November 2016 and February 2017.

7.0 Forced Labor and Implicated Companies

7.1 Implicated Sectors

Companies in many sectors are benefiting from human rights violations targeting Uyghurs and other Turkic peoples, including forced labor, both in the Uyghur homeland and in cities across China. Key, high-risk industries complicit in Uyghur forced labor include the global apparel and textiles sector, the solar sector, car batteries, agriculture, electronics, toys, automotive, among numerous others.⁶⁰ According to the US Government's Xinjiang Business Supply Chain Advisory⁶¹ of July 13 2021, issued by the Department of Homeland Security as well as five other cabinet-level departments, in Annex 2, Industries/goods implicated include following⁶²:

- Agriculture (including such products as raw cotton, hami melons, korla pears, tomato products, and garlic)
- Cell Phones
- Construction
- Cotton, Cotton Yarn, Cotton Fabric, Ginning, Spinning Mills, and Cotton Products
- Electronics Assembly
- Extractives (including coal, copper, hydrocarbons, oil, uranium, and zinc)
- Fake hair and human hair wigs, hair accessories
- Food processing factories
- Footwear
- Gloves
- Hospitality Services
- Metallurgical grade silicon
- Noodles
- Printing Products
- Renewable Energy (polysilicon, ingots, wafers, crystalline silicon solar cells, crystalline silicon solar photovoltaic modules)
- Stevia

⁶⁰ <https://www.regulations.gov/comment/DHS-2022-0001-0162>

⁶¹ Department of Homeland Security. (2021) "Xinjiang Supply Chain Business Advisory." <https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2021/07/Xinjiang-Business-Advisory-13July2021-1.pdf>

⁶² Department of Homeland Security. (2021) "Xinjiang Supply Chain Business Advisory." <https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/xinjiang-business-advisory-13july2021-1.pdf>.

- Sugar
- Textiles (including such products as apparel, bedding, carpets, wool, viscose)
- Toys

7.2 Key High-Risk Sectors

Concerning companies in the cotton, textile, and garment supply chains—Xinjiang’s cotton lint production provides for over 85 percent of China’s total cotton production and 20 percent of global output. After the cotton is ginned and classed in Xinjiang, most cotton bales are transported to China’s eastern provinces to be further processed into yarn. Roughly one-fifth of Xinjiang cotton remains within the autonomous region for yarn production. In addition, China is the world’s largest cotton lint and cotton yarn importer. Cotton grown in Xinjiang accounts for roughly 60 percent of cotton yarn available to produce cotton fabric in China. China is the world’s largest cotton fabric exporter, with exports accounting for over 20 percent of cotton fabric production.⁶³

Concerning companies in the solar supply chain, as of 2020, China controlled an estimated 70 percent of the global supply for solar-grade polysilicon and China also dominated manufacturing in other downstream solar photovoltaic (PV) components including ingots, wafers, and cells that are assembled into solar modules. Around 95 percent of solar PV modules rely on solar-grade polysilicon. In 2020, five of the top six solar-grade polysilicon companies, by capacity, were headquartered in China, with 45 percent of the world’s supply of solar-grade polysilicon coming from four producers with operations in Xinjiang.⁶⁴

7.2 XPCC

The XPCC, which has been sanctioned by the U.S. government in connection with serious human rights abuses, is closely connected with polysilicon production in Xinjiang. As of June 2021, the U.S. Department of Labor’s List of Goods Produced by Child Labor or Forced Labor includes polysilicon produced in China, given evidence of the production of polysilicon for solar panels by forced labor connected to Xinjiang in particular. Between 2016 and 2018, many polysilicon manufacturers used a government-sponsored corporate incentive to employ “surplus labor transfers.” Reporting indicates that within these companies there are indicators of forced labor, including restricting workers from quitting, traveling or participating in religious services, paying less than minimum wage, applying harsh or unsafe work conditions, and threatening detention.

A report by C4ADS using publicly available information revealed that despite severe sanctions against the XPCC by the United States and the European Union, it has continued to profit from Uyghur forced labor while retaining access to international financial markets and global supply chains in ways that implicate vast numbers of western companies, investors, and consumers. After mapping out more than 2,913 subsidiaries majority-owned by the XPCC, C4ADS specifically found that a) the XPCC engages in domestic and regional trade that feeds into global supply chains, often through Central Asia and Russia; b) such trade involves products that the United States government deems at high risk of forced labor, including cotton and tomato products; c) these products are then purchased by numerous US and global retailers and intermediary suppliers, including well-known brands; d) the XPCC uses foreign subsidiaries to conduct development-related activities in Central Asia through contracts with regional governments and the Asian Development Bank, e) the XPCC retains access to international liquidity by listing on

⁶³ Department of State. (2021) “Xinjiang Supply Chain Business Advisory.” <https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2021/07/Xinjiang-Business-Advisory-13July2021-1.pdf>. Annex 3.

⁶⁴ Ibid.

Chinese financial markets its own publicly traded subsidiaries, in which foreign investors are invested including major US and Western banks and financial institutions.⁶⁵

7.3 Implicated Companies List

A (partial) list of companies suspected or with proven ties to Uyghur forced labor either directly or indirectly include⁶⁶:

Mondelez International and its subsidiaries 5 Star, Alpen Gold, Barni, Belvita, Bournvita, Cadbury, Chips Ahoy!, Clorets, Club Social, Cote d’Or, Enjoy Life Foods, Freia, Halls, and Honey Maid. ○ Supply chain links to sugar, and tomatoes from Xinjiang ([Chinafile](#))

● **Adidas**

- Supply chain links to Haoyuanpeng Garment Group / Haoyuanpeng Clothing Company (Anhui) ([ASPI](#)) ([corporate link](#)) (labor transfers) (Xinjiang ai.d source)
- Supply chain links to Huaifu Fashion Co + Huaifu Top Dyed Melange Yarn Co Ltd (ASPI) (Laundering Cotton) via Tung Mung Textile
- Supply chain links to Qingdao Jifa Group via Qingdao Jifa Huajin Garment Co Ltd (ASPI)

● **Amazon**

- Supply chain links to Dahua (La Times) (Reuters)
- Supply chain links to Weiqiao Textile CO. LTD (Laundering Cotton)
- Provides essential web services to at least 8 of the Chinese surveillance companies under scrutiny or on the Entity List (source 1)
- Supply chain links to Hon Hai Precision Industry Co Ltd aka Foxconn (Foxconn Wikipedia)
- Supply chain links to Lens Technology (ASPI)
- Supply chain links to Dongguan Yidong Electronic Co
- Supply chain links to O-Film (ASPI)

● **Apple**

- Supply chain links to O-Film (Nanchang) produces Apple's camera modules. Transferred 700 Uyghur workers to another factory just DAYS before Apple CEO Tim Cook was scheduled to visit. Says they cut ties (SUPPLIER LIST) (ASPI) (RWR Advisory) (US Entity List) (The Information Report) (AP reporting) (O-film website)
- Supply chain links to Hon Hai Precision Industry Co Ltd/ Foxconn Technology- In Foxconn's Zhengzhou factory known as "iphone city", over 2,700 Uyghurs have been transferred into Apple's supply chain since 2018 1 (Supplier List)
- Supply chain links to Dongguan Yidong Electronic Co via Goertek (Supplier List)
- Supply chain links to Hubei Yihong Precision Manufacturing Co (21 Wilberforce) (ASPI) ○ Supply chain links to Changji Esquel Textile Co Ltd (Guardian)(Entity list)(TechTransparencyProject)(ASPI) (WSJ)(US Treasury Sanctions)(Shipment)(Jan19 Shipment)(Esquel CEO)(2014 Industry Journal) (Eyewitness report)(Cotton Grower)(CSIS report)
- Supply chain links to Lens Technology (SupplierList) (Tech Transparency Project) (WSJ) ○ Supply chain links to Luxshare Precision Industry Company Ltd (Supplier List) (Apple Insider) (The Information Report)

⁶⁵ Bukharin, Irina. (2021) “Long Shadows How the Global Economy Supports Oppression in Xinjiang.” C4ADS. <https://c4ads.org/reports/long-shadows/>.

⁶⁶ Echeverria, Cynthia. (2021) “Comment Submitted by Jewish World Watch.” Regulations.gov. Department of Homeland Security, March 9. <https://www.regulations.gov/comment/DHS-2022-0001-0080>.

- Supply chain links to Acon USA / Advanced-Connectek Inc (The Information Report)(Digi Times)
- Supply chain links to Shenzhen Deren Electronic Co (Supplier List) ○ Supply chain links to Avery Holding (not on 2021 supplier list) (AppleInsider)
- Supply chain links to CN Innovations (Supplier List) (AppleInsider)
- Supply chain links to Suzhou Dongshan Precision Manufacturing Co Ltd 1. The Information Report
- Supply chain links to Acbel Polytech 1. The Information Report ○ Supply chain links to Dongguan Yidong Electronic Co via Hubei Yihong (ASPI) ○ Supply chain links to Esquel Group (Esquel/Apple financial statements)
- Supply chain links to BOE Technology Group Co. Ltd (京东方) (ASPI) (Apple Insider) (RPRNA)*set to become Apple's second-largest OLED screen supplier by 2021 (On Apple's Supplier List)
- Supply chain links to Foxconn (ASPI)
- Supply chain links to Fuying Photoelectric Co., Ltd (Corporate Complicity Scorecard) (ASPI)
- Supply chain links to Goertek (ASPI) (APPLE SUPPLIER LIST) (Corporate Complicity Scorecard)

● **Brooks Brothers**

- Supply chain links to Changji Esquel Textile Co Ltd (ASPI)
- Supply chain links to Luthai Textile Co, LTD. (Laundering Cotton)
- Supply chain links to Texhong Textile Group (Laundering Cotton)
- Supply chain links to Jiangsu Lianfa Textile Co Ltd (Laundering Cotton)

● **Gap Inc. and its subsidiaries Banana Republic Old Navy and Gap**

- Supply chain links to Changji Esquel Textile Co Ltd (Brand disclosure/ open apparel registry) (ASPI)
- Supply chain links to Luthai Textile Co, LTD. (Laundering Cotton)
- Supply chain links to Texhong Textile Group via Winnitex Ambattur Fashion (Laundering Cotton)
- Supply chain links to Jiangsu Lianfa Textile Co Ltd via Eam Maliban Textiles (LAUNDERING COTTON)
- Supply chain links to Youngor Textile Holdings Co Ltd (ASPI)
- Supply chain links to Qingdao Jifa Group via Qingdao Jifa Huajin Garment Co Ltd (ASPI) ○ Supply chain links to Huafu Fashion Co, LTD (Laundering Cotton)
- Supply chain links to Weiqiao Textile CO. LTD (Laundering Cotton)
- Supply chain links to Shandong Zoucheng Guosheng(factory) Jiangsu Guotai Guosheng Co, Ltd. aka Jiangsu Guotai International Group (ASPI)

● **PVH Co. and subsidiaries: Calvin Klein, Tommy Hilfiger, Warners and more**

- Supply chain links to Nanjing Synergy Textiles Co (ASPI)
- Supply chain links to Youngor Textile Holdings Co Ltd (Glossy article). (ASPI)
- Supply chain links to Changji Esquel Textile Co Ltd (ASPI)
- Supply chain links to Shandong Zoucheng Guosheng/ Jiangsu Guotai Guosheng Co, Ltd. aka Jiangsu Guotai International Group (ASPI)
- Supply chain links to Huafu Fashion Co, LTD (Laundering Cotton)
- Supply chain links to Luthai Textile Co, LTD. (Laundering Cotton)
- Supply chain links to Texhong Textile Group (Laundering Cotton)
- Supply chain links to Jiangsu Lianfa Textile Co Ltd via Ungaran Sari Garments (Laundering Cotton)

● **Costco**

- Supply chain links to Hetian Taida Co, Ltd (ASPI- Uyghurs for Sale) (South China Morning Post)
- Supply chain links to Centric Brands (imported from Hetian Taida) (ASPI- Uyghurs for Sale)
- Supply chain links to Hetian Taida Apparel Co, Ltd. (producing children's pajamas for import to the US) (ASPI- Uyghurs for Sale)
- Supply chain links to Absorba Pajamas (made with FL) (ASPI- Uyghurs for Sale)

- Supply chain links to Luthai Textile Co, LTD. via Metro Garmin via Lufeng via Xinjiang Luthaifengshouor Luthai Shandong (Laundering Cotton)
- Supply chain links to Shandong Zoucheng Guosheng(factory) Jiangsu Guotai Guosheng Co, Ltd. aka Jiangsu Guotai International Group (ASPI)
- Supply chain links to Jiangsu Lianfa Textile Co Ltd via Metro Garmin (Laundering Cotton)

● **Dell**

- Supply chain links to O-Film (ASPI)
- Supply chain links to Hon Hai Precision Industry Co Ltd aka Foxconn (ASPI) (Supplier List)
- Supply chain links to Hefei Highbroad Advanced Material Co (ASPI)
- Supply chain links to Sichuan Mianyang Jingweida Technology Co Ltd (ASPI)
- Supply chain links to IBM (Supplier List)
- Supply chain links to Intel (Supplier List)
- Supply chain links to LG (Supplier list)
- Supply chain links to Samsung (Supplier list)
- Supply chain links to Sharp (Supplier List)
- Supply chain links to Toshiba (Supplier List)
- Supply chain links to Foxconn (ASPI)
- Supply chain links to Chinese Academy of Science's Institute of Automation (CASIA) have a joint laboratory dedicated to AI and cloud computing (corporate Complicity Scorecard)

● **Eddie Bauer**

- Supply chain links to Luthai Textile Co, LTD. (Laundering Cotton)
- Supply chain links to Texhong Textile Group (Laundering Cotton)
- Supply chain links to Weiqiao Textile CO. LTD (Laundering Cotton)
- Supply chain links to Jiangsu Lianfa Textile Co Ltd (Laundering Cotton)
- Supply chain links to Huaifu Fashion Co, LTD via Thahn Cong Textile via New Lanka Trading via Huaifu Hong Kong(Laundering Cotton)

● **Ford**

- Supply chain links to O-Film via SAIC Motor (ASPI)
- Supply chain links to Camel (battery provider) (Financing Genocide)
- Supply chain links to SAIC Motor (Chinafile)

● **General Electric**

- Supply chain links to Huadian Electric (has XUAR subsidy)(Subsidy or joint venture) (Corporate Complicity Scorecard)
- Supply chain links to Harbin Electric Group (Subsidy or joint venture) ties to XPCC + more (Corporate Complicity Scorecard)
- Supply chain links to Aviation Industry Corporation of China (AVIC) (Corporate Complicity Scorecard)
- Supply chain links to Harbin Electric (Corporate Complicity Scorecard) is a GE partnership with a Xinjiang subsidiary
- Supply chain links to joint venture, HDGE, with China Huadian, a state-owned enterprise. China Huadian signed a strategic cooperation agreement with the Xinjiang government, according to the Chinese-language Polaris Solar Photovoltaic Network News (WSJ) (Corporate complicity scorecard)
- Supply chain links to Hubei Yihong Precision Manufacturing Co (ASPI Uyghurs For Sale)

● **Google**

- Supply chain links to Hefei Bitland Information Technology Co Ltd (Zdnet article) (ASPI)
- Supply chain links to Hon Hai Precision Industry Co Ltd aka Foxconn (ASPI)

- Supply chain links to Goertek (Corporate Complicity Scorecard)
- Supply chain links to Huawei (Corporate Complicity Scorecard)
- Supply chain links to Feitian (Corporate Complicity Scorecard)
- Supply chain links to Hubei Yihong Precision (ASPI)

● **Hanes**

- Supply chain links to Texhong Textile Group (Laundering Cotton)
- Supply chain links to Luthai Textile Co, LTD. (Laundering Cotton)
- Supply chain links to Huaifu Fashion Co, LTD via MAS Active via Indo Taichen via Huaifu Shenzhen (Laundering Cotton)

● **Intel**

- Supply chain links to Hikvision partnership Intel supplies Hikvision (Corporate Complicity Scorecard)
- Supply chain links to Hon Hai Precision Industry Co Ltd aka Foxconn (ASPI)

● **JC Penny**

- Supply chain links to Weiqiao Textile CO. LTD (Laundering Cotton)
- Supply chain links to Texhong Textile Group (Laundering Cotton)
- Supply chain links to Luthai Textile Co, LTD. (Laundering Cotton)
- Supply chain links to Shandong Zoucheng Guosheng(factory) Jiangsu Guotai Guosheng Co, Ltd. aka Jiangsu Guotai International Group (ASPI)
- Supply chain links to PT Sam Kyung Jaya Busana - Xiamen International Trade Group (ITG) Co Ltd (LONG SHADOWS)

● **J Crew**

- Supply chain links to Jiangsu Lianfa Textile Co Ltd (Laundering Cotton)
- Supply chain links to Texhong Textile Group (Laundering Cotton)
- Supply chain links to Luthai Textile Co, LTD. via Ungaran Sari Garments Via Kuthai Shandong (Laundering Cotton)
- Supply chain links to Changji Esquel Textile Co Ltd (ASPI)

● **Lacoste**

- Supply chain links to Jiangsu Lianfa Textile Co Ltd (Laundering Cotton)
- Supply chain links to Huaifu Top Dyed Melange Yarn Co Ltd (ASPI)
- Supply chain links to Youngor Textile Holdings Co Ltd (ASPI)
- Supply chain links to Texhong Textile Group (Laundering Cotton)
- Supply chain links to Luthai Textile Co, LTD. (via Aditya Birla via Luthai Shandong or Lufeng via Xinjiang Luthaifengshou (Laundering Cotton)
- Supply chain links to Huaifu Fashion Co, LTD via MAS Active via Indo Taichen via Huaifu Shenzhen (Laundering Cotton)
- Supply chain links to Changji Esquel Textile Co Ltd (ASPI)

● **Levi's**

- Supply chain links to Huaifu Fashion Co, LTD via Nobland Vietnam via Win Textile via Huaifu Macao (Laundering Cotton)
- Supply chain links to Luthai Textile Co, LTD. (Laundering Cotton)
- Supply chain links to Texhong Textile Group (Laundering Cotton)
- Supply chain links to Shandong Zoucheng Guosheng/ Jiangsu Guotai Guosheng Co, Ltd. aka Jiangsu Guotai International Group (ASPI)
- Supply chain links to Jiangsu Lianfa Textile Co Ltd via Aquarelle (Laundering Cotton)

- **Macy's**

- Supply chain links to Xiamen ITG via Meridian Textiles (REPORT- Long Shadows)
- Supply chain links to Luthai Textile Co, LTD. (Laundering Cotton)
- Supply chain links to Texhong Textile Group (Laundering Cotton)
- Supply chain links to Weiqiao Textile CO. LTD (Laundering Cotton)
- Supply chain links to Jiangsu Lianfa Textile Co Ltd via Samwon Busana (Laundering Cotton)
- Supply chain links to Shandong Zoucheng Guosheng/ Jiangsu Guotai Guosheng Co, Ltd. aka Jiangsu Guotai International Group (ASPI)

- **Lulu Lemon**

- Supply chain links to Huaifu Fashion Co, LTD via MAS Active via Indo Taichen via Huaifu Shenzhen (Laundering Cotton)
- Supply chain links to Luthai Textile Co, LTD. via Ungaran Sari Garments via Lutai Shandong (Laundering Cotton)
- Supply chain links to Texhong Textile Group (Laundering Cotton)
- Supply chain links to Jiangsu Lianfa Textile Co Ltd via Ungaran Sari Garments (Laundering Cotton)

- **Microsoft**

- Supply chain links to O-Film (ASPI) (Corporate Complicity Scorecard)
- Supply chain links to Hubei Yihong Precision Manufacturing Co (ASPI) (Corporate Complicity Scorecard)
- Supply chain links to Hon Hai Precision Industry Co Ltd aka Foxconn (ASPI) (Corporate Complicity Scorecard)
- Supply chain links to Haiyi Software (WSJ)
- Supply chain links to Beijing Zhongke Fuxing Information Technology (WSJ) work with several detention centers, including in Xinjiang (Corporate Complicity Scorecard) (“Partners,” Zhongke Fuxing)
- Supply chain links to Dajiang Innovations (DJI) partnership (WSJ)
- Supply chain links to Huawei partnerships (WSJ)
- Supply chain links to Goertek Inc. (Corporate Complicity Scorecard) (Goertek's LinkedIn)

- **Nike**

- Supply chain links to Taekwang industrial Co Ltd (WSJ)
- Supply chain links to Qingdao Taekwang Shoe Manufacturing Company (ASPI) *makes 7M shoes annually; Taekwang's Laixi factory is one of the largest manufacturers of shoes for Nike
- Supply chain links to Qingdao Jifa Group (Glossy article) (ASPI) (WSJ)
- Supply chain links to Haoyuanpeng Garment Group / Haoyuanpeng Clothing Company (Anhui) (ASPI) (corporate link) (labor transfers) (Xinjiang aid source)
- Supply chain links to Haoyuanpeng Garment Group (ASPI)
- Supply chain links to Changji Esquel Textile Co Ltd (ASPI)
- Supply chain links to Qingdao Jifa Huajin Garment Co Ltd (glossy article) (ASPI) also their parent co Qingdao Jifa Group
- Supply chain links to Texhong Textile Group (Laundering Cotton)
- Supply chain links to Huaifu Fashion Co, LTD via MAS Active via Indo Taichen via Huaifu Shenzhen (Laundering Cotton)

- **Nissan**

- Supply chain links to O-Film via SAIC Motor (ASPI)
- Supply chain links to Camel (battery provider) (Financing Genocide)

- **Samsung**

- Supply chain links to O-Film (ASPI)

- Supply chain links to Dongguan Yidong Electronic Co (ASPI)
- Supply chain links to Hefei Highbroad Advanced Material Co (ASPI)
- Supply chain links to Advanced Connectek (Acon USA)

- **Target**

- Supply chain links to Shandong Ruyi Technology Group Co.
- Supply chain links to HuaFu Fashion Co, LTD (Laundering Cotton)
- Supply chain links to Luthai Textile Co, LTD. (Laundering Cotton)
- Supply chain links to Texhong Textile Group (Laundering Cotton)
- Supply chain links to Weiqiao Textile CO. LTD (Laundering Cotton)
- Supply chain links to Jiangsu Lianfa Textile Co Ltd via Aquarelle (Laundering Cotton)
 - Supply chain links to Shandong Zoucheng Guosheng(factory) Jiangsu Guotai Guosheng Co, Ltd. aka Jiangsu Guotai International Group (ASPI)

- **Tesla**

- Supply chain links to Longi (Yicari)
- Supply chain links to Trina Solar (Daqo +Tongwei Solar Company)
- Supply chain links to GCL-Poly/Jiangsu Zhongnengb (via Canadian Solar)
- Supply chain links to SAIC Motor (ASPI)
- Supply chain links to Lens Technology (ASPI)

- **Trine Solar**

- Supply chain links to Tianjin Zhonghaun (Daqo New Energy and Trina Solar sign long-term silicon material supply contract, Sina, November 30)
- Supply chain links to ASIA SILICON (In Broad Daylight)
- Supply chain links to LONGI (In Broad Daylight)
- Supply chain links to GCL-Poly (In Broad Daylight)
- Supply chain links to Daqo (In Broad Daylight)

- **Uniqlo**

- Supply chain links to HuaFu Fashion Co, LTD (Laundering Cotton)
- Supply chain links to Luthai Textile Co, Ltd. via Starpia (Laundering Cotton)
- Supply chain links to Texhong Textile Group (Laundering Cotton)
- Supply chain links to Weiqiao Textile CO. LTD (Laundering Cotton)
- Supply chain links to Qingdao Jifa Group via Qingdao Jifa Huajin Garment Co Ltd (ASPI) ○ Supply chain links to Youngor Textile Holdings Co Ltd (Glossy article) (ASPI)

- **Volkswagen**

- Supply chain links to Hefei Highbroad Advanced Material Co (ASPI)
- Supply chain links to O-Film via SAIC Motor (ASPI)
- Supply chain links to Camel (Financing Genocide)

- **Walmart**

- Supply chain links to Xiamen ITG via Meridian Textiles (REPORT- Long Shadows)
- Supply chain links to Luthai Textile Co, LTD. (Laundering Cotton)
- Supply chain links to Texhong Textile Group (Laundering Cotton)
- Supply chain links to Weiqiao Textile CO. LTD (Laundering Cotton)
- Supply chain links to Qingdao Jifa Group via Qingdao Jifa Huajin Garment Co Ltd (ASPI) ○ Supply chain links to Shandong Zoucheng Guosheng(factory) Jiangsu Guotai Guosheng Co, Ltd. aka Jiangsu Guotai International Group (ASPI)
- Supply chain links to Jiangsu Lianfa Textile Co Ltd (Laundering Cotton)

7.4 Uyghur Forced Labor Prevention Act (UFLPA)

The Uyghur Forced Labor Prevention Act (UFLPA) was signed into law by President Biden on December 23, 2021. It establishes a rebuttable presumption that the importation of any goods, wares, articles, and merchandise mined, produced, or manufactured wholly or in part in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region of the People’s Republic of China, or produced by certain entities, is prohibited by Section 307 of the Tariff Act of 1930 and that such goods, wares, articles, and merchandise are not entitled to entry to the United States. The presumption applies unless the Commissioner of U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) determines that the importer of record has complied with specified conditions and, by clear and convincing evidence, that the goods, wares, articles, or merchandise were not produced using forced labor.⁶⁷

The UFLPA was enacted on December 23, 2021, with a June 21, 2022 effective date for a rebuttable presumption that goods mined, produced, or manufactured wholly or in part in Xinjiang or by an entity on the [UFLPA Entity List](#) are prohibited from U.S. importation under 19 U.S.C. § 1307.⁶⁸ The UFLPA Entity List was developed by the Forced Labor Enforcement Task Force (FLETF) and was published on June 21, 2022. Merchandise imported by entities identified by the FLETF on the UFLPA Entity List have been subjected to the rebuttable presumption since the UFLPA rebuttable presumption went into effect on June 21, 2022.

7.5 UFLPA Enforcement

While the UFLPA established the broad presumption that all imports from Xinjiang or manufactured by Uyghurs and other minorities outside of the region are tainted with forced labor and therefore banned from U.S. shores, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has limited enforcement resources, so it needed to outline where it would focus its attention first. For this, the law mandated that DHS include in its 17 June strategy the UFLPA Entity List of Chinese firms tied to alleged forced labor—the list published in June of 2022 named just 20 companies, with four from the solar industry. Missing from the list were scores of firms that independent organizations have identified as being tied to forced labor, both inside and outside of Xinjiang.⁶⁹

Effective enforcement of the UFLPA requires comprehensive disclosure of supply chain information from all importers of high-risk products, regardless of country of origin. Because of the multi-country sourcing of inputs, finished goods imported from other countries are very likely to include prohibited goods, especially in the high-risk industries listed above. However, enforcement focus adopted by DHS was relatively narrow, targeting four high-risk sectors (apparel, cotton, tomatoes, and polysilicon), and within those sectors, shipments imported directly from Xinjiang, or associated with the twenty companies found by DHS to have produced goods with forced labor, recruited or received workers subjected to forced labor, or that are affiliated with the “poverty alleviation” program in Xinjiang (“UFLPA Entity List”).⁷⁰

Three of the four high-risk sectors (cotton, tomatoes, and polysilicon) were mandated by Congress in the UFLPA and are wholly or partially covered by existing CBP withhold release orders (WRO) barring entry. Eleven of the 20 companies on the UFLPA Entity List likewise are specifically covered by [11](#)

⁶⁷ U.S. Customs and Border Protection. (2021) “Uyghur Forced Labor Prevention Act.” <https://www.cbp.gov/trade/forced-labor/UFLPA#:~:text=DHS%20issued%20a%20Notice%20Seeking,the%20Xinjiang%20Uyghur%20Autonomous%20Region>.

⁶⁸ Department of Homeland Security. (2022) “Uyghur Forced Labor Prevention Act.” <https://www.dhs.gov/uflpa>.

⁶⁹ Song, Ligang, Ross Garnaut, Fang Cai, and Lauren Johnston. (2016) *China’s New Sources of Economic Growth: Reform, Resources and Climate Change*. ANU Press.

⁷⁰ Flacks, Marti, and Madeleine Songy. (2022) “The Uyghur Forced Labor Prevention Act Goes into Effect.” *Center for Strategic and International Studies*. <https://www.csis.org/analysis/uyghur-forced-labor-prevention-act-goes-effect>.

[existing WROs](#) related to Xinjiang, as are many of the products produced by the other companies, either because their products fall under the sector-wide cotton WRO, or because they likely contain components from companies subject to WROs.⁷¹

Since the UFLPA went into effect last June, shipments across multiple sectors have been targeted and detained. Brands, in at least some sectors, have been asked to provide an unprecedented level of supply chain disclosure. However, there has been little transparency about enforcement by CBP. The data released by CBP in September 2022, when CBP first started releasing data on shipments it has targeted, did not describe what percentage of shipments targeted for “further examination” are ultimately allowed into the United States. This means that experts, as the Worker Rights Consortium stated in February, 2023 Congressional testimony, “cannot glean from the data CBP is publishing how many shipments have been detained—or even how many have been targeted for ‘further examination’—in any of the high priority sectors identified by the UFLPA (cotton, tomatoes, polysilicon) or in any other individual sector.”⁷²

7.6 Unemployment Monitoring and Early Warning: New Trends in Xinjiang’s Coercive Labor Placement Systems

This text is from <https://jamestown.org/program/unemployment-monitoring-and-early-warning-new-trends-in-xinjiangs-coercive-labor-placement-systems/>.

Introduction

In mid-2019, the first efforts to systematically research and conceptualize state-sponsored forced labor systems in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR) took place ([Journal of Political Risk](#), December 2019). First, this research examined the placement of detainees in Vocational Skills Education and Training Centers (VSETCs, 职业技能教育培训中心, *zhiye jineng jiaoyu peixun zhongxin*), which function as re-education camps; and second, the findings detailed the transfer of rural surplus laborers (农村劳动者转移就业, *nongcun laodongzhe zhuan yi jiu ye*) into secondary or tertiary sector work – referred to as Poverty Alleviation through Labor Transfer (脱贫转移就业, *tuopin zhuan yi jiu ye*). In addition to general evidence for coercive labor placements into labor-intensive manufacturing, scholars uncovered evidence of coercive labor transfers for specific economic sectors such as cotton and tomato picking, as well as the production of polysilicon for solar panels ([Newlines Institute](#), December 2020; [CBC News](#), October 29, 2021; [Bloomberg](#), April 2021).[1] Much of the evidence implicating these industries came from publicly available government data, media or company reports, typically dating from between 2017 and 2020. Unfortunately, since then, such evidence has become much sparser. This examination argues that this falloff in information is not just due to government censorship. Rather, it also reflects systemic and concerning changes to the ways that coercive labor placements in Xinjiang are being consolidated.

After the successes of the highly mobilizational labor placement efforts between 2016 and 2020, Xinjiang’s current (14th) Five-Year Plan (2021-2025) focuses on consolidating and maintaining these outcomes through unemployment and poverty prevention and surveillance mechanisms. Individuals who were coercively mobilized into work placements are now effectively prevented from leaving them. Since 2021,

⁷¹ Flacks and Songy, “The Uyghur Forced Labor Prevention Act Goes into Effect.”

⁷² Hearing of the Senate Committee on Finance: Ending Trade that Cheats American Workers By Modernizing Trade Laws and Enforcement, Fighting Forced Labor, Eliminating Counterfeits, and Leveling the Playing Field, 118th Cong. (2023) (Nova, Scott). <https://www.finance.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/2023.02.16%20Nova%20Testimony%20for%20Customs%20Hearing.pdf>.

hundreds of thousands of cadres are conducting real-time monitoring of rural Uyghurs' employment and income status. This general shift away from mobilizational to more institutionalized and monitored forms of labor placement simultaneously reduces the publication of specific evidence (propaganda texts) that typically accompany such campaign-style experimental efforts, while intensifying and institutionalizing the risk of coercion. Despite the decrease in concrete publicly available evidence, the new developments are increasing both the scale and the scope of coercive labor, expanding it to higher-skilled sectors. This has profound implications for researchers and policymakers.

This report analyzes new and highly authoritative sources – Xinjiang's official Five-Year Plans – to pinpoint the first half of 2017 as the juncture when labor transfers became highly coercive, which is concurrent with the mass internment campaign in Xinjiang. Additionally, this is the first examination to draw on evidence from internal speeches by central government leaders (the “Xinjiang Papers”) in 2014 that set the stage for a foundational policy shift. Thereby, the primary objective of Xinjiang's labor placements has become even more political than before. Understanding the unique nature and Beijing's ultimate objectives of these coercive labor systems is crucial for developing effective countermeasures.

The evidence and analysis presented below concerns only coercive labor through the transfer of rural surplus laborers ([Jamestown Foundation](#), March 2021). Since 2019, virtually no new documentary or conceptual evidence on forced work placements of VSETC detainees has emerged, and it is unclear if significant new developments on this front can be expected (most VSETC detainee work placements occurred between 2018 and 2020; see *Journal of Political Risk*, [December 2019](#); [February 2020](#)). Additional witness testimony has been important, but has not unveiled new conceptual or other developments. The forced work placement of likely hundreds of thousands VSETC detainees continues to implicate many labor-intensive manufacturing sectors, especially textiles and garments. Rural surplus laborers who refuse state-mandated labor transfer placements remain at risk of penalization through internment in re-education camps.

Coercive Labor Transfers in Xinjiang: A Side Product of Beijing's Political Goals

Any analysis of coercive labor and related countermeasures must consider the shift in political priorities mandated by the central government in 2014. The Xinjiang Papers, a set of classified internal state documents, contain confidential speeches by central government leaders from 2014 that outline Beijing's political objectives for employment-creation ([Uyghur Tribunal](#), December 9, 2021).

In 2014, General Secretary Xi Jinping stated that ethnic groups should undertake enterprise work. He argued that large numbers of unemployed persons will “provoke trouble”; in contrast, enterprise employment is “conducive to ethnic interaction, exchanges and blending” and makes ethnic groups “study Chinese culture.” [2]

Premier Li Keqiang argued that “people without land, employment or a fixed income have nothing to do and wander all day; ... they will also be easily exploited by evildoers.” Therefore, Xinjiang must “transform [people's] way of thinking about employment” and “vigorously develop labor-intensive industries that absorb more employment.”

Politburo Standing Committee (PSC) Member Yu Zhengsheng stated economic development “must absolutely be subservient to [the goals of] social and long-term peace and stability.” He noted that Xinjiang's “requirements for the development of labor-intensive industries are particularly urgent,” not because these industries were likely to “contribute more to economic growth,” but because “they are particularly important for employment and for promoting exchanges and the integration of various ethnic groups.”

These statements all highlight the primacy of political over economic drivers – a clear departure from the region’s prior policy focus of achieving social stability through economic growth. Research clearly shows how after 2014, Xinjiang’s labor transfers increased in scale and became progressively more coercive ([Jamestown Foundation](#), March 2, 2021).

In addition to seeking cultural assimilation and greater state control, Beijing also pursues labor transfers in order to alter ethnic population structures. The Nankai Report, a crucial Chinese research document outlining the securitized transfer of Uyghurs to other provinces, states that labor transfers help “reduce Uyghur population density in Xinjiang.” Based on the Nankai Report, an independent legal analysis concluded that Xinjiang’s labor transfers meet the criteria of the Crimes Against Humanity of forcible transfer and of persecution as defined by the International Criminal Court ([Jamestown Foundation](#), March 2, 2021). Labor transfers of Uyghurs from southern Xinjiang to regions dominated by Han Chinese populations feature prominently in Chinese academic and state discourses on “population optimization” – attempts to reduce Uyghur population density and alter ethnic population distributions (increasing Han populations) for national security purposes ([Central Asian Survey](#), 2021).

Since the goal of stability maintenance has been achieved, the regional government is now focusing on long-term economic development. However, Xinjiang’s continued social stability is predicated upon ensuring that ethnic minority citizens remain in state-controlled and economically productive factory settings. Therefore, the region’s coercive labor systems remain necessary for the ongoing achievement and consolidation of political goals.

“Train all who should be trained”: The Highly Mobilization Labor Transfer Phase 2016 to 2020

These new priorities were directly reflected in Xinjiang’s macro-level planning documents. Xinjiang’s 12th Five-Year Social and Economic Development Plan (2011-2015) hardly mentioned labor transfers and in both instances described them as a “voluntary” process ([Shihezi University](#), January 18, 2011). In contrast, the 13th Five-Year Plan (2016-2020) strongly emphasized labor transfers and state-led employment. It verbatim repeated Xi Jinping’s demand from 2014 to “systematically expand the scale of [relocating] Xinjiang’s ethnic minorities to other parts of China to receive education, employment, and residence,” and for the first time outlined annual labor transfer targets (of at least 2.2 million) ([National Development and Reform Commission \[NDRC\]](#), May 2016). Local governments were to assign work to urban “zero job households” within 24 hours.

The point at which Xinjiang’s labor transfers became highly coercive coincided with the beginning of the mass internment campaign in the first half of 2017.

Xinjiang’s 13th Five-Year Poverty Alleviation Plan from June 2017 first adopted the new central government concept of Poverty Alleviation through Labor Transfer (转移就业脱贫, *zhuan yi jiu ye tuo pin*) ([XUAR Government](#), May 19, 2017). The plan noted that poor people’s “labor and employment willingness and abilities are insufficient.” Relying heavily on employment creation and labor transfers, it repeated five times that locals’ “inner motivation” is insufficient and must be “stimulated.” People’s outdated mindset of “waiting, relying, wanting” must be “eradicated.” The Plan reiterated that “curing poverty means to first cure ignorance and backwardness.” Every household without (a form of state-approved) employment must have at least one person “realize employment.”

Also in mid-2017, the XUAR published a more targeted Regional Development and Poverty Alleviation Implementation Plan for southern Xinjiang ([Alashankou City Government](#), May 10, 2017). It specified all-out social mobilization efforts to “stimulate [people’s] drive and determination to change [their]

situation of poverty [and to] change [people’s attitude] from ‘I am wanted to get rid of poverty’ to ‘I want to get rid of poverty’”.

This sharp turn towards more coercive mobilizational approaches coincided with Chen Quanguo’s ascent as Xinjiang party secretary in 2016. In January 2018, the government then initiated a special plan to transfer laborers from poor counties in southern Xinjiang to other regions ([PRC government](#), June 9, 2018). Imitating language from the concurrent mass internment campaign, the plan mandated to “train all who should be trained” (应培尽培, *yingpei jinpei*). Other reports described the effort as “transfer all who should be transferred” (应转尽转, *ying zhuan jin zhuan*; [Xinjiang Minsheng Net](#), April 8, 2019).

Between 2016 and 2020, Xinjiang had planned to annually transfer 2.2 million rural surplus laborers. It exceeded this goal by over 30 percent, transferring 2.87 million workers per year. In 2021, the region set a record by transferring a staggering 3.2 million surplus laborers, 15.4 percent more than planned ([XUAR government](#), February 7). This new record is not a coincidence, but a result of Xinjiang’s current intensified approach to Poverty Alleviation through Labor Transfer.

Monitoring and Prevention: New Trends in Labor Transfers and Employment-Based Poverty Alleviation 2021 to 2025

After the successes of the highly mobilizational labor transfer campaigns (2016 -2020), Xinjiang’s current (14th) Five-Year Social and Economic Development Plan (2021-2025) focuses on consolidating, maintaining and expanding these outcomes. In short, those who were coercively mobilized into work placements are now effectively prevented from leaving them.

Xinjiang’s key regional and local Five-Year Plans (2021-2025) reflect the following significant new developments:

- A new full employment requirement whereby all persons able to work are to work (previously, this extended to only at least one person per household)
- Strong focus on preventing people from returning to poverty through decreased income, through an Unemployment Monitoring and Early Warning System” (失业监测预警机制, *shiye jiance yujingji*). [3]
- Expanded vocational training, increasing average annual training volumes from 1 million to 1.5 million person-sessions ([XUAR government](#), December 14, 2021).
- Large-scale promotion of “order-oriented employment skills training” (订单式就业技能培训, *dingdan shi jiuye jineng peixun*) wherein companies place orders for workers, and the state takes, trains and delivers them to these companies.

Xinjiang’s 14th Five-Year Social and Economic Development Plan orders officials to “persist in combining local nearby employment and transfer and [labor] export employment, causing every able-bodied person to achieve stable employment” ([NDRC](#), June 11, 2021). Similarly, the 14th Five-Year Employment Promotion Plan states the need to “diligently cause every single person who is able to work to realize employment” ([XUAR government](#), December 14, 2021). This expansion is concerning, as those who are currently not in full-time employment often have other duties, including familial responsibilities; shifting mothers and working-age persons in caretaking roles into such work runs a high risk of coercion. The Xinjiang’s Women’s Development Plan (2021-2025), which outlines detailed targets for the “development” of the female population, specifies an expansion of rural women’s labor transfers ([National Working Committee](#), January 24).

Xinjiang's current development plans lack some of the highly coercive mobilizational language that was commonplace in the 2016-2020 period. This is because the remarkable successes in mobilizing rural surplus laborers are now being consolidated through a normalization of labor transfer and employment mechanisms. The 14th Five-Year Employment Promotion Plan warns that “a large number of rural laborers need continuous and stable employment.” In southern Xinjiang, particularly, the “comprehensive quality of rural laborers...is not high,” resulting in a mismatch between the economic need for higher-skilled workers and an abundance of low-skilled labor. The plan cautions this mismatch is becoming the most prominent problem in Xinjiang's labor market. Therefore, the region must promote the “institutionalization of medium- and long-term employment work” to create an “institutionalized development pattern.” The state's solution to this challenge is more institutionalized control and surveillance of the surplus workforce, along with intensified vocational training efforts. For 2021-2025, the XUAR plans to increase training intensity from 1 million to 1.5 million person-sessions per year ([XUAR government](#), December 14, 2021). This will ensure that persons subjected to coercive labor transfers gradually enter more highly skilled employment, increasing the scope of Xinjiang's forced labor issue. In 2021, Xinjiang achieved this new goal by conducting 1.48 million vocational training sessions ([PRC Central Government](#), February 25). The state's new mantra here is “high-quality development” (高质量发展, *gao zhiliang fazhan*), an increasingly ubiquitous concept in state planning documents.

The Xinjiang 13th Five-Year Poverty Alleviation Plan from June 2017 first mandated the creation of the Unemployment Monitoring and Early Warning System to support the achievement of employment targets. The 14th Five-Year Employment Promotion Plan mandates that this system be “improved.” Governments at “county and township levels” must “comprehensively analyze the specific reasons for the decline in [a particular household's] income,” and the first listed countermeasure is labor transfer. Therefore, this system prevents households from exiting labor transfers for work with decreased measurable incomes. State media reports confirm the implementation of a four-color early warning code for all administrative levels, who must dynamically provide “timely assistance” if a household's income threatens to fall below the poverty threshold ([Xinjiang Daily](#), March 31, 2020). At the Third Central Xinjiang Work Forum (第三次中央新疆工作座谈会, *di san ci zhongyang Xinjiang zuotan hui*), Xi himself ordered the region to improve and complete its Unemployment Monitoring and Early Warning System ([PRC Embassy in Sweden](#), November 12, 2020).

Xinjiang's 13th Five-Year Social and Economic Development Plan noted three times the need to increase “inner motivation” (内生动力, *neisheng dongli*) of those who, according to the state, lack the drive for gainful employment in state-sanctioned settings. Xinjiang's 14th Plan only mentions this term once. Local plans indicate how recently implemented coercive training and transfer programs have “succeeded” in addressing this “inner motivation” problem to inculcate desired qualities in ethnic laborers. Hotan County's 14th Five-Year Social and Economic Development Plan lauds the fact that:

[T]he scale of industrial workers who understand the national language, know technology, and observe discipline is constantly expanding, providing strong human support for accelerating the construction of a modern industrial system...([Hotan County Government](#), January 14, 2021)

As this achievement has been largely based on coercive skills training involving military drill, political indoctrination, and assimilation, it is safe to say that in Uyghur regions, the past several years of Xinjiang's forced labor training and placement practice now form the bedrock of the region's future industrial and economic policy.

These changes have significant consequences for how coercive labor is discussed in state media. During the previous highly mobilizational phase, the state frequently documented purported successes of coercive labor mobilization through boastful propaganda stories from the ground. These accounts, which serve the

important political purposes of disseminating the results of policy experimentation and signaling local governments' active involvement to their superiors, usually gave specific local examples of coercion that implicated particular companies. In the current institutionalization phase, such sources are less relevant and have already become much less common (also due to state censorship). Instances of coercive mobilization continue per current policy priorities, but they are no longer the primary policy enforcement mechanism.

Unemployment Monitoring and Early Warning: Examples from Uyghur Regions

Local Five-Year plans in key southern Uyghur-majority regions frequently use stronger, more specific language when describing these systems. Hotan County's 14th Five-Year Social and Economic Development Plan speaks of "resolutely holding the bottom line of no large-scale returns to poverty" ([Hotan county](#), January 14, 2021). Instead of emphasizing labor transfers, it stresses the need to "consolidate" poverty alleviation gains by "perfecting monitoring and assistance systems and mechanisms that prevent a return to poverty." This includes implementing "income monitoring" as a mechanism for "early detection, early intervention, [and] early assistance." Karakax County's identical plan mandates "monitoring of households with a sudden decrease in income" ([Karakax county](#), December 2020). Kashgar City's plan exhorts officials to "resolutely prevent a return to poverty" ([Kashgar City Development and Reform Committee](#), February 9). Kashgar's Bachu County describes this monitoring mechanism as an employment-related "emergency response system" ([Bachu county](#), October 11, 2020).

Xinjiang's Unemployment Monitoring and Early Warning System uses several mechanisms that also enforce the region's preventative policing and societal securitization mechanisms. Big data analysis is provided by the Poverty Alleviation Big Data Platform (脱贫攻坚大数据平台, *tuopin gongjian da shuju pingtai*), grid management, mass mobilization of cadres, and village-based work teams – the same entities identifying persons for internment in re-education camps ([Xinhua](#), September 22, 2020). In 2021, Xinjiang sent 400,000 cadres to investigate and monitor the poverty and income situations of 12 million rural households through an "early prevention, early intervention, early assistance" campaign that identified 774,000 households for "real-time monitoring" ([China Daily](#), January 11). The goal is to undertake full quarterly monitoring campaigns using grassroots cadres and village work teams together with big data analysis ([State Council Information Office](#), February 26).

State propaganda accounts outline several instances of such early interventions, often focusing on families that suffered external shocks (e.g., decreased income or increased expenses). However, both local testimonies and descriptions of the mechanisms involved indicate that the Unemployment Monitoring and Early Warning System promotes even greater levels of state-mandated labor among rural populations. In one instance, a construction worker with high blood pressure was assigned less strenuous work in a garment factory. The previous employment status of his wife, who suffers from a kidney disease, is unclear. However, after this household's return to poverty was prevented, she was also made to work – as a cleaner. The somewhat surprising measure of assigning physically demanding work to an apparently chronically ill person is possibly because this household includes seven persons. Without both adults working, the household's per person income would likely fall below the poverty line.

Moreover, full employment has become a region wide target. A village party secretary emphasizes that "to prevent a return to poverty, we cannot rely on giving money to support people, to prevent falling into the welfare trap, and policies to support lazy people" ([China Daily](#), January 11). This reasoning mirrors that of Xi, who in a December 2021 address argued that China must not go down the path of "welfarism" (福利主义, *fuli zhuyi*), which he referred to as an erroneous strategy pursued by populist Latin American regimes that produced "lazy people" (懒人, *lanren*; [Qiushi](#), May 15).

Consequently, poverty prevention mechanisms involve creating a “stable mental foundation” in those who are “lazy.” A state account from Jiashi County gives the example of a “lazy” man who “could not even do a full day’s work” ([Xinjiang Daily](#), April 12). However, the man notes how village cadres “fundamentally changed my thinking” and gave him a “new life” – language that is very similar to the forced testimonies of former re-education detainees. Interviewed officials emphasize that locals who “lack ambition” to work are targeted with “various methods” that “stimulate their inner motivation.” While Xinjiang’s current job placement efforts are on the whole less reliant on large-scale mobilization campaigns, they continue to specifically target households and persons whose income is near the state’s poverty line, and where full employment is unrealized.

Similarly, another state media account argues that to prevent a return to poverty, officials must “stimulate [people’s] inner motivation so that the poverty-stricken households can continue to increase their income,” and that this is a key area of focus for disciplinary inspection and supervision organs at all administrative levels ([People.cn](#), August 2, 2020). The article notes that in Yingjisha County, the Commission for Discipline Inspection and Supervision visited 2,165 households and investigated 489 households that had been alleviated from poverty in order to assess their employment situations. Government reports indicate that households with declining incomes receive “targeted assistance measures,” most notably, industry-based development and public welfare jobs are allotted to those whose skills are too low for labor transfers ([Hotan Prefecture Government](#), December 15, 2021). Only those who are literally “unable to work” are eligible for social security benefits instead of employment.

Another report describes how “in the process of monitoring the prevention of a return to poverty,” an ethnic minority region successfully completed the task of putting all 1,872 able villagers into employment ([China Daily](#), January 11). This again indicates how anti-poverty monitoring mechanisms and work processes are used to intensify potentially coercive labor placements in predominantly ethnic regions.

Overall, Xinjiang’s approach to prevent people from returning to poverty appears to have intensified state-mandated labor placement measures. The new system implements the recently adopted full employment requirements. Coercive mobilizational campaigns may still be used, especially in regions where employment rates are lagging, but the overall emphasis has shifted to institutionalization and monitoring mechanisms.

New Developments in Labor Transfers to Other Provinces

Since 2020, the Xinjiang government has stopped publishing annual figures on transfers of rural surplus laborers to other provinces. The so-called Nankai Report, a frank internal assessment of such transfers by Chinese academics, documented the securitized and potentially coercive nature of such transfers ([Jamestown Foundation](#), March 2021). The report estimates that 76,000 laborers were transferred between 2017 and 2019, approximately 25,000 annually. Xinjiang’s September 2020 white paper on employment rights noted that between 2014 and mid-2020, 117,000 surplus laborers were part of such transfers ([Xinhua](#), September 17, 2020). . For 2020, a transfer of 20,000 laborers was planned ([CCTV](#), May 13, 2020).

Xinjiang’s 13th Five-Year Social and Economic Development Plan first established an annual quota of 10,000 cross-provincial labor transfers. The 14th plan makes a rather general mention of the concept, which indicates the practice has continued. In fact, it appears to be very much alive. In 2020, Hotan officials suggested their prefecture alone should transfer 20,000 rural surplus laborers annually to eastern China. Similarly, the 14th Five-Year Social and Economic Development Plans in Hotan and Qiemo counties, both ethnic regions, call for “increased expansion of the intensity of organized labor export” to other prefectures and provinces ([Hotan county](#), January 14, 2021; [Qiemo county](#), March 22). The plan for Bachu county, a Uyghur majority population region in Kashgar prefecture with a high share of ethnic rural laborers, specifies

an expansion of “employment channels for labor transfers inside and outside Xinjiang” ([Bachu County](#), October 11, 2021). These mandates are consistent with wider political goals of assimilation and population optimization that are important to the central leadership in Beijing, and therefore are unlikely to be easily abandoned.

In sum, despite the discontinuation of official reporting, it is safe to assume that Xinjiang’s annual labor transfer volume to other provinces continues at volumes comparable to previous years (approximately 20,000 to 25,000). However, these transfers are now undocumented and therefore more difficult to track.

Estimating the Current Scale of Coercive Labor in Xinjiang

Based on figures from 2019 of 2.59 million rural surplus laborers for all of Xinjiang and 1.65 million for the southern Uyghur majority regions, the author previously estimated that up to 1.6 million ethnic citizens in Xinjiang are at risk of coercive labor through state-mandated transfers ([Jamestown Foundation](#), March 2021). In addition, at least several hundred thousand former VSETC (vocational re-education camp) detainees are also estimated as at risk of forced labor.

In 2021, Xinjiang transferred 3.17 million surplus laborers (some multiple times), an increase of 10.5 percent or 300,000 over 2019 ([Tianshan Net](#), October 10, 2020). [4] Initial evidence from Xinjiang’s increasingly pervasive Unemployment Monitoring and Early Warning System indicates these additionally-transferred laborers are at significant risk of coercion. Chinese academic studies previously analyzed by the author indicate that those who had previously chosen not to participate in such transfers or in full-time wage labor generally had reasons to do so ([Jamestown Foundation](#), March 2021). However, these are population groups or household members that the state labels “idle” – an unacceptable condition, especially under the new full employment target.

Consequently, the number of transferred rural surplus laborers at risk of coercive labor likely approaches two million. Together with former VSETC detainees sent to work in factories, between two to two and a half million persons in Xinjiang are estimated to be at risk of coercive labor.

Recent Trends in Xinjiang’s Foreign Trade: Soaring Export Volumes in Southern Xinjiang

In 2021, Xinjiang’s direct trade with other countries increased 5.8 percent. Of the total export value, 51.4 percent comprised labor-intensive products, especially textile and garment production, which is concerning as these sectors are those most likely to involve Uyghur forced labor ([Urumqi Customs](#), 2021). The export volume of such products grew 31 percent in 2021. In the first four months of 2022, the value share of exported labor-intensive products among all exports continued to grow even faster at 63.4 percent year-on-year, outpacing the region’s total export volume which grew 45.4 percent during that time ([China Daily](#), May 14). These figures reflect the success of Beijing’s intensified coercive labor strategy in the region. This directly contradicts a reported statement by Madelaine Tuininga, head of the European Commission Directorate for Trade’s sustainable development department, who in the context of this issue implied that “goods produced with forced labor only represent a small part of all the goods produced in a region” ([South China Morning Post](#), May 13).

In 2021, direct trade between XUAR and the United States declined 61.3 percent to \$372 million, likely as a result of supply chain divestments and sanctions ([Xinjiang Government](#), 2022). However, Xinjiang’s trade with the European Union (EU) rose 13.6 percent to \$1.24 billion ([Urumqi Customs](#), 2021). Trade with Vietnam grew by a stunning 108.9 percent to \$408 million. This is noteworthy, Xinjiang could be using Vietnam to circumvent U.S. import sanctions, especially for cotton textile products.

State reports about growing Xinjiang-EU trade relations are boastful, highlighting both increased volumes and the large number of trains connecting the two regions ([China Daily](#), March 21). The reports invariably underscore that this directly aligns with the political aims of Xi's signature Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). In the Xinjiang Papers, Xi stated that Xinjiang needed to be pacified due to its geostrategic significance for the BRI. Increased trade between Xinjiang and the EU is therefore not just an economic but also a directly political objective, and as a result, Beijing can be expected to deploy measures that promote and increase such trade if the EU fails to take effective countermeasures.

In the first four months of 2022, Xinjiang's total foreign trade volume (exports and imports) rose 33.7 percent over the previous year ([China Daily](#), May 14). However, the foreign trade volume of key Uyghur majority population regions in southern Xinjiang that are core targets for coercive poverty alleviation and labor transfers grew much faster. Foreign trade volumes of Kashgar, Hotan, Kizilsu and Aksu prefectures soared by 105.7, 273.6, 273.7 and 99 percent respectively during the same time ([China Daily](#), May 14). This trend is troubling but not unexpected, given that in December 2021, Beijing replaced Xinjiang's party secretary Chen Quanguo with Ma Xingrui, a technocrat from Guangdong with extensive experience promoting economic development ([Reuters](#), December 29, 2021). During his first visits to southern Xinjiang's Uyghur regions (Hotan prefecture), Ma emphasized that following the "victory in poverty alleviation," the region must "vigorously develop labor-intensive industries" ([Tacheng Prefecture Government](#), January 10). In line with Ma's technocratic and development-oriented outlook, Xinjiang is said to be developing a distinctly "export-oriented economy" (外向型经济; *waixiangxing jingji*; [China Daily](#), May 14).

Previously, Hotan Prefecture, similarly a core part of the Uyghur heartland regions, experienced an expansion of foreign trade by 235.6 percent in 2019 and by a further 51.4 percent in the first 11 months of 2020 ([Aksu News](#), January 6, 2021). Hotan's key export products are all linked to labor-intensive manufacturing or agricultural processing, and include hair products, footwear, textiles, clothing, agricultural products, luggage, toys, and small appliances. Available data indicates a likely further increase of exports of products linked to labor-intensive manufacturing that rely heavily on coercive Poverty Alleviation Through Labor Transfer mechanisms.

Policy Implications and Recommendations

Just as the upscaling of Xinjiang's most coercive labor transfers broadly coincided with the campaign of mass internment, both the re-education drive and this labor placement system have now shifted from highly mobilizational and experimental to more institutionalized forms. Chen Quanguo oversaw both of these campaigns. His core expertise was the use of high-powered mobilizational drives – both for re-education internment and for labor placements. Chen's successor appears to have been tasked to render the results of both campaigns sustainable in the long term. In April 2022, Ma Xingrui asserted that "people deceived by extremist ideology" would still be "rescued" (a euphemism for re-education). He also emphasized that the region will "never allow the hard-won situation of [social] stability to be reversed" ([China.com.cn](#), April 22). To this end, Xinjiang will "promote the normalization" of "counterterrorism and stability maintenance," and "optimize [its] counterterrorism and stability maintenance policies." This indicates a shift from campaign-style mobilizational forms of mass internment to a more institutionalized way of continuing what will likely be more targeted (rather than highly indiscriminate) forms of re-education and internment.

The implications of these trends are three-fold.

First, the prevalence of coercive forms of labor placements in Xinjiang is pervasive and large-scale. Recent trends only reinforce these developments as the scope and scale of coercive labor transfers increased in 2021. Through intensified vocational training and ongoing state-led economic development efforts,

coercive labor is likely to expand from predominantly low-skilled into increasingly more high-skilled industrial sectors.

Second, the systemic nature of coercive labor in Xinjiang is the product of political objectives that can only be reached by shifting millions of Uyghur laborers from rural to industrial livelihoods, breaking up traditional communities, and transferring ethnic minorities to Han majority regions. This explains why Beijing considers western countermeasures on Xinjiang a red line. In early 2021, state-orchestrated smear campaigns and consumer boycotts targeted western companies that had divested from Xinjiang. In summer 2021, China passed a countersanctions law that punishes companies who comply with western sanctions. As a result, companies who proactively adjust their supply chains and take due diligence seriously are liable to be penalized by the Chinese state. This could reduce their incentives to proactively perform due diligence. It has also certainly made companies far less likely to publicly commit to divesting from Xinjiang-linked supply chains and to increase the transparency of their due diligence efforts.

Third, Xinjiang's recent shift from highly mobilizational to more institutionalized and monitored forms of managing labor placements has further reduced the availability of on-the-ground propaganda and state media reports. This shifting evidence situation has made research far more challenging, if not impossible. At the same time, in-person supply chain auditing in Xinjiang is not feasible, as the ever-expanding surveillance state severely punishes those who speak out. Such auditing has also become much more challenging in China in general ([Wall Street Journal](#), September 21, 2020; [Axios](#), June 23, 2021).

All three of these trends and developments point toward the same policy implication: rather than placing the responsibility for countering coercive labor linked to Xinjiang on individual companies, governments need to create a rebuttable presumption that any products originating from Xinjiang, especially those made with lower-skilled, labor-intensive manufacturing (or related agricultural harvesting and processing), are tainted with coercive labor.

On April 20, 2022, China formally ratified the International Labor Organization's (ILO) Forced Labor Convention and Abolition of Forced Labor Convention from 1930 and 1957 ([Bloomberg](#), April 20). The 1957 convention explicitly forbids "mobilising and using labour for...economic development" and "as a means of racial...or religious discrimination" (ILO, 1957). As China's own foreign ministry has stated that "[t]here is no 'forced labor' in Xinjiang, only voluntary employment and free choice in the labor market," Beijing clearly has no intention of abandoning its crucial political goals in the region that are directly dependent on the continuation of coercive labor schemes ([PRC Foreign Ministry](#), May 19, 2021).

While Xinjiang's labor transfers directly violate these prohibitions, the region's consolidation of its coercive labor mechanisms during 2016 to 2020, together with a focus on monitoring and surveillance, will make it easier to pretend that ILO standards are met. Put differently, Beijing's ratification of these conventions is likely a calculated strategy to allay criticism. Actual policies in Xinjiang indicate that intrusive and coercive labor placement and retention mechanisms are being intensified rather than dismantled.

The extent of state-sponsored forced labor in Xinjiang requires a comprehensive political response. The rebuttable presumption defined in the Uyghur Forced Labor Prevention Act (UFLPA) enacted by the United States, which stipulates that all goods produced in Xinjiang are potentially tainted by forced labor unless proven otherwise, is one of the only effective solutions to the region's coercive labor problem. As a compromise, governments could limit the rebuttable presumption to products made with low-skilled, labor-intensive manufacturing, especially in sectors such as cotton, textile and garment production, the processing of tomatoes, of polysilicon, and related fields. However, Xinjiang's pursuit of "high-quality development"

and intensified vocational training means that sectors requiring higher skills levels will in the future increasingly be at risk of coercive labor as well.

Notes

[1] See also Laura T. Murphy and Nyrola Elimä, “In Broad Daylight: Uyghur Forced Labour and Global Solar Supply Chains.” Sheffield, UK: Sheffield Hallam University Helena Kennedy Centre for International Justice,” May 2021, <https://www.shu.ac.uk/helena-kennedy-centre-international-justice/research-and-projects/all-projects/in-broad-daylight>; Ana Swanson and Chris Buckley, “Chinese Solar Companies Tied to Use of Forced Labor,” *New York Times*, January 28, 2021, <https://www.nytimes.com/2021/01/08/business/economy/china-solar-companies-forced-labor-xinjiang.html>; “China’s ‘tainted’ cotton”, BBC, December 14, 2020, <https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/extra/nz0g306v8c/china-tainted-cotton>.

On coercive transfers of Uyghurs to other provinces, see Vicky Xiuzhong Xu, et al, “Uyghurs for Sale,” Australian Strategic Policy Institute, March 1, 2020, <https://www.aspi.org.au/report/uyghurs-sale>. On the ongoing use of forced labor in the processing of cotton, see “Laundering Cotton: Laundering Cotton: How Xinjiang Cotton is Obscured in International Supply Chains,” Sheffield Hallam University, April 4, 2022, <https://www.shu.ac.uk/helena-kennedy-centre-international-justice/research-and-projects/all-projects/laundered-cotton>

[2] Quotes in sections from- Adrian Zenz, “The Xinjiang Papers: An Introduction” The Uyghur Tribunal, November 27, 2021, p. 20, 39, 40; document no.2, p.65

[3] This system is also being implemented in other regions in China through Targeted Poverty Alleviation (精准扶贫, *jingzhun fupin*). However, implementation in these regions is typically not conducted with the same intensity and level of coercion compared to Xinjiang.

[4] Although transfers are measured in “person-times” (人次, *ren ci*), one person may be transferred more than once in a given year, there are no indications that the ratio of persons to transfers has substantially changed. In fact, institutionalization of stable employment through such transfers would indicate a reduction in the frequency of annual transfers for some people (typically for seasonal work). This means that it is safe to assume a net increase of approximately 300,000 persons in the labor transfer system between 2019 and 2021.

7.7 Complicity of U.S. Companies in Human Rights Violations, Surveillance, Forced Labor and Military Modernization in the People’s Republic of China

This text is adapted from “Corporate Complicity Scorecard”, published by the Victims of Communism Memorial Foundation. <https://victimsofcommunism.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/02/Corporate-Complicity-Scorecard-2.3.22.pdf>.

The US private sector increasingly finds itself at the heart of US-China geopolitical tension. In their endeavor to capture Chinese markets and boost their bottom lines, American corporations have increasingly supported Beijing’s military modernization, surveillance state, domestic securitization, and attendant human rights violations. As a result of this growing dependency, some corporations engage in political lobbying in the US in ways that ultimately serves Beijing’s interests while potentially undermining the values and principles that undergird the western democratic order.

Until now, scrutiny of US industrial actors' complicity with problematic actions of the Chinese state has been scattered and ad hoc, without comprehensive or comparative assessments across players. This report fills this important gap: it presents broad-ranging assessments of the nature of American corporations' involvement in China, and then grades them based on a transparent and replicable new methodology.

This research does not assume that doing business in China is inherently wrong. However, support for Beijing's military modernization, surveillance state, and human rights violations may contradict professed corporate ethics, mislead consumers, and risk violating relevant laws in the US and elsewhere. Many US companies began their relationships with China well before China revealed itself as an aggressive international player. Companies which do substantial business with China need to reassess their role—not just the benefit they receive, but the degree to which they could be said to facilitate China's abusive domestic and international policies.

Based on both existing and new research findings, the report seeks to systematically put together all the pieces of a company's involvement in China and assigns each a grade from A to F. Each company profile represents an examination that is much more comprehensive than what has been published to-date and turns the findings into a grade that allows readers to compare how they perform.

The authors reviewed eight well-known firms—Amazon, Apple, Dell, Facebook, GE, Google, Intel, and Microsoft—for potentially problematic linkages that may directly or indirectly support China's state surveillance, military modernization, and human rights violations. Hundreds of primary and secondary sources were fed into 12 indicator categories related to operations and partnerships, leading to a final grade. While the development of such a transparent rating methodology is the key innovation of this report, it also features a substantial number of previously unreported facts.

The research findings are wide-ranging and invite further scrutiny of how US companies' engagement with China relate to US-sanctioned Chinese entities such as the Xinjiang Construction and Production Corps as well as US laws such as the US Trafficking Victims Protection Act. Overall, this project aims to inspire the development of new best practices for US industry. Rather than merely condemning the US private sector, the report develops a grading scorecard system in order to incentivize corporations to equally promote freedoms and rights everywhere.

Dell operates an artificial intelligence and computing architectures laboratory in partnership with the state-run Chinese Academy of Sciences Institute of Automation (CASIA), which specializes in developing surveillance technologies for the Chinese government and that could potentially be used to oppress Uyghurs in Xinjiang. CASIA also has ties to the Chinese surveillance state's operations in Xinjiang. As early as 2007, a delegation from the Institute visited the Xinjiang Institute of Physics and Chemistry to discuss cooperation in "Xinjiang minority speech and language processing technology.

Facebook is actively used to spread CCP disinformation related to Xinjiang. In March 2021, China's state-owned Xinhua News Agency purchased, for under 100 USD, an ad on Facebook featuring a video of the mayor of Urumqi, the capital city of Xinjiang. In the video, the mayor declared that the "peace and stability that people from all ethnic groups in Xinjiang once longed for has become a reality." He also described a "plot" on the part of Western countries to smear China's reputation by fabricating stories of genocide. That advertisement was seen some 200,000 times in two days. Last year, a Facebook ad purchased by state-owned CCTV featuring students in a Xinjiang boarding school describing themselves as well-fed and taken care of was shown over a million times in four days. These are not isolated cases: In 2020, the Chinese government's messaging on Facebook about its treatment of ethnic minorities in Xinjiang hit a new high. Facebook makes some 5 billion USD annually from advertisements sold in China.

Intel’s technology is used by Xinjiang’s public security authorities. In 2019, the Wall Street Journal found that Intel technology was being used in surveillance systems in Xinjiang, and that Intel had invested in and provided technologies to a company embedded in Xinjiang and supported by the Chinese Ministry of Public Security. A 2020 investigation by The New York Times found that the Urumqi Cloud Computing Center—a hub through which the Chinese government monitors “countless people in Xinjiang”—runs on chips manufactured by Intel and Nvidia. And in December 2020, the chairs of the Congressional-Executive Commission on China sent a letter to Intel’s CEO seeking information on the company’s involvement in Xinjiang surveillance. Despite this public attention, Intel technology appears to still be used in Xinjiang surveillance applications. For example, the Chinese Ministry of Commerce website notes that the “Border intelligent control system of the Xinjiang Entry-Exit border inspection station” relies on Intel CPUs. A 2020 procurement post from the Public Security Bureau of Shaya County, Xinjiang reports the purchase of Intel hard disks. A similar 2021 report from the Public Security Bureau of Changji Hui Autonomous Prefecture in Xinjiang reports the purchase of Intel servers.

In 2012, Intel partnered with the Chinese Academy of Sciences Institute of Automation (CASIA) in jointly establishing the “China-Intel Internet of Things Technology Research Institute” to focus on intelligent perception, trans- mission technology, and big data processing technology. As stated above, CASIA is implicated in Xinjiang's surveillance state.

The results of the report are presented below, please refer to the full report⁷³ for further details:

Company Grades

Amazon	Apple	Dell	Facebook	GE	Google	Intel	Microsoft
D	D	F	B	F	B	F	F

Four of the companies failed at least one of the five binary “auto-fail” tests concerning their ties to China, resulting in four F grades.

Binary Auto-Fail Tests (red indicates activities that prompted auto-fail grades)

Indicator	Amazon	Apple	Dell	Facebook	GE	Google	Intel	Microsoft
Operations in Xinjiang								
Direct Indicators of Forced Labor								
Direct Support to Military or State Security								
Active Support to Designated Surveillance/ Threat Actors								
Lobbying on China-specific Human Rights Legislation								

⁷³ Full report: <https://victimsofcommunism.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/02/Corporate-Complicity-Scorecard-2.3.22.pdf>.

Company Final Grades

	Amazon	Apple	Dell	Facebook	GE	Google	Intel	Microsoft
Binary Tests	PASS	PASS	FAIL	PASS	FAIL	PASS	FAIL	FAIL
Operations	D	C	F	B	D	B	F	F
Partnerships	D	D	D	B	F	B	F	D
Overall Grade	D	D	F	B	F	B	F	F

A breakdown of the scoring input indicators is detailed in the charts that follow.

Legend	
Red	negative score (-0.33)
Yellow	neutral score (0.00)
Green	positive score (0.33)

8.0 Internal Government Documents from Xinjiang: An Overview

This section is adapted from Zenz, A. (2022a) Xinjiang Police Files. The Journal of the European Association for Chinese Studies. 3 (2022), 1-56. <https://doi.org/10.25365/JEACS.2022.3.ZENZ>.

Between 2019 and 2021, several internal documents from Xinjiang were obtained and published by researchers and media outlets. Table 1 shows related publications in chronological order (this table includes only publishing initiatives that specifically pertained to internal government or other semi-public documents containing at least some information that is considered internal to the state).

Date of first publication	Title	Contents	Source of data	Published by
November 2019	Xinjiang Papers (partial disclosure)	Over 11 classified and top-secret speeches and documents from the central government and the XUAR. The Times only published a brief summary of some of the documents.	Anonymous source in Xinjiang via anonymous intermediaries.	New York Times (Ramzy and Buckley 2019)
November 2019	China Cables	Classified policy document regarding the operations and security of VSETCs in Xinjiang, as well as four shorter bulletins.	Anonymous source in Xinjiang, via exile Uyghur Asiye Abdulaheb.	ICIJ (2019) / Adrian Zenz (2019b)
November 2019	Xinjiang QQ Files	A set of ca. 25,000 internal files from local government work groups in several counties in Xinjiang, including spreadsheets of persons with their internment status.	Obtained by Adrian Zenz via local social networks in Xinjiang (w/o hacking)	Zenz (2019a, 2019b); many victims were entered into the Xinjiang Victims Database
February 2020	Karakax List	Internal spreadsheet from Karakax County detailing the internment of 311 persons (with reasons for their internment and the incremental reasoning behind their release).	Anonymous source in Xinjiang, via exile Uyghur Asiye Abdulaheb.	Zenz (2020a) / multiple media outlets
January 2021	Urumqi Police Database	Internal database of the Urumqi City PSB and the XUAR PSB (ca. 250 million data entries).	Obtained by anonymous source from within Xinjiang police networks in 2019 (unclear if leaked or hacked)	The Intercept (Grauer 2021)
March 2021	Nankai Report	Public research report by a group of academics from Nankai University on	Nankai University publication, first	Zenz (2021a) / BBC

		labour transfers of Uyghurs to other parts of China, with a discussion of related security measures.	identified by Asiye Abdulaheb, archived by Adrian Zenz	(Sudworth 2021)
November 2021	Xinjiang Papers (full disclosure of 11 files)	11 classified and top-secret speeches and policy documents from central government and XUAR related to Beijing's policies in the region.	Anonymous source in Xinjiang via intermediaries, provided to the Uyghur Tribunal.	Zenz (2021c, 2021d) via Uyghur Tribunal (publication of the full transcripts)
April 2022	Xinjiang Police Files	Thousands of internal files from internal PSB networks in Konasheher and Tekes Counties, including speeches by officials, instructions for re-education camp police, and images of detained persons.	Obtained by anonymous individual through hacking.	Zenz (this publication)

Table 1. Chronology of the publication of internal XUAR state documents.

Each of the previous leaks provided a limited but highly targeted amount of new information that shed important new light on the nature of this atrocity. Moreover, they did so at different administrative levels, with the Xinjiang Papers representing the highest level (central government), and the Urumqi Police Database and the Xinjiang QQ Files the lowest. Conceptually-speaking, one can classify the material into four administrative levels⁷⁴:

1. Central government level
2. XUAR regional autonomous (provincial) level
3. Prefectural or county-level policy directives
4. Local policy implementation (in townships, villages, work units) as evident from specific work reports or spreadsheets

At the highest administrative level, the Xinjiang Papers were unique in that they gave insights into the thinking of General Secretary Xi Jinping on the situation in Xinjiang, as well as featuring the order of XUAR leaders to “round up all who should be rounded up” *ying shou jin shou* 应收尽收 (Zenz 2021c, table 6 on page 23). When published in full in December 2021, the Papers provided the academic community with an insider view of the top-level policy design dynamics *dingceng sheji* 顶层设计⁷⁵ of XUAR policymaking: nearly all major policy initiatives that evolved in the region since 2016 were either directly mandated or at least clearly encouraged by the central leadership (Zenz 2021c). As noted by Tobin, the Papers complement an understanding of the oppressions in the XUAR that had until then been predominantly framed through the lens of regional-level policy implementation. Here, the Papers provided specific insights into the discourses that explicate the genesis and evolution of these policies (Tobin 2021).

At a lower but still XUAR-wide conceptual level, the China Cables, especially their main document (a classified state telegram), furnished the first strong proof that, internally, the Chinese state viewed the re-education “centres” as highly securitised facilities that had to be run like prisons (Zenz 2019b; Autonomous Region Party Political and Legal Affairs Commission 2017b). Previously, information about the security features of these “centres” had been obtained from government websites, procurement bid documents, or satellite images. Reading about camp security procedures from an official and stamped

⁷⁴ This categorisation reflects a simplified version of Chinese administrative levels, which include the central government, provinces and autonomous regions, prefectures and prefecture-level cities, counties / county-level cities / urban districts, townships / towns / urban subdistricts, and villages / urban neighborhoods (compare Heilmann 2017, 73, 86, 100). This simplification was performed by the author based on the nature of the available internal government material and related bureaucratic processes.

⁷⁵ Top-level design constitutes a more centralised and streamlined policymaking approach, introduced by Xi in 2013 (Alpermann and Schubert 2019, 200).

internal document signed by Xinjiang’s second most powerful official at the time, the former Deputy Party Secretary and former Secretary of the Political and Legal Affairs Commission Zhu Hailun, gave that leak a special quality and unique authority. Also, the fact that this was a XUAR-wide directive that mandated an improved “establishment of Vocational Skills Education and Training Service Bureaus at the prefecture and county levels” furnished important support for estimating the scale and scope of the re-education campaign (Autonomous Region Party Political and Legal Affairs Commission 2017b, 8; Zenz 2019b, Section 6).

At the time, this was complemented by evidence derived from a large leak of internal documents that the author obtained in the second half of 2019 through social media networks used by local government units that were operated through Tencent’s QQ app (Zenz 2019b). This cache, now for the first time dubbed by the author as the “Xinjiang QQ Files”, consists of over a dozen sets of internal local (township) government files. In October 2019, months after the author first used these files in a research paper on parent-child separation (Zenz 2019a), XUAR authorities mandated a thorough clean-up of local data, including the shifting of file sets to secured databases and offline IT systems, with a special focus on removing evidence listing people’s “detention status” (Associated Press 2019). Among the Xinjiang QQ Files were internal government spreadsheets predominantly from Yarkand County (Kashgar Prefecture) that contained lists of detained persons by household. From this material, the author was able to calculate internment shares for entire populations, assessing that most of those sent to internment facilities were heads of households, their sons, or other male figures (Zenz 2019b, Section 9.2.2). The average ages of those in re-education were much higher than those claimed by the Chinese state, with the oldest person being 77 years old. This is corroborated by the Xinjiang Police Files. By February 2022, internment data from the Xinjiang QQ Files made up nearly half (7,972 of 17,237) of all victims listed in the Xinjiang Victims Database who were interned under Chen Quanguo (Xinjiang Victims Database 2022).⁷⁶

In terms of policy evidence, the China Cables were quite narrow in scope. Focused on specific aspects of VSETC management, they did not explain who exactly was to be detained and for what presumed reason, nor answer many other questions surrounding the campaign. Some of these knowledge gaps were filled by the Karakax List, which represented an entirely different type of document. Rather than coming with official formatting, dates, authorship, or stamps, it is an unmarked, undated, and unsigned spreadsheet saved as a simple PDF document (Zenz 2020a). However, the lack of formatting was compensated by the List’s detailed contents. Outlining the fate of 311 detained persons, the unique feature of the Karakax List were the conceptual associations embedded in it: each data row shows a person with the reasons for their internment and an appraisal of their family situation and the reasoning behind whether they could be released or not. Notably, it showed that many Uyghurs had merely been detained because they were classified as “untrustworthy persons” 不放心人员, and that the primary reason for their detention were violations of birth control policies.

The Urumqi Police Database files provided an insider view into real-time police surveillance operations through data recorded at police checkpoints and from records created at police meetings (Grauer 2021). It helped us to understand how the authorities flag “suspicious” persons and utilise extensive digital monitoring to create links between diverse pieces of gathered data, including financial transactions, physical movement, biometric data, phone call records, and social media behaviour. This dynamic data flow is then fed into regular local police reports. Both this database and the Xinjiang QQ Files provide detailed insights into local records that are created in the process of implementing security-related policies. The Urumqi Police Database focused substantially on data that is dynamically created in the process of surveillance, which may generate so-called push notifications in the Integrated Joint Operations Platform (IJOP) 一体化推送 that require authorities to investigate or detain persons (Human

⁷⁶ After exporting the dataset with the filter option “exclude pre-Chen Quanguo victims”, each data row that contained the keyword ‘Zenz’ in the column ‘About the testifier’ was counted as a match.

Rights Watch 2019). The Xinjiang QQ Files contain predominantly static data that at times show the outcome of this surveillance, such as internment status and prison sentences.

Not all pivotal documentary evidence has been internal or classified. While the Nankai Report was originally in the public domain (although it has since been removed and effectively become an internal document), it carried a unique authority by virtue of having been published by a well-known academic institution. It provided timely new insight into securitised labour transfers, notably transfers of Uyghurs to other provinces. The Nankai Report also contained unique admissions by these academics, one of them a dean and former deputy Secretary-General of the Tianjin municipal government, on the nature of the internment campaign: that the “education and training centres” (VSETCs) were a “drastic short-term measure” that was “absolutely necessary and effective” (Zenz 2021a, 14).

The Xinjiang Police Files span a wide range of internal documents across different administrative levels. They include statements by XUAR leaders such as Chen Quanguo and other officials that are exceptionally unrestrained in nature. This is likely because they are oral speech transcripts and not formally-published speeches or policy documents. Even when confidential and internal, the more formal types of documents simply do not feature the unfiltered, raw bouts of personal opinion and emotive overtones that are contained in these transcripts. The Xinjiang Papers, while containing several fairly direct statements by Xi Jinping and XUAR officials, have not revealed some of the “smoking gun” admissions that would conclusively and authoritatively answer some of our remaining questions regarding Beijing’s unprecedented re-education drive in the region. This is where the Xinjiang Police Files fill an important gap. The speech transcripts are titled “transcription from recording” 根据录音整理 (compare for example Liu 2015). While they lack official formatting – they are just plain Word documents with a simple header – their content is unprecedented in terms of the insight given into these leaders’ actual personal thinking. To date, documents of this type from Xinjiang have never been published in the public domain.

Besides XUAR-level documents such as leaders’ speeches, the Xinjiang Police Files include mostly security-related documents at all lower administrative levels. These include announcements *tongzhi* 通知, often transmitted in the form of state telegrams or cables, *fadian* 发电; work demands *gongzuo yaoqiu* 工作要求 related to a specific work aspect; work plans *gongzuo fang’an* 工作方案; implementation plans *shishi fang’an* 实施方案; briefings *qingkuang tongbao* 情况通报; and specific products of policy implementation such as work reports *gongzuo baogao* 工作报告 and spreadsheets. In tandem, they span across the entire policy cycle, covering measures that are to be implemented, are being implemented, or have been implemented and are being reported or evaluated. Chen’s two speech transcripts in particular are unique in that they provide us not only with unusually frank policy implementation directives, but also with some of the thought processes and attitudes behind these policies.

9.0 Policy Recommendations

Sanction the Chinese officials implicated by the Xinjiang Police Files at the highest levels.

The speeches uncovered in these files contain constant references to General Secretary Xi himself, including his close interest and guiding role in the governance of Xinjiang.

No central government officials have yet been sanctioned for their implication in the internment of Uyghurs. Section 6.4 contains a list of central government officials implicated in the planning, execution and support of the atrocities that are recommended to be sanctioned.

Press China to end its atrocities against the Uyghurs.

Having publicly declared that China is committing genocide and crimes against humanity, the United States and like-minded governments must be at the center of the effort to publicly demand for the Chinese government to immediately halt the commission of mass atrocity crimes against Uyghurs in Xinjiang by (US Holocaust Museum, 2021):

- Halting arbitrary detention and releasing all those who are being held arbitrarily or without due process
- Ending forced sterilization, forced birth control, and forced abortion
- Stopping the forcible transfer of Uyghur children from their families
- Ending the use of forced labor in Xinjiang and elsewhere in China
- Halting actions that infringe on the rights of Uyghurs to live freely in accordance with their customs, culture, and religious practice
- Granting full, unimpeded access to independent monitors including journalists and representatives of international investigative bodies, including those mandated to collect, preserve, and store information regarding international crimes, including crimes against humanity and genocide.

In addition, to fulfil its treaty obligation to prevent genocide once determined, the U.S. government should develop and publish a related strategy.

The UFLPA Entity List must be expanded and enforced more aggressively.

Studies from organizations including the Victims of Communism Memorial Foundation, the Australian Strategic Policy Institute, and the UK's Sheffield Hallam University have identified scores of Chinese companies suspected of ties to forced labor that have not been included on the UFLPA Entity List to date. For a start, all XPCC affiliates and subsidiaries—of which there are nearly 3,000 identified (Bukharin 2021)—must be included on the Entity List. The UFLPA required the FLETF to make a comprehensive list, and yet there are only 20 companies on the list to date, and all of the entities on the list are derived from WROs or Commerce Department actions dating from June 2021 or earlier.

If CBP requires additional funding to more rigorously enforce the UFLPA, and to make a comprehensive list of all companies complicit in forced labor, Congress should designate additional resources to CBP targeted specifically to a full-scale enforcement effort.

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Import Additional Sources and Publications

NOTE: Important further evidence can be found in the Full Judgement published by the U.K. Uyghur Tribunal (https://uyghurtribunal.com/wp-content/uploads/2023/03/UT_Judgment_E-PDF_activelinks_20Feb2023_FINAL.pdf), on the website of the Xinjiang Documentation Project (<https://xinjiang.sppga.ubc.ca/>), on the site of the Xinjiang Data Project (<https://xjdp.aspi.org.au/>), and on the site of the Xinjiang Police Files: www.xinjiangpolicefiles.org.

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