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Moolenaar: Congress Must Be Vigilant Against Chinese Espionage Targeting Members and Staff

May 11, 2026

This weekend, The New York Times reported on a Chinese espionage effort that targeted the staff of the Select Committee on China.

“The Chinese government actively targets Congress and congressional staff as part of a broader influence and intelligence collection effort, frequently using benign-appearing inquiries to get sensitive information related to U.S. defense, supply chains, and economic strategy. The Select Committee is a high-priority target due to its investigative and policy work, but so are all other Congressional members and staff. Vigilance is essential and everyone who works for Congress must remain alert to suspicious outreach,” said Select Committee Chairman John Moolenaar in a statement provided to the paper.

The full NYT article is available here.

He Offered a Lawmaker’s Aide Quick Cash. Was He Spying for China?

By Dustin Volz

The New York Times

May 9, 2026

When a man identifying himself as Chris Chen reached out this winter to an aide on a House committee focused on threats from China, he came armed with a lucrative offer.

The staff member, Mr. Chen proposed, could earn $10,000 or more by barely lifting a finger. All he would need to do is agree to phone calls every other week to share information about the committee’s work and U.S. foreign policy about China.

Insights into U.S. trade or national-security issues, including the Trump administration’s plans for Venezuela in the aftermath of the January military operation there, would be especially valuable, Mr. Chen said. To sweeten the pot, Mr. Chen repeatedly promised to send the aide $2,000 up front.

The offer seemed too good to be true. Instead of quietly accepting the deal, the aide, whose identity The New York Times agreed to withhold because he works on sensitive policy issues related to China, reported it to his bosses on the House Select Committee on the Chinese Communist Party. The panel quickly concluded Mr. Chen was not the Singapore-based business consultant he claimed to be, but instead likely a Chinese intelligence officer or contractor seeking a new recruit.

The outreach by Mr. Chen to an aide on the very committee responsible for investigating Chinese national-security threats appears to provide an unusually vivid portrait of how Beijing’s spy services seek to gain access to sensitive information from within the corridors of power in Washington.

After notifying his colleagues on the committee, the congressional aide responded and conveyed an interest in expanding his “advisory work outside my primary duties.” From then on, Mr. Chen appeared hooked. In follow-up emails and on phone calls, he expressed a willingness to be flexible with the work arrangement while making clear he was eager to start paying.

“I can pay you $2,000 — $2,000 advance payment,” Mr. Chen said during a call in January. “As soon as possible in the next few days, just to make sure our operation is getting started.”

Mr. Chen at times seemed most curious to learn what those close to power in the United States thought about China’s stated intentions, such as a commitment to purchase U.S. soybeans or whether China would relax control over rare-earth minerals. “So if China turns the controls back next year, do you guys have a plan B?” he asked.

The committee has been targeted by Chinese intelligence operations before. Last year, the panel disclosed that an apparent impostor was posing as its Republican chairman, Representative John Moolenaar of Michigan, and sending emails to government agencies and other institutions seeking information about potential sanctions against Beijing. Cybersecurity investigators linked the emails to a hacking group with ties to the Ministry of State Security, a central spy agency for China.